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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the problems of coordination and adaptation in integrated relief 
operations responding to complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE). It is an exploratory case 
study of the relief operation in Southern Sudan where a CHE has been ongoing since the mid-
1980s. The study spans the 20 year-period from 1989 to 2009 with a focus on three points in 
time - 1989, 1998 and 2009 - when violence and acute food shortage threatened the lives of 
thousands of people. The study draws on the literature on CHE and coordination during relief 
operations while its theoretical framework is based on the literature on Organization Theory, 
Interorganizational Coordination Theory, Complex Adaptive Systems Theory, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework, Lewin’s Force Field Theory and the Science of 
Networks. The study applies the theoretical framework and uses both descriptive analysis and 
social network analysis to study the relief operation within its dynamic environment. The 
descriptive analysis explains the background to the relief operation and enables me to account for 
the constellation of especial circumstances that led to the emergence of the operation at that 
specific time. The network analysis enables me to map the structure of the operation and the 
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relationships among the actors and to understand how coordination takes place. Studying the 
relief operation at three points in time allows me to understand how the process of adaptation 
took place and how the operation evolved in response to the changes in its environment.  
The findings of the study reveal that the structure of the operation is a horizontal 
hierarchy characterized by interdependency and strong local connections between the actors 
which enable them to join their efforts when needed but also to have the ability to act 
independently. They also reveal that the environment in which a relief operation takes place have 
a strong impact on the operation while the operation itself impacts that environment. Over the 
period of 20 years, the structure of the relief operation changed little but its members changed 
and its scope and focus has also changed in response to changes in its environment.  
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1.0  RESEARCH PROBLEM AND CONTEXT 
Protracted intra-state conflicts are a defining feature of the post-Cold War world.  Many 
of these conflicts, coupled with poverty, underdevelopment and acts of nature such as droughts 
and floods, escalated to what came to be known as complex emergencies - also complex political 
emergencies and complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE). They are caused by the interplay of 
multiple factors – social, economic, natural and above all political – and result in human 
suffering and deprivation, not only for those involved directly in the conflict but also for civilians 
not directly associated with the conflict. In many CHE, the state is part of the conflict, and in 
some of them the state has failed and armed groups and militias took over power. 
CHE are extreme situations disrupting the societies in which they occur and causing a 
myriad of problems, making it beyond the ability of individual states to respond to them. This led 
to the involvement of the international community represented by neighboring states, donor 
countries, UN organizations, the Red Cross Movement and NGOs which join their efforts to 
provide relief and assistance to the populations affected by these emergencies. Since the response 
to a CHE is a collective one that brings many agencies and organizations to work together, the 
questions of how the agencies involved interact and what forms of multiorganizational 
structures, whether formal or informal, emerge to coordinate their efforts become very pertinent. 
The fact that these agencies and organizations have different mandates and agendas, come in 
 2 
different sizes and capacities, some are governmental while others are non-governmental makes 
the orchestration of the response a very complex undertaking.   
Moreover, many CHEs are very protracted – they take a long time to build up and stay as 
CHEs long after the specific event to which there has been an international response is over. This 
has been the case with some of the long-term civil conflicts and intra-state wars such as Sri-
Lanka, Congo, Somalia and Southern Sudan. This raises the question of how flexible and 
adaptable is a CHE response system (or a relief operation) to the changing conditions of the 
emergency and how the multiorganizational structures responding to CHE evolve over time. 
Relief operations take place in unsafe, unstable and unpredictable environments. The fluid nature 
of a protracted CHE and the continuously changing conditions on the ground require that the 
response system as a whole be flexible and adaptable. For that to happen, the members of the 
system have to be continuously interacting with each other and with their environment. Studying 
the relationships and interactions between relief organizations and the other actors, such as the 
military and political authorities, involved in a CHE response at different points in time will shed 
light on the adaptability of the system. Considering the multiplicity and diversity of actors 
responding to a CHE, the complexity and, in many cases, the long duration of these crisis 
situations, the research seeks to understand the structure of relief operations and address the 
problems of coordination and adaptation in integrated relief operations responding to CHEs.  The 
focus of the research will be on the specific relief operation that has been taking place in 
Southern Sudan.  
The following section provides an overview of complex emergencies, their origins, how 
they are defined and why they are a significant problem. Section two will give an account of 
humanitarian action in response to complex emergencies and discusses the issue of coordination. 
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Section three presents the research questions and section four presents the significance of the 
study.  
1.1 COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES 
1.1.1 Intrastate Wars 
Wars and violent conflicts between groups and nations have been a permanent feature of human 
societies, but the last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented increase 
in intra-state wars in Africa, Asia and Europe. A number of studies, conducted during the early 
1990s and cited by Sarkees, Wayman and Singer (2003, p. 53), show that the period from the end 
of the Second World War to the 1990s had witnessed a doubling of ‘ethno-political conflicts’ 
(Gurr, 1994). During the five years between 1989 and 1993, 90 armed conflicts took place and 
involved more than one third of the countries in the world (Wallensteen and Axell, 1994). 
The characteristic feature of these armed conflicts is that they are primarily ‘civil’, i.e. 
fought between different groups belonging to the same multi-ethnic state or as Ake (1997) 
described them, the conflicts are ‘state-centred’ and are associated with the use of state power 
(p.1). Emphasizing the increasing number of intra-state wars as compared to inter-state wars, 
Yilmaz (2007) mentions that  “… from May 1988, when the Cold War was coming to its end, to 
the present day, there have been 47 conflicts in which the United Nations (UN) intervened and 
only three of them were inter-state in character” (P. 12). This unprecedented increase in intra-
state (or civil) wars, at the time of the end of the Cold War and amidst the hopes that the world 
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will be more peaceful, has prompted many political scientists and war and peace researchers to 
study the reasons behind increasing violent conflicts in the world. 
Although the end of rivalry between the USA and the ex-USSR was thought to lead to a 
more peaceful world, the loss of the containment of the Cold War is mentioned as one of the 
factors behind the increase in violent conflicts in the world (Sarkees, Wayman and Singer, 2003; 
Sunderland et al., 2008; Yilmaz, 2007; Ake, 1997).  The influence that was exercised by the two 
superpowers on their allies decreased and “… an environment was created in which civil wars 
and other less organized forms of domestic violence could flourish….” (Soderlund,Briggs, 
Hilderbrandt, 2008, p. 1).  Donini (1996) calls the situation after the end of the Cold War, the 
‘lifting of inhibitions”, the inhibition to wage war and the inhibition to intervene by the 
international community in sovereign states through the provision of humanitarian aid (p. 7). 
Other factors behind the increase in intra-state wars are rivalry between different ethnic 
groups, identity claims, lack of political representation and increase in power and status by some 
groups at the expense of others, perceptions of marginalization by minorities, poverty and 
struggle over resources and national wealth and the desire for self-determination by some groups 
(Ake, 1997; Albala-Bertrand, 2000; Yilmaz, 2007).   
1.1.2 From Intra-state wars to CHE 
One of the characteristics of intra-state wars is that they impact a large number of non-
combatants as compared to inter-state wars. They lead to death in numbers counted in hundreds 
of thousands and to suffering among large segments of the civilian population, whose means of 
livelihoods are usually destroyed or severely compromised as a result of the conflict. This leads 
to internal displacement and movement of affected populations across borders. Coupled with 
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poverty which is already widespread in many of the conflict countries, the wars escalated to 
complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE). Reflecting the increasing number of emergencies and 
their significance, at the end of the 1990s the United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) initiated a project on “the Wave of 
Emergencies of the Last Decade”  to study the causes, extent, predictability and responses to 
these emergencies (Ake, 1997). 
Although the use of the term CHEs among scholars and practitioners is relatively new, 
many scholars consider that there is nothing new about the concept itself as crises caused by 
violent conflicts and societal strife have always been there.  As Albala-Bertrand (2000c) states, 
“the unprecedented fact is precisely the sheer numbers of current major emergencies and their 
long lasting persistence” (p. 6).  Capturing the same fact that CHE are not a new phenomenon, 
Ake (1997) mentions that “humanitarian emergencies are not specific to the contemporary world. 
They have occurred with uncanny inevitability in every historical epoch. However in this era, 
they have acquired a singular significance by their incidence, spread and intensity. And also by 
their poignancy in a post-cold war world which was reasonably expected to be less violent” (p. 
1).  
According to the United Nations, countries face complex emergencies when they 
confront “armed conflicts affecting large civilian populations through direct violence, forced 
displacement and food scarcity, resulting in malnutrition, high morbidity and mortality” 
(Reliefweb, 2001).  Based on these four elements – namely war, disease, hunger and 
displacement, Vayrynen (2000) developed a typology of CHE which includes ‘strong’ cases of 
complex emergencies, ‘limited’ cases and cases of partial violent crises where only two of the 
four elements are present (p. 74-75). Table 1-1 shows Vayrynen’s typology of CHE in the 1990s. 
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Table 1-1: A Typology of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies in the 1990s 
 War Disease Hunger Displacement Type 
Afghanistan X X X X Strong 
Mozambique X X X X Strong 
Angola X X X X Strong 
Somalia X X X X Strong 
Rwanda X X X X Strong 
Liberia X X  X Limited 
Burundi X X  X Limited 
Sri Lanka X X  X Limited 
Sierra Leona X X  X Limited 
Sudan  X  X X Limited 
Ethiopia  X X X Limited 
Eritrea  X X X Limited 
Burma  X X X Limited 
Source: Vayrynen, R. (2000, p. 74 -75)  
CHE are a significant global problem not only because of their frequency, spread and 
intensity, but also because of the magnitude of preventable loss of life and the devastating impact 
they have on whole societies and on the different aspects of life of the population.  This is why 
CHE are defined in terms of their causes as well as their impact and the type of response they 
receive. The next section discusses the definitions of CHE which shed lights on what they are.  
1.1.3 What is a CHE 
The different definitions of a CHE are closely related and all revolve around three main aspects 
of the emergency - namely its causes, impact and response. Definitions vary based on which of 
the three aspects of the emergency are highlighted.   
It is agreed among many scholars that the term CHE was first introduced in the late 1980s 
(Barrow & Jennings, 2001; Donini, 1996; Duffield, 1994). According to Donini (1996), the term 
seems to have been first used in Mozambique during the end of the 1980s to reflect the 
uncommon notion at the time that the UN had to negotiate with both the government, which is its 
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natural counterpart, and simultaneously with the opposition movement/forces to be able to 
provide assistance to the affected populations.  This negotiated assistance falls outside the UN 
standard agreement with the country by which the UN specialized agencies provide assistance, 
each within its mandate and area of specialization. According to Calhoun (2008) “whether or not 
this was the precise origin of the term ‘complex humanitarian emergency,’ it points to a core 
theme: the idea that some emergencies have multiple causes, involve multiple actors, and compel 
an international response” (p. 84) beyond the assistance that is usually provided by the UN and 
other actors to developing countries under normal conditions. 
The term CHEs is used interchangeably with the terms complex emergencies and 
complex political emergencies to describe crises induced by violent political conflict, but as 
Albala-Bertrand (2000c) mentions, the term “… is not a well-defined concept, but most authors 
somehow agree on its fundamental components” (p. 3). Along the same lines, Goodhand & 
Hulme (1999) state that “the term complex political emergency (CPE) is not an analytical tool, 
but a descriptive category which provided a shorthand expression for many, often dissimilar, 
conflicts” (p. 16). They use the term to refer to conflicts which combine the following features: 
conflict within and across state boundaries; with political origins; protracted duration, involve 
social cleavages as “the roots of many CPEs lie in relations between enduring identity groups, 
which do not necessarily correspond with existing nation-state boundaries”; and predatory social 
formations. These predatory social formations imply that CPEs are often ethno-nationalist in 
nature, characterized by “a virulent loyalty to one particular social group, accompanied by 
equally strong feelings of antipathy towards other social groups living within the same state” 
(Crisp, J. 1995 cited in Goodhand & Hulme, 1999). 
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In studying and writing about CHEs, many scholars take as their starting point, the 
definition put forward by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) which states that a CHE is: 
a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable 
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency 
and/or the ongoing United Nations country program. Such emergencies have in 
particular, a devastating effect on children and women, and call for a complex range of 
responses (IASC 1994 cited in OCHA, 1999). 
 
Although the definition captures more or less the major components of what makes a 
CHE, it has come under much scrutiny by many scholars who dissected it to its smallest parts, 
studied it from different perspectives and linked it to some of the failures of international 
responses to CHE. 
Taking the term Complex Humanitarian Emergency, David Keen (2008) in his book 
Complex Emergencies avoided the use of the term ‘humanitarian’ altogether because the word 
‘humanitarian’ implies “… that the solution lies with humanitarian relief … [and] … may 
prejudge the motives of interveners as altruistic (when they may be much more complicated)” 
(p.1).  Along the same lines, Albala-Bertrand (2000c), in discussing the three words making up 
the term CHE, mentions that the term humanitarian “… has the connotation of philanthropic, 
altruist, selfless, which is our case would be highly misleading. Even if there are unselfish 
elements in all emergency responses, it is safer to assume the opposite, as all emergency can be 
easily put within a mostly utilitarian framework, especially the response coming bilaterally from 
abroad” (p. 18-9).  Slim, H. (2005) mentions that ‘most humanitarian agencies also have other 
aims than purely humanitarian ones” (p. 16). 
Calhoun (2008) in critiquing the concept of a CHE mentions that the term emergency 
represents as “sudden, unpredictable, and of short term what are commonly gradually 
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developing, predictable, and enduring clusters of events and interactions”.   He further states that, 
the elements that make up a complex emergency  - including ethnic conflicts, displacement and 
refugees, food shortage and infectious diseases are not rare occurrences, as they are “… at least 
partially predictable and in specific cases may last for years” (p. 86-7). Making the same 
argument as Calhoun (2008), Goodhand & Hulme (1999) mention that “[Complex Political 
Emergencies] (CPEs) have enduring features. They are seldom temporary crises after which 
society returns to ‘normal’ levels of physical violence” (p. 16).  Treating complex emergencies 
as sudden, short term crises after which the society will resume normal activity is one of the 
criticisms leveled against the international responses to these crises leading to ineffective 
outcomes. 
The term ‘complex’ is the phrase CHE refers to both the multi-casual nature of the 
emergency in the sense that it has been fueled by a number of inter-linked causes and to the 
‘multi-mandate’ nature of the response required to deal with it (Barrow & Jennings, 2001; Ojaba, 
2002; Vayreynen, 1996). Albala-Bertrand (2000) states that complexity “…implies sets of 
interconnected outcomes that are not amenable to simple observations.” (p. 2) as well as “… [it] 
also derives from the response itself, as this may not be fully neutral or may not be perceived as 
such by the parties in conflict. That is, the emergency response is likely to affect societal 
behavior and existing institutional frameworks, as it is unlikely to operate fully independent from 
the conflict itself” (p. 22). 
Taking the definition of UN OCHA of the term CHE, Keen (2008) identified two 
problems: the first one is that of defining a complex emergency in terms of a ‘breakdown in 
authority’ and the second one is the statement that a complex emergency “requires an 
international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the 
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ongoing United Nations country program” (p. 2-3).  According to Keen (2008), not all complex 
emergencies are associated with a breakdown of authority and he gives the examples of Rwanda 
and Sudan where the state authority had a strong hold in many parts of country during the years 
of the emergency (p. 2-3). In Sudan, even in areas where the state was unable to impose its 
authority, the government was still an active part of the conflict and had retained some degree of 
control of the humanitarian assistance provided by the international community.  In Keen’s view, 
accepting a breakdown in state authority as part of the definition of a complex emergency runs 
the danger of putting governments off the hook and amounts to endorsing the excuses they make 
regarding their responsibility towards their citizens. With regards to the second problem, Keen 
objects to defining the emergency in terms of the required response because of the “potential for 
muddling up problem and solution….”.  He also poses the question “is there really any 
emergency that can be properly handled by a single agency? (p. 3). Notwithstanding his criticism 
of the term, Keen (2008) stopped short of proposing an alternative definition. 
Other scholars pointed out that the term CHE does not emphasize enough the political 
nature of the crisis which is the main factor differentiating between a complex emergency and a 
natural disaster, which can also be multi-causal. Notable among these scholars is Duffield (1994) 
who unlike Keen, proposes an alternative definition which underscores the political dimension of 
emergencies. Duffield’s definition states:  
complex emergencies are essentially political in nature; they are protracted political 
crisis resulting from sectarian and predatory indigenous responses to socio-
economic stress and marginalization. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies 
have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic 
integrity of established societies. They attack social systems and networks. 
Humanitarian assistance itself can become a target of violence and appropriation by 
political actors who are organic parts of the crisis.  Complex Emergencies are 
internal to political and economic structures. They are different from natural 
disasters and deserve to be understood and responded to as such (p. 4).   
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Duffield’s definition clearly focuses on the political causes and impact of a complex 
emergency and he acknowledges that humanitarian assistance provided as a response to an 
emergency can be manipulated by political actors and can play a part in further fueling the 
conflict. He does not consider the response to an emergency as part of the definition, on the 
contrary he stresses that the response to a complex emergency has to be rooted in a clear 
understanding of its causes and the impact it has on the affected population. Approaching a 
complex emergency in the same manner as a natural disaster will not lead to an effective 
response to it. Saving lives and dealing with the impact of the emergency in the same way as in a 
disaster situation is not the ultimate answer as a complex emergency is ‘internal to political and 
economic structures’ unlike a natural disaster that hits without discrimination. 
An alternative definition, still focusing on the political dimension of the emergency was 
suggested by Macrae and Zwi (1994). It states that CHEs are “conflict-generated emergencies … 
[caused by] the breakdown of the state, and its replacement by a political culture which 
reinforces and condones the use of violence to secure and maintain power” (p.21). In this 
definition, we encounter the same difficulty as with the UNOCHA definition highlighted by 
Keen (2008) which is the assumption of a breakdown of the state authority. It is worth noting 
that many CHEs are caused by fighting between functioning states (as opposed to failed states) 
and opposition or rebel movements having certain demands or trying to change the regime in 
place.  
Nafziger’s (1996) and Vayreynen’s (1996), both cited in Albala-Bertrand (2000c),  
definition of a CHE focuses on the fact that they are social and man-made crises and on their 
impact in terms of the large number of people affected by the four factors of war and physical 
violence, disease, hunger and displacement (p. 10-11). Vayreynen (1996), in his definition, 
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makes the important remark that although a large number of people die and suffer during an 
emergency, there are others who may benefit from it. 
Notwithstanding how they are defined and the differences in their magnitudes and 
durations, yet all CHE entail a response by the international community.  
1.2 HUMANITARIAN ACTION  
The two strategies to respond to a CHE are political action, which attempts to resolve the root 
causes of the conflict leading to the emergency; and humanitarian action, which has been the 
principal strategy through which the international community responds to CHE. Slim, H. (2005), 
defines humanitarian action as consisting of four types of activities: assistance – material help 
and support; Protection – defense of people’s safety and dignity; livelihood – economic support; 
advocacy – speaking out on behalf of people’s needs for all three (p. 7).  Relief operations 
through which humanitarian action is carried out are often very big and extremely complex 
involving a large number of actors responding to a wide range of needs and implementing a large 
number of programs and projects covering the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, 
health and education services as well as other services (ILO 2007, p. 20). 
1.2.1 Humanitarian Space  
Unlike natural disasters, where relief is provided to the victims of the disaster wherever they may 
happen to be – on the site of the disaster or in areas to which they have taken refuge, one of the 
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important issues related to the response to a CHE is securing ‘humanitarian space’ (Minear, 
2002; Penny, 2001, p. 5; Van Brabant, 1999 ). 
In its glossary of terms, OCHA (2003) uses the term humanitarian space to mean 
‘humanitarian operating environment’ which is a conducive operating environment “in which 
humanitarian organizations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely” (p. 14 
-15). Without securing humanitarian space, either no relief can be provided or its provision will 
be highly problematic as it becomes conditional on approval of the local authorities which can 
jeopardize the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality that  govern the provision of 
humanitarian aid as per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (19 December 1991). 
Unfortunately, the concepts of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian action are not 
straightforward and can be interpreted differently by different actors. As put by an OCHA senior 
negotiator in Angola: 
Impartiality and neutrality are not straightforward concepts in practice. Aid agencies or 
workers may consider themselves neutral because they have no vested interest in the 
conflict. But if they are engaged in providing aid to a population in a besieged city, the 
perpetrator of the siege is going to perceive them as being anything but neutral. …. 
(OCHA, 2002, p. 94). 
 
How humanitarian action is perceived by the host communities not only determine the 
humanitarian space but also the safety and security of the staff of humanitarian agencies. Slim 
(2004) mention that in many parts of world – including the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, Iraq and Afghanistan, humanitarian action is challenged, resented and denied and 
humanitarian workers are targeted (p. 2). Referring to the different perceptions between the two 
groups, the providers of humanitarian assistance and its recipients, Slim (2004) points out that 
“the experience of receiving humanitarian action is not the experience of being a humanitarian. It 
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is a different and more complicated thing than the initially good thing that a humanitarian means 
it to be” (p. 5). 
In such a “highly political and politicized setting” as described by Minear & Smith 
(2007), humanitarian workers have to be very sensitive to these different perceptions, to 
safeguard and protect the humanitarian space in which they can operate and at the same time 
adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality (p. 2). This is often very challenging 
because in CHE, access to people in need has to be negotiated with warring factions and relief 
assistance and food aid can be manipulated which “impede the channeling of relief to the most 
needy” (Keen, 2008, p. 126).  Under such circumstances, adherence to the principles of 
neutrality and impartiality becomes more crucial but at the same time more difficult as 
humanitarian agencies sometimes find themselves making judgments or taking sides, especially 
those agencies who work in human rights advocacy in addition to working on humanitarian 
assistance. They have to ‘tread a thin line’ to ensure their neutrality and impartiality. 
1.2.2 Humanitarian Diplomacy 
Negotiating access to the people in need and securing and safeguarding humanitarian space is the 
area where the interaction between the political and humanitarian action strategies comes into 
play. Van Brabant (1999) discusses “… an orchestrated ‘humanitarian diplomacy’… [which 
includes] what do the agencies request and from whom, what negotiation strategy and tactics do 
they pursue, is collective representation possible.. ?”  (p. 20). In explaining the meaning of 
humanitarian diplomacy, Minear & Smith (2007) explain it 
encompass[es] the activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space 
from political and military authorities within which to function with integrity. These 
activities comprise such efforts as arranging for the presence of international 
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humanitarian organizations and personnel in a given country, negotiating access to 
civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, 
promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and 
institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian 
objectives (p. 1). 
 
These types of activities, in which agencies are involved during emergency relief 
operations, are activities which blur the distinction of what is referred to as a political strategy 
versus a humanitarian assistance strategy which is assumed to be completely apolitical. 
Negotiating a humanitarian space is where these two strategies interact (Van Brabant, 1999). 
Humanitarian Diplomacy is dictated by the environments of CHEs, which are, by 
definition, politically sensitive and there is no alternative to engaging in negotiations with the 
political and military authorities on all sides of the conflict.  In many CHE, the fighting is not 
between two groups only but among many factions who fight against the established government 
as well as among themselves. To secure access to the people in need, humanitarian workers have 
to negotiate with all groups. 
Accordingly, the humanitarian response to a CHE cannot be free from political 
considerations as they are part of what makes a CHE, and these political considerations work on 
different levels – the international, regional, national and local level.  Agencies and their 
personnel have to work with caution and with a proper understanding of the underlying causes of 
the conflict in addition to the broader dynamics impacting on the situation. What is important is 
also an understanding of the impact of aid and humanitarian assistance on the emergency itself. 
1.2.3 Criticisms against Humanitarian Action 
In spite of all the efforts by the international community to respond as quickly, efficiently and 
effectively as possible to CHEs, yet the record of the outcomes of relief operations in CHEs is 
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mixed. Scholars studying the practice of humanitarianism concluded that the two main problems 
with responses to CHEs are: first, the international community treats complex emergencies as 
short-term, stand-alone crises after which the society will resume normal activity – in the same 
manner it treats natural disasters; and second, responses focus solely on the humanitarian aspect 
(that is saving lives and alleviating suffering) and not enough attention is paid to fostering a 
political dialogue that might lead to resolving the root causes of the conflict (Duffield, 1994; 
Goodman & Hulme, 1999; MacFarlane,2000; Natsios 1997; Rieff, 2002). 
1.2.3.1  Adequacy of Humanitarian Action  
Treating CHEs as short term crises resulted in responding to them in the same way as 
responding to natural disasters without giving enough consideration to the different contexts and 
to the politically dynamic environment of CHEs. Notwithstanding the interaction that in many 
cases takes place between natural disasters and politically-induced CHE (Tsui, 2003, p. 35), it is 
much more challenging to respond to CHEs for a number of reasons.  
Unlike natural disasters, CHEs are associated with conflict, political breakdown and 
social dislocation, and are of longer duration and wider scope than natural disasters (Albala-
Bertrand, 2000b; Duffield 1994; Macrae & Zwe, 1994; Tsui, 2003). They are also reflections of 
much broader global dynamics that make the response much more complicated and politically 
sensitive. In his analysis of CHE, Calhoun (2008) points out that CHE, such as those in Bosnia, 
Sudan and Rwanda “… are not simply the results of ancient ethnic hatreds, the permanence of 
poverty, or the potential for evil lurking in human nature (though each of these has arguably 
played a part). They are results also of geopolitics and shifting patterns of long-distance trade, 
colonialism, the end of the cold war, and oil” (p. 85).  These global dynamics and the strategic 
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priorities of the donor countries have their impact on which CHE get more attention than others 
and which are ignored and become ‘forgotten emergencies’ (ILO 2007, p. 19).   
In the event of a natural disaster, both the host government and the relief agencies 
involved in the response are more or less on the same side and working together to mitigate the 
negative impacts of the disaster. However, in CHEs, the status and role of the host government 
become problematic since, in many cases, the government represents one side of the conflict and 
is often engaged in open warfare with the opposition forces. This poses a challenge to 
humanitarian agencies since they have to provide assistance to the affected populations on both 
sides of the conflict. 
As such we find that in CHEs, in addition to the disaster itself, political, security, and 
bureaucratic considerations and operational constraints that inhibit efficient action among the 
actors involved are more pronounced than in natural disaster situations (Natsios 1997, p. xx; Tsui 
2003, p. 37).  Tsui (2003) points out in CHEs, “…, the provision of timely assistance may be as 
critical [as in natural disasters], but the operating environments are usually more complex and 
require more tailored response” (p. 36). 
1.2.3.2  Focus on Humanitarian Action Only 
Discussing the focus of the international community on the humanitarian action and 
ignoring political action that addresses the underlying causes of the emergency, Munslow & 
Brown (1999) mention that “relief aid has become seen as a policy in its own right, and has 
become detached from an overall policy to engender peace” (p. 210). 
The idea here is not to challenge the primacy and the utmost importance of humanitarian 
aid as in many cases it represents the line between life and death for those receiving it but to 
draw attention to the fact that if there are no efforts to look at the root causes of these CHE and 
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to help in fostering a dialogue to resolve them, they will become a permanent feature of the 
societies in which they are taking place.  As Ogata (2005)1 puts it “try as we might to protect the 
refugees and alleviate their suffering, humanitarian action alone could not lead to solving their 
problems” (p. 317).  The argument is that humanitarian assistance should not be the only 
response to a CHE and it should not replace the political efforts to resolve it.  
According to Fiona Terry (cited in Calhoun, 2008), “interventions in complex 
emergencies are not ‘solutions,’ because emergencies themselves are not autonomous problems 
in themselves but the symptoms of other underlying problems” (p. 88).  Accordingly, if political 
and diplomatic efforts are not stepped up to solve the underlying problems, CHEs will persist.  
As ILO (2007) depicts the situation, “… humanitarian action is often chosen by the international 
community as a substitute for political intervention. This poses an additional strain on 
responders, as crises which are essentially political in nature are responded to through 
humanitarian means” (p. 19). The point is that the international community has relegated its role 
in resolving conflicts to a lower priority and is focusing mainly on the provision of humanitarian 
assistance with the result that many CHEs persisted for long periods of time and became 
normalized. 
In discussing the political and humanitarian action in response to CHE, Macrae & 
Nicholas (2001) discuss the concept of ‘coherence’ between the two strategies whereby “… 
closer integration between aid and political responses was seen to be necessary in order to 
address the root causes of conflict-induced crises and to ensure that aid did not exacerbate 
political tensions” (p. 290). They conclude that coherence is a flawed approach since 
humanitarian action became the primary form of political action.  As articulated by Munslow and 
                                                 
1 Sadako Ogata was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during the 1990s. 
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Brown (1999) “It would appear that some Western governments want the end results of peace 
and development, but do not want to take their share of the responsibility to make it possible” (p. 
211). 
The above are the two main criticisms against responses to CHE. Although there is no 
doubt that humanitarian action played a major role in saving lives and sustaining communities 
whose means of livelihoods have been severely compromised, there are a number of issues that 
humanitarian actors have to contend with. These are summarized by Leader, 2000 (as cited in 
Black, 2003) as follows: 
 first, are fears that humanitarian action may strengthen ‘predatory forces that sustain 
conflict,’…; there is the concern that humanitarian action undermines and prevents the 
emergence of a social contract, since it means that factions do not have to be accountable 
to those they claim to represent. In addition, humanitarian action can present a 
smokescreen behind which powerful nations may be released from the need to take 
political or military action in favor of justice. It is seen as market driven, and so, 
unaccountable, leading to problems in terms of its quality. Finally, prioritizations of 
issues of access by humanitarians are seen as leading to a downplaying of rights and 
protection (p. 96). 
 
The next section will discuss one of the important issues related to the response to a CHE 
– that of coordination between the different actors involved. Coordination plays an important 
role, not only in the intersection between political and humanitarian action but also in the 
effectiveness of relief operations.   
1.2.4 Coordination Experiences 
In a study of coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, Donini (1996) discussed 
the different views held by practitioners on coordination. He mentions that for some, 
coordination constitutes another layer of bureaucracy that slows down the response to an 
emergency and the provision of humanitarian needs. For others, coordination requires “strong 
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leadership, clear functional responsibilities, and a ‘coordination as management’ approach” (p. 
12).  Donini (1996) summaries coordination situations in three board categories: 
coordination by command … in which strong leadership is accompanied by some sort of 
authority…; coordination by consensus… in which leadership is essentially a function of 
the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and to mobilize the key actors around 
common objectives and priorities; and coordination by default… [which] involves only 
the most rudimentary exchange of information and division of labor among actors (p 14). 
 
Donini’s (1996) conclusion is that coordination-by-default is not sufficient and there is a 
need for a coordination entity “to orchestrate the management of the various inputs and programs 
so that all the actors can fit into a coherent and effective response” (p. 122). In the three cases he 
examined, the coordination entity has been a UN agency.  He also points out the role of the 
coordination entity in facilitating transition to recovery in the post conflict phase. The 
importance of information gathering and analysis is stressed in his conclusion as very crucial in 
understanding the dynamic nature of the emergency and the fast changing events in the country 
(p. 128). He also stressed the primary role of government in coordination and advises that even 
in the cases of failed states where there might not be a central government to take the 
coordination role, humanitarian actors “… should be aware of the need to preserve and nurture 
local and national coping mechanisms” (p. 16-17).   
 Sommers (2000) studied coordination experiences in Sierra Leone and Rwanda.  He 
defines coordination as “a multidimensional activity that takes place among a variety of actors at 
multiple levels across a range of activities. It is a dynamic process, responding to changing 
political, military, and humanitarian circumstances on the ground” (p.5). He expounds on that 
saying “coordination is a messy, dynamic, and evolving process; the crises that created the 
humanitarian emergencies in the first place ensure that this will be true” (p.5).  
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In this study, Sommers (2000) examined the nature of relationships among humanitarian 
actors by highlighting the three important coordination functions – strategic planning, resource 
mobilization and security information management. He focused on coordination among 
organizations, functions and programs. His conclusions, which fall within the classical, 
hierarchical view of organizations, highlight the importance of the command element in 
humanitarian coordination. He concluded that “…. strong authority represented a necessary 
ingredient in the successful coordination” (p. 108).  He also emphasized the role of donor 
governments in positively influencing coordination. Sommers (2000) pointed out that 
marginalization of national government from coordination structures by humanitarian actors is 
one of the shortcomings of the practice of coordination because ‘it limits synergies between 
relief and longer-term development’.  Another shortcoming is the overemphasis placed by 
humanitarian officials on the role of personalities in effective coordination while 
underemphasizing “the significance of well-structured institutional relationships and clearly 
delineated coordination systems” (p. x). 
Stockton (2002) studied strategic coordination, as opposed to, operational coordination in 
Afghanistan. In discussing the term coordination in the context of the relief operation in 
Afghanistan, Stockton mentions that 
‘coordination’ is another slippery term. For some, it is simply about the voluntary 
sharing of information, while for others it is an authoritarian form of control. 
Confusingly, the term is used as a noun to refer to an outcome as well as a verb to 
describe a process. For most, it is a positive value-laden term; being ‘coordinated’ 
is seen as a desired state of affairs. For others, the word is pejorative, referring to a 
time-consuming process of pointless meetings and inconsequential discussions, or, 
as a mechanism for illegitimate control that serves to undermine much cherished 
agency independence (9-10). 
Unlike Donini (1996) and Sommers (2000), Stockton does not accept that effective 
coordination can only be achieved through command and having in place hierarchical structures 
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and a body vested with the authority to control the coordination process. Stockton brings into 
attention the financial and political costs of coordination, elements missing from previous 
studies, as serious challenges to effective coordination. He also differentiates between strategic 
and operational coordination mentioning that “strategic coordination is concerned with the 
vertical connections between a single overarching strategy and its subsidiary tactical operations. 
… In contrast, operational coordination concerns the management of the horizontal linkages 
between tactical operations, primarily focusing … upon logistics and information exchange” 
(2002, p. 12). One of the challenges facing operational coordination is that there is no strategic 
coordination – no agreement on the overarching strategy objective among agencies providing 
assistance.  In line with the previous studies, Stockton highlights the importance of 
communication in effective communication and the crucial role of the government in 
coordination.  
In a study of humanitarian coordination, commissioned by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Reindorp and Wiles (2001) reviewed the studies 
of coordination over the last decade and examined in depth the three cases of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Kosovo. They concluded that coordination will only 
succeed where the context is conducive such as “small numbers of humanitarian agencies, where 
relationships among agencies have been built over time, and where shared technical expertise 
facilitates communication and increases focus on how to achieve shared goals rather than agency 
profile” (p. iv). The importance of a limited number of humanitarian agencies is also highlighted 
by Sommers (2000, p. 41 & 60). Another three factors that lead to the success of the coordination 
effort are: 1) the importance of incentives to coordination such as security and access to 
beneficiaries through collaboration; 2) whether coordination creates value added to the agencies 
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involved, which, in turn, depends on the competency of leadership and the skills of the staff 
entrusted with coordination; and 3) making coordination more systematic (Reindrop & Wiles, 
2001; Sommers, 2000). 
While Reindorp and Wiles (2001) focused on coordination within the UN system only, 
Rey (2001) examined the challenges of coordination within the UN system in addition to other 
sets of humanitarian actors such as the European Union (EU), and NGOs. His study revealed that 
the recurring themes in discussions of coordination among UN, EU, NGOs in addition to 
governments and donor bodies are: the importance of having a lead agency responsible for 
coordination tasks; defining common principles; establishing the practice mechanisms for 
coordination at all levels, devoting resources to coordination; incorporating all humanitarian 
actors – national and local; and last, setting up mechanisms for information sharing with other 
actors (p. 116-7). Weiss and Collins (1996), in an earlier study, provided a more general 
discussion of the challenges facing the humanitarian system. They described the diversity of 
actors in the humanitarian system and the difficulty of coordinating their actions by discussing 
the interests of different actors, their resources, and their organizational structures and functions 
and how these different factors influence their interactions.  
 All these studies agree that coordination is important because of the changing nature and 
growing impact of emergencies, the expanding size and complexity of humanitarian operations 
and the increasing number of diverse actors. Coordination is vital to avoid waste of resources, 
duplication of effort, and to ensure effective outcome of relief operations.  
Even if we accept the conclusion that a command element is essential for coordination, 
this will create challenges for organizations in the field since many of these organizations are 
part of larger organizations – with their own chains of command and operating procedures. The 
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organizations in the field, participating in a response to a complex emergency are accountable 
and have reporting lines to their headquarters in addition to their accountability to the 
commanding organization in the field, assuming there is one. This might result in conflict that 
will make coordination even more challenging. 
1.2.4.1  Coordination between Hierarchy and Network 
The debate is still ongoing between those who see the command and control approach as 
the most effective coordination option or others who do not agree. Discussing the tension 
between coordination by command and by consensus Van Brabant (1999) mentions that  
understanding coordination in either/or terms of ‘coordination by command’ or 
‘coordination by consensus’, with the latter believed to lead to the lowest common 
denominator, is not totally devoid of realism but also not entirely helpful.  Striving for 
total consensus among a large number of agencies most of whom have no clear policies, 
is a misplaced objective. More realistically the coordination process seeks to create a 
‘critical mass’ of leading agencies, whose improved analysis and increased effectiveness 
makes them more influential in the debates and decisions about interventions (p. 13). 
 
A number of recent studies began to conceptualize the coordination problem less in terms 
of classical hierarchical theory and more in terms of a network of actors (Stephenson, 2006; and 
Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006).  According to Stephenson (2006), Minear (2002) discussed the 
tension between coordination by command and coordination by consensus. In Minear’s view, 
“the solution is not to devise a middle solution but to choose one or the other and work to offset 
its inherent disadvantages.” (p. 34). Stephenson (2006a) disagrees with this position and sees the 
solution “in devising humanitarian social networks of action that can act effectively without 
central control or direction” (p. 46).  Stephenson (2006) calls for conceiving the operating 
environment of humanitarian assistance as an interogranizational social network (p. 41). He 
clearly indicates that the principal challenge that humanitarian aid organizations face is that of 
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developing “sustained and sustainable communication ties among actors that are linked most 
basically by their common interest to develop a capacity to act without imposition of unified 
control” (p. 47).  
1.2.4.2  Summary 
The studies reviewed above reveal that one of the important factors that facilitate 
coordination among the different organizations in relief operations is the timely and accurate 
information gathering, analysis, exchange, and dissemination (Donini, 1996; Reindrop & Wiles, 
2001; Stephenson, 2006). They also stress the fact that the rapidly changing conditions of an 
emergency call for continuous adaptation and a creative response (Donini, 1996; Reindrop & 
Wiles, 2001; Sommers, 2000). The studies highlighted the different powers wielded by donor 
and national governments in facilitating or hindering coordination. 
The studies show that factors that hinder coordination include disagreement on what it 
means, the high costs associated with it, the fact that coordination efforts will create another 
layer of bureaucracy and cause delays at a time when a high premium is put on speed, issues of 
power and authority among agencies involved and the desire for agency profile, as well as the 
lack of appropriate structures and of capable leadership (Donini, 1996; Minear, 1992 & 2002; 
Van Brabant, 1999). Reindorp and Wiles (2001) highlight the structural, institutional and 
management obstacles to coordination within the UN system and point out that one fundamental 
problem is the inability of the system to change. They mention that within the UN system, 
UNOCHA has the mandate to coordinate but no power or authority to tell another UN agency 
what it should do. There is also the tension between organizations that have the operational 
experience such as WFP and UNICEF and an organization with a coordination role only such as 
OCHA.  
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It can be concluded from these studies that the nature of the problem is systemic.  Since 
the coordination problem is systemic, there is a need to go beyond the analysis of individual 
organizations and to examine the system as a whole to see how the repeated interactions of the 
organizations and their patterns of relationships among themselves and with their environment 
can enhance or hinder coordination and the ability of the system to adapt to changes in the 
environment. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research proposes to study relief operations as open systems whose parts are continuously 
interacting among themselves and with their dynamic environment. Taking the specific case of 
the relief operation in Southern Sudan, where a CHE has been ongoing since the 1980s, the main 
questions that the research seeks to answer are: 
1. How do agencies involved in a relief operation coordinate their work as revealed by 
their interactions? 
2. What is the underlying structure of the relief operation? 
3. How does a relief operation evolve over time to adapt to the changing conditions of 
the emergency? And 
4. How and why do certain institutions emerge and then disappear?  
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This research will complement the body of literature aiming at understanding the complexities of 
relief operations during armed conflicts and the challenges facing them.  The current literature on 
CHE and relief operations is generally either descriptive or evaluative and in many cases, lacks 
solid theoretical foundations. Previous analysts writing on humanitarian aid did not consider the 
interrelationships between organizations participating in relief operations as revealed by their 
actual interactions. Their studies were largely based on interviews, review and analysis of 
documentary sources and in some cases participatory observation.  None of the studies reviewed 
has utilized social network analysis to empirically study the interrelationships between 
organizations as well as to map the actual structure of the relief operation based on the 
interactions between the actors. Furthermore, none of the studies focused on one relief operation 
over an extended period of time to understand how the operation evolved overtime and adapted 
to the changes in the dynamic context in which it was taking place. Conceptualizing a relief 
operation as a complex adaptive system and applying social network analysis to its study will fill 
this gap, allow for a mapping of the structure of the operation, and lead to a better understanding 
of how this structure evolved over time. The analysis will be a welcome addition to the literature 
in the field. Mapping the actual structure of the operation as it emerged from the interactions of 
the different actors will help in addressing the coordination question and also in informing the 
design of relief operations in the future.   
The research proposes to apply ideas and concepts from Organization Theory, 
Complexity Theory and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and utilizes 
Social Network Analysis to study the dynamics of relief operations in CHEs. Although some of 
the recent studies in the field (Stephenson, 2006) explicitly stated  that it is time to study 
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coordination in the humanitarian field as a network, none of these studies examined a relief 
operation as a network with an identifiable structure and patterns of relationship that are 
distinguishable from the attributes of the organizations themselves.  Analyzing a relief operation 
as a complex adaptive system and understanding its structure and evolution overtime will be a 
valuable contribution to the literature on the provision of aid in CHEs 
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2.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study is carried out within a theoretical framework that draws upon a number of 
theories relevant to the research questions. Since the research problem being studied is multi-
faceted, it is important to situate it within a conceptual framework of relevant theories, which 
will provide “… a kind of intellectual scaffolding that gives a coherent structure to inquiry” 
(Schlager, 1999 cited in Koontz, 2003, p. 1). The theories relevant to understanding the structure 
of relief operations in CHEs and their evolution as well as the processes of coordination and 
adaptation are: Organization Theory, the Theory of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS); 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, and Science of Networks. 
As presented in chapter one, the environment of a CHE is very complex, dynamic and 
unpredictable. It confronts the organizations responding to the emergency with a set of 
constraints that is impossible for any organization to negotiate and overcome single-handedly. 
Therefore, working with other organizations is a prerequisite to functioning in such 
environments but unfortunately it is not a simple task. To understand how organizations 
responding to a CHE interact and join their effort to achieve their goals, to overcome the 
constraints presented by their environment and to make the best use of any opportunities that 
come up, the study conceptualizes these organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), 
 30 
which are open systems in a process of continuous interaction among themselves and with their 
environments. 
Organization Theory and the study of organizations as open systems provide the 
theoretical foundation against which one can study relief operations in CHE. Complexity Theory 
and the study of CAS provide useful insights for understanding the characteristics of systems 
such as relief operations. The IAD framework takes into account the context in which 
organizations exist and provides a means for understanding the environment and its impact on 
the patterns of interactions between different actors and the outcomes of these interactions.  It 
sheds light on how and why different institutions come into being and how they evolve.  
As a relief operation is made up of multiple independent organizations working together, 
its structure resembles a network more than a bureaucratic organization. Network Theory will 
help us better understand the structure and functioning of a relief operation. Social Network 
Analysis is instrumental in understanding the dynamics of interactions among different entities 
working in a complex environment and in describing the overall interconnected system of a relief 
operation in a CHE; in revealing the structure of the system and in identifying the key actors and 
their connectedness. A theoretical framework that draws upon Organization Theory, Theory of 
CAS, the IAD Framework and Network Theory together will provide an all-encompassing lens 
for better understanding the structure of relief operations, how it evolves and the processes of 
coordination and adaptation. 
The chapter is organized as follows:  section 2 will provide an overview of Organization 
Theory; section 3 will present Theories of Interorganizational Coordination; section 4 will cover 
the Theory of CAS; section 5 will introduce the IAD Framework and section 6 will provide an 
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overview of Network Theory and the Science of Networks. The last section will present the 
Theoretical Framework of the study.   
2.2 ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Relief operations, by default, take place in disaster and/or conflict environments characterized by 
uncertainty, unpredictability and instability. Disaster/conflict environments are the direct contrast 
to stable environments in which organizations can, to some extent, afford to be hierarchical and 
function as ‘rational systems’ as opposed to ‘open systems’ (Scott, 2003). To understand open 
systems one has to consider them against rational systems. 
2.2.1 Rational Systems – the Bureaucratic Organization 
As rational systems, organizations are closed systems separate from their environments, with 
very specific and predetermined goals, highly formalized structures with an identifiable set of 
participants, clear roles and positions, and strict rules and procedures which guide decision 
making and behavior towards the achievement goals (Gulick, 1937; Weber, 1946; Wilson, 1887). 
 The best example of the rational system is the bureaucratic organization, which is an 
ideal type of organization that does not exist in reality. The building blocks of the bureaucratic 
organization were outlined by the classical scholars in Organization Theory starting with Adam 
Smith (1776) who underscored the importance of specialization and division of labor in an 
organization without giving due attention to how the different parts of the organization interact 
among themselves and with their environment (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). According to this view, 
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once each member of the organization knows his/her role, tasks will be carried out without need 
for interactions and communication.  
Variants of Smith’s ideas were developed in the writings of other classical scholars. 
Woodrow Wilson (1887) stated that ‘The Study of Administration’ is concerned with 
discovering the ‘best principles’ and the ‘simplest arrangements’ by which responsibility can be 
fixed upon officials. Wilson’s ideas were given support by the work of Frederick Taylor (1911) 
“The Principles of Scientific Management” which are based on the principle that there is ‘one 
best way’ of getting any task done efficiently and that of Fayol (1916) who stated that the 
principles of management – unity of command; span of control; centralization and responsibility 
are universal (Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Shafritz & Hyde 1997). 
 The most important statement about the bureaucratic organization was made by Weber 
(1922) who outlined six principles of how an ‘ideal-type bureaucracy’ is organized. The 
principles stress the following: work is coordinated through hierarchy, where subordinates follow 
orders from superiors, jurisdictional areas and levels of graded authority are clearly specified; 
rules, regulations and laws are stable, exhaustive and can be learned; and communication takes 
place through written documents (Weber 1946).  
The issue of coordination in organizations, which was not considered by the classical 
theorists so far, found its expression, in Gulick (1937) description of managerial activities 
common to all organizations, which are planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, 
reporting and budgeting (POSDCORB). Although Gulick summarized the main functions of 
managers and considered coordination as a separate managerial task, yet as pointed out by 
Moore (1995), Gulick’s view is too inward looking  and omits an important task that managers 
have to carry out, which is understanding and shaping their organization’s environment.  
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To sum up, it can be clearly seen that the environment in which an organization exists did 
not feature in the Classic Theory of Organization. Since as rational systems, organizations were 
viewed as separate isolated entities with no links between them, we find that scholars believed 
that once the organization is properly structured and the activities of its members are delineated 
with clear specialization and division of labor, it will run efficiently. As long as jobs are clearly 
described and relations are clearly defined, people know their roles within the hierarchy, 
communication takes place through official channels, and the organization will run smoothly. In 
the classical view, communication takes place vertically and is viewed as a smooth neutral 
process of a manager relaying orders to subordinates and subordinates reporting results to the 
manager. But as time passed and experience accumulated, people came to realize that “… formal 
bureaucracies, which require hierarchy to coordinate activity, have, because of that structure, 
significant potential for disaster. Passing inaccurate or unrepresentative information up the line 
or passing misunderstood information down the line can result in major organizational errors” 
(Lerner, 1992, p. 24). Furthermore, people came to realize that organizations have never been the 
isolated islands they were thought to be and they are in a continuous process of interaction and 
communication with their environment (Luhmann, 1985, 1989).  
Even in stable environments of today’s world, the Classical Organization Theory does 
not describe the reality of organizations as no organization is able to survive in isolation from its 
environment and focus on its internal processes only. This is even more true in disaster/conflict 
environments which present organizations with a number of challenges rendering their routine 
standards of operations, strict division of labor and vertical communication channels obsolete. In 
such an environment, organizations need to be open systems continuously learning, evolving and 
adapting to the changing nature of the situation.  
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2.2.2 Open System 
When organizations are defined as ‘open systems’ the focus shifts from formal structures to 
interdependencies between the different parts of the organization and the reciprocal ties that 
connect the organization to its environment, which includes other organizations.  The 
environment consists of both the material-resource environment and the institutional 
environment which covers the human, political, social, and cultural systems that shape the 
material-resource environment. The environment is key to the survival of the organization since 
it is the source of energy, information and material that the organization needs to maintain itself 
(Scott, 2003). 
The open system perspective on organizations highlights the diversity and complexity of 
groups and organizations making up the system as well as the looseness of connections between 
them, making them loosely coupled systems (Buckley, 1967). In contrast to rational systems, 
open systems are characterized by their conscious awareness and continuous interaction with the 
environment which impacts on how they function (Marion, 1999; Scott, 2003).  
The interaction between the organization and its environment enables it to achieve its 
goals, which in the case of an open system are more fluid than in a rational system and are not 
necessarily pre-determined or commonly held by all members of the organization. More 
importantly, this interaction includes the exchange of resources that enables the organization to 
counteract ‘entropy’ or the loss of energy, which takes place when the system is in a static state 
(Nicolis and Prigogine 1977; Katz and Kahn 1978; Scott, 2003, p. 89-90). According to Morgan 
(2006), “closed [rational] systems are entropic in that they have a tendency to deteriorate and run 
down. Open systems, on the other hand, attempt to sustain themselves by importing energy to try 
to offset entropic tendencies” (p.40). Exchange of resources is enabled by the fact that as an open 
 35 
system, organizations are loosely coupled; that is, they contain elements which are weakly 
connected to other elements in the system. This enables autonomous action which at the same 
time takes into account what is happening in the external environment (Scott, 2003, p. 88).  In 
defining system openness, Buckley, (1967, p. 50) states: “that a system is open means, not 
simply that it engages in interchanges with the environment, but that this interchange is an 
essential factor underlying the system’s viability, its reproductive ability or continuity, and its 
ability to change.” (Cited in Maurer (Ed.), 1971, p. 4)  
The open system approach to understanding organizations, in addition to its emphasis on 
the relationship of the organization to its environment, defines an organization in terms of 
interrelated subsystems which depicts key patterns and interconnections between different units, 
groups, and departments within an organization (Morgan, 2006, p. 39). At the interorganizational 
level, the open system approach focuses “… on understanding the relationships and interactions 
within and among aggregates of organizations” (Baum and Rowley, 2002, p. 7) As opposed to 
closed systems, which have very specific and defined boundaries, one of the characteristics of 
open systems is that it is very difficult to determine their boundaries because they “… are made 
up of subsystems and are themselves subsumed in larger systems – an arrangement that creates 
linkages across systems and confounds the attempt to erect clear boundaries around them” (Scott, 
2003, p. 90). This is very relevant to the study of relief operations which are part of a global 
system and the organizations who participate in relief operations are parts of other organizations. 
As such Scott’s description of an open system as subsystems subsumed in larger systems 
perfectly fits the reality of relief operations.  
Given the context of CHE and the nature of humanitarian action, it becomes clear that the 
open system approach is an appropriate approach to understanding relief operations and the 
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organizations constituting them. It enables the research to take into account the interaction 
between participants in the relief operation and their environment and how each shapes the other. 
Introducing the environment leads us to a discussion of the Theories of Interorganizational 
Coordination.  In the context of relief operations, where the participants are autonomous, 
independent organizations voluntarily working together with no central authority directing them, 
the question becomes why do organizations opt to work together? Theories of Interorganizational 
Coordination, presented in the next section, are efforts by organizational scholars at answering 
this question.  
2.3 THEORIES OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION (IOC) 
Organizations, whether public, private or nonprofit, work together. Many undertakings in 
today’s world involve the efforts of more than one entity because of the complexity of the tasks, 
of increased specialization and interdependence among organizations and between them and 
their environment. Based on the open system approach, a number of theories of 
Interogranizational Coordination (IOC) were developed to explain why organizations work 
together. The theories cover a continuum of what is meant by coordination. They range from 
explaining coordination as the organization’s strategic adjustment to its environment, to the 
recognition of interdependence between organizations and voluntary exchange of resources, and 
finally to institutional arrangements, power and control where coordination becomes a deliberate 
intervention which makes participants recognize their interdependence (Alexander, 1995, p. 6 - 
7). Three of the IOC theories of relevance to the study of relief operations are Exchange Theory, 
Transaction Cost Theory and Contingency and Organizational Ecology Theory.  
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According to Exchange Theory, resource dependence and exchange is the main factor 
behind interorganizational relationships (Benson, 1975, in Alexander, 1995, p. 7 - 8). There are 
three types of resource exchanges – voluntary exchanges, exchanges resulting from power 
dependence, and interactions which are the result of legal-political mandates – themselves the 
products of prior exchanges of one or the other kind (Raelin, 1992, p. 243-244 cited in 
Alexander, 1995 p. 8 - 9).  Transaction Cost Theory, developed by Roland Coase in 1937, “… 
explains the emergence of hierarchical organizations in the economic market by the desire of 
firms to minimize their transaction costs” (Alexander, 1995, p. 12). 
Contingency Theory and Organizational Ecology Theory shift the focus from resource 
dependence and transaction cost calculations to the adaptation of the organization(s) to its (their) 
environment. Contingency theory focuses on the adaptation of a single organization to its 
environment through its voluntary adjustment to the decisions and actions of other organizations 
in that environment. Organizational Ecology focuses on the ‘fit’ of a number of organizations 
with their ecology (Alexander, 1995, p. 10; Scott, 2003, p. 105). It also explains that 
interorganizational coordination is the means through which organizations respond to factors in 
their environment over which they have no control. As Marion (1999) mentions “environmental 
uncertainty… is an important force here” that requires flexible organizational structures (p. 84). 
Environmental factors create interdependence between the different organizations in that 
environment (Alexander, 1995, p. 11).  
Mogan (2006) summarizes some of the underlying ideas of Contingency Theory as 
follows: “organizations are open systems that need careful management to satisfy and balance 
internal needs and to adapt to environmental circumstances; there is no best way of organizing. 
The appropriate form depends on the kind of task or environment with which one is dealing; 
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[and] … different types or ‘species’ are needed in different types of environments” (p. 42).  
Furthermore, he adds that to understand the Organizational Ecology perspective, it is “… 
necessary to understand that organizations and their environments are engaged in a pattern of co-
creation, where each produces the other… Environments then become in some measure always 
negotiated environments rather than independent external forces.” (Morgan, 2006, p. 63) 
This insight of external environments becoming negotiated environments is particularly 
relevant to relief operations in CHE, whereby the very presence of a relief operation and the 
interaction of its participant organizations with the environment impact on that environment.  
The organic view of organizations as sets of interacting subsystems in a continuous process of 
adaptation to their environment defines them as CAS. The next section discusses complex 
adaptive systems.  
2.4 COMPLEXITY THEORY AND COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
The last three decades have witnessed many advances in the natural and physical sciences 
which have great implications on social sciences and organization theory (Begun, 1994; Byrne, 
1999; Kiel & Elliot, 1996; Marion, R. 1999). These advances, which include chaos theory, non-
linear dynamic systems theory, dissipative structures, self-organization, self-organized criticality, 
and collectively known as Complexity Science, are all concerned with the study of complex 
adaptive systems (Bak & Chen, 1991; Kauffman, 1993; Lewin, 1999; Prigogine, et al., 1972; 
Prigogine, & Stengers, 1984). The main argument shared by all the different perspectives of 
Complexity Science is that linear, reductionist models that focus on only a part of the system are 
inadequate to study the behavior of the systems made of many interconnected elements which 
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are continuously interacting among themselves and with their environments. The linear, 
reductionist models work best “… for static, homogeneous, equilibrating worlds,” but not for 
dynamic worlds consisting of heterogeneous entities (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 20). 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are defined by their shared characteristics which 
include a large number of interacting entities whose repeated interactions, both ordered and 
chaotic, result in emergent properties and new structures.  The entities interact, not only among 
themselves, but with other elements that exist outside their system (MacLean et al., 1999; 
Morgan, 2006, p. 251).  Axelrod and Cohen (1999) define CAS as systems in which an action 
can lead to unanticipated and unpredictable consequences while Holland (1995) views them as 
systems composed of many agents described in terms of rules. The agents are in a continuous 
process of evolution, adaptation and self-organization through the modification of their rules as 
they learn and accumulate experience.  “In CAS, a major part of the environment of any given 
adaptive agent consists of other adaptive agents, so that a portion of any agent’s efforts at 
adaptation is spent adapting to other adaptive agents” (Holland, 1995, p. 10). This continuous 
process of change, self-organization and adaptation in both the behavior of CAS and their 
structure to better fit their environment is what defines them.  
The study of complexity aims at understanding the patterns in which the entities in a CAS 
come together, and the ways in which they interact and adapt to their changing environments and 
the order that emerges out of these interactions. Emergence, resulting from the interactions of the 
entities, is one of the important properties of CAS. According to Goldstein (1999), emergence 
refers to ‘the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process 
of self-organization in complex systems.” (Corning, 2002, p. 7).    
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CAS are dynamic, non-linear and adaptive, and their patterns are ever-changing as they 
learn through evolution (Holland, 1995).  One of the important characteristics of these systems, 
is that they are systems with no central control or authority, yet they manage to produce “… 
robust patterns of organization and activity” and move from a state of chaos towards increasing 
order (Miller and Page, 2007, p. 7). 
According to Kauffman (1993), complex systems adapt their behavior to the 
environment, and in the process reorganize their own structure to better fit that environment. 
Kauffman holds that all systems operate on a continuum ranging from chaos to order and that 
learning and adaptation occurs for systems residing ‘at the edge of chaos.’ In this specific region, 
where complex systems have sufficient but flexible structure to hold and exchange information, 
systems in chaos will self-organize towards order - a spontaneous effort to emerge from 
randomness (Kauffman, 1993). Self-organization refers to  “… the capacity of open and living 
systems, such as we live in and we ourselves are, to generate their own new forms from inner 
guidelines rather than imposition of form from outside.” (Loye & Eisler, 1987; White et al., 1997 
cited in Matthews et al., 1999). It is at the edge of chaos, Kaufman (1993) asserts that 
connectivity and the flow of information between the different entities increase the capacity of 
the system for learning, change and self-organization. 
Kauffman’s (1993) concept of the ‘edge of chaos’ in biological systems is similar to 
Prigogine and Stengers’ (1984) concept of “dissipative structures” in chemistry.  Prigogine 
coined the phrase, dissipative structures, to explain the behavior of systems moving from 
equilibrium to far-from-equilibrium conditions. The notion of dissipation usually refers to the 
system losing its energy, but Prigogine and Stengers (1984) use the phrase dissipative structures 
“… to emphasize the constructive role of dissipative processes in … [the formation of new 
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dynamic states of matter reflecting the interaction of a given system with its surroundings]” (p. 
12). The point that Prigogine and Stengers (1984) are stressing is that systems in states of 
extreme instability and disorder have the potential, through processes of communication among 
their different components and with their environment, to emerge from chaos, to self-organize 
and to experience order in ‘far-from-equilibrium states’ (p. 13). 
Relief operations are characterized by organizational complexity (Duffield, 1994; 
Anderson & Woodrow, 1998). The fact that in relief work, many interactions take place between 
different entities highlights the importance of studying not only the attributes of these entities but 
also the patterns of relationships between them.  Luhmann (1985) points out that complexity 
comprises the two different concepts of elements and relations (p. 100).  Making the same point, 
McCarthy and Gillies (2003) state that complexity, as a system’s attribute, “increases as the 
number and variety of elements and relationships within the system becomes greater, and 
increases as the level of predictability and understanding of the system as a whole decreases” (p. 
72).  This depiction fits very well the environments of relief operations in which the increase in 
the number of elements and the web of their interactions and relationships creates more 
complexity and where the unpredictability of the environment of a relief operation results in 
more complexity.  
Both the self-organization perspective and the dissipative structures perspective 
emphasize the inextricable interlinkages and close relationship between the system and its 
environment. The intertwining of the system and its environment points to the importance of 
considering both sets of factors, internal to the system and external to it, in attempting to 
understand how a system performs, learns and evolves (Matthew,1999, p. 448). One way of 
considering both the internal and external factors is to study CAS within the Institutional 
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Analysis and Development Framework.  
2.5 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework gives due attention to the context 
in which entities “interact to create the institutional arrangements that shape their collective 
decisions and individual actions” (Andresson, 2006, p. 27). It allows the researcher to go beyond 
the study of the entities making up the system and their interactions among themselves and with 
their environments to explore the structure of the system and to systematically study the 
environment itself and how it impacts the system and at the same time is impacted by it. 
The IAD framework is a comprehensive framework that takes into account the system 
itself, the exogenous factors affecting it, the interaction between the system and the exogenous 
factors, the outcomes of the interactions and how the outcomes are evaluated. According to 
Ostrom (2005), the focal unit of analysis in the IAD framework is “… an action arena in 
which… participants and an action situation interact as they are affected by exogenous 
variables… and produce outcomes that in turn affect the participants and the action situation” (p. 
13). An action situation is defined as the social space where participants interact (Gibson et al. 
2005; Koontz, 2003; Ostrom 2005). According to Ostrom (1994, p. 29, cited in Koontz, 2003), 
the action situation includes the following: “participants in positions who must decide among 
diverse actions in light of the information they possess about how actions are linked to 
potential outcomes and the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes” (p. 4).  
The exogenous variables, or contextual factors, referred to here are the material/physical 
conditions, attributes of the community in which the action arena is situated and rules. These 
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factors are significant because they create incentives and constraints that shape the interactions 
between participants, the actions they choose to take and the benefits, costs and potential 
outcomes of these actions (Ostrom, 2005, p. 15). The patterns of interactions between 
participants structure the situations they face (Smajgl, et al., 2009, p. 29) or as Morgan (2006) 
puts it the environments that the participants face become ‘negotiated environments” (p. 63). 
One of the important aspects of the IAD framework is that it provides a means to 
understand how institutions, broadly defined as “… the prescriptions that humans use to organize 
all forms of repetitive and structured interactions…,” emerge and develop (Ostrom, 2005, p. 3). 
As such the framework is instrumental in understanding the emergence of certain structures and 
institutions in CAS where repetitive interactions take place between the different entities in the 
system. Emergence in CAS is a property of the system – as the system elements interact, self-
organize and move gradually from chaos to order some properties or structures emerge. In the 
IAD framework, emergence, in addition to being the result of interaction of the elements within a 
system (action arena), it is very much influenced by contextual factors such as the community, 
physical/material environment and rules. Accordingly, analyzing a CAS within the IAD 
framework gives the added advantage of a systematic analysis of the contextual factors 
impacting on CAS and their behavior.  
Rules are one the three contextual factors impacting on the action arena. The concept of 
‘rules’ is quite general and refers to regulations, instructions, precepts or principles (Black, 1962, 
cited in Ostrom, 2005). Rules as regulations refer to something “laid down by an authority… as 
required of certain persons”; rules as instructions “can be thought of as the strategies adopted by 
participants within ongoing situations” (p. 17); rules as precepts “are part of the generally 
accepted moral fabric of a community’ (Allen, 2005, cited in Ostrom, 2005); and rules as 
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principles refer to physical laws (Ostrom, 2005, p. 16-17). What is of significance for CAS are 
not the written rules or those that result from a formal legal procedure, but “the institutional rules 
[that] are often self-consciously crafted by individuals to change the structure of repetitive 
situations that they themselves face in an attempt to improve the outcomes that they achieve” 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 18). Rules play a major role in shaping the patterns of interactions of the 
participants and at the same time they are shaped by these interactions. 
The above discussion of open systems, CAS and IAD framework shows that the focus of 
these three theories is on relationships and interactions between diverse participants in a system. 
Examining relationships and interactions leads us to the Science of Networks. 
2.6 THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Since open systems and CAS are constituted of many interconnected entities and since, within an 
IAD framework, interactions among participants are a crucial aspect of any action arena, the 
science of networks and social network analysis are very important in the study of these systems. 
Before discussing the science of networks, it is important to place the network perspective within 
the context of how human societies have been organized throughout history. According to 
Ronfeldt’s (1996) article ‘Framework about Social Evolution’, there are four basic forms of 
organization of human society: the kinship-based tribe (extended families, clan), the hierarchical 
institution (army, church, bureaucratic state), the competitive-exchange market (sellers and 
buyers), and finally the network. As the result of the increasing complexity of societies, network 
forms of organization as compared to hierarchies and markets are on the rise (p. 2). 
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2.6.1 The Science of Networks 
The concept of ‘network’ is open to many interpretations some of them broader than others. 
Nohria & Eccles (1992) consider all organizations, even the hierarchies and markets, as social 
networks which exist in an environment made up of other organizations. In contrast to this all-
encompassing view  of networks, Ronfeldt, D. (1996) use the term network “… to refer to 
organizational networks, mainly the “all channel” design where all members are connected to 
and can communicate with each other” (p. 4). For Ronfeldt (1996), the organizational networks 
are distinct from both market and hierarchy.  Agranoff, (2006) commenting on the wide use of 
the term network points out that “a term is required that fits the activity of cooperation or mutual 
action without being so broad that it encompasses every human connection” and he uses the term 
‘collaborative networks’ to describe mutual action (p. 56). O’Toole (1997), in discussing 
networks in public administration, describes them as: 
Structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where 
one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical 
arrangement. Networks exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formally 
established linkages and policy-legitimated ties. The notion of network excludes mere 
formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but it includes a very wide range of structures 
in between. The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority 
bonds, exchange relations, and collations based on common interest, all within a single 
multiunit structure (p. 45). 
 
O’Toole’s (1997) description of the network fits the reality of relief operations in CHE 
where multiple organizations work together without a central authority. The interdependence of 
the network is created to a large extent by the nature of the environment in which they operate 
and over which they have little or no control. Both formal ties and informal linkages exist 
between organizations in relief operations. Patterns of interaction are more horizontal than 
vertical and authority is very diffused, compared to hierarchical organizations. Patterns of 
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interactions lead to the emergence of structures that O’Toole describes as neither formal 
hierarchies nor perfect markets and which can generally be labeled ‘networks’.   
Looking at the common characteristics of networks, Baker (1992) identifies four: 
flexibility, decentralized planning and control, lateral ties among members and integration across 
formal boundaries of discipline and authority. A network consists of organizations that share 
information and act together to achieve some common goal. It constrains the actions of its 
members and at the same time is shaped by these actions. In addition, in a network there is a high 
degree of integration of people, positions, location, tasks and resources. One of the defining 
features of a network form of organization is its reliance on information sharing and 
communication among its members (Nohria & Eccles, 1992; Ronfeldt, 1996). In explaining how 
the information revolution favors the rise of organizational networks, Ronfeldt (1996) mentions 
that “it erodes hierarchies, diffuses power, ignores boundaries, and generally compels closed 
systems to open up” (p. 13). When systems open up they interact with their environment, adapt 
to changes in that environment and at the same time shape the environment, and generally 
display the characteristics of complex adaptive systems as they are no more closed rational 
systems governed by a set of defined rules and procedures.  
 The Science of Networks helps in understanding complex adaptive systems as it shifts 
the focus from the attributes of the individual members of the system only to both their attributes 
and relationships and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The patterns of relationships 
between the members of a system and their connectedness give rise to the structure and 
dynamics of the system (Watts, 2003). Watts (2003) points out that interactions in a network 
generate complexity which might be greater or less than that displayed by the members of the 
network. This is the main point of departure of the Science of Networks from the more 
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traditional individualistic approaches where “… individual actors are depicted as making choices 
and acting without regard to the behavior of other actors” (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982, p. 9).   
 In the context of a network, both the actors and their attributes; which are “… those 
qualities that inherently belong to a unit apart from its relations with other units or the specific 
context within which it is observed”; and their relations, which are the properties that emerge 
from the connections or linkages between actors, are important in understanding how networks 
function (Knoke, & Kuklinski, 1982, p. 9). According to Scott (2000), “relations are not the 
properties of agents, but of systems of agents; these relations connect pairs of agents into larger 
relational systems” (p. 3). To understand the structure of any organization or social system, 
relational data are indispensible as networks are studied by analyzing their relational data, which 
are based on the ties and connections relating one actor/agent to another (Hanneman, 2001; 
Jackson, 2008; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
From a network perspective, the members of a system are interdependent rather than 
independent actors whose connectivity allows them to communicate and exchange resources 
such as information (Graber, 1992; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Watts, 2003). Accordingly, in 
making decisions no actor can afford to ignore the decisions made by other actors. The higher 
the degree of connectivity between actors, the more they communicate, interact and share 
resources. Networks have the ability to pass information even when they are loosely connected 
because they are not evenly connected and have clusters of denser connectivity tied together by 
sparser connections between these clusters. The positions of actors in a network are very 
important as they may constitute hubs, i.e. nodes that connect different clusters together and as 
such facilitate the flow of information between clusters that are not tied otherwise (Graber, 2003; 
Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Watts, 2003).  
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2.6.2 Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be considered as the application of the Science of Networks. 
Freeman (2004) describes SNA “… as a structural perspective on relations among actors 
grounded in systematic empirical data, using graphic imagery and mathematical and 
computational models.”   
There are three premises underlying SNA. First, “the structure of relations among actors 
and the location of individual actors in the network have important behavior, perceptual, and 
attitudinal consequences both for the individual units and for the system as a whole” (Knoke, & 
Kuklinski, 1982, p. 13). The second premise is that “structural relations are often more important 
for understanding observed behaviors …” than the attributes of the individual actors (Knoke & 
Yang, 2008, p. 4). The third premise is that “structural relations should be viewed as dynamic 
processes. This principle recognizes that networks are not static structures, but are continually 
changing through interactions among their constituent people, groups and organizations” (Knoke 
& Yang, 2008, p. 6). These premises make network analysis an appropriate approach to study 
organizations functioning in turbulent, rapidly changing and unpredictable environments, where 
having a less centralized structure makes the organizations and the system as a whole more 
adaptable. Adaptability means that the structure of the organization and that of the system is not 
static and is changing all the time to fit with its environment. In such environments, the 
interactions between the actors give rise to network forms of organization rather than 
hierarchical ones.  
One of the strengths of SNA is that it takes into account both relations that occur between 
the actors and those that are absent – what is known as ‘structural holes’ (Burt, 1992). According 
to Jackson (2008), “a structural hole is a void in the social structure, and in terms of social 
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networks refers to an absence of connections between groups” (p. 70). The structure of the 
network is revealed by all ties and relationships, both present and absent. Network structures, as 
described by Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982), “ … vary dramatically in form, from the isolated 
structure in which no actor is connected to any other actor, to the saturated structure in which 
every actor is directly linked to every other individual” (p. 12) . Most networks lie somewhere in 
between these two ends of the spectrum.  
2.7 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY  
Based on the theories cited above, the theoretical framework for this study is based on a 
number of premises. The first premise is that relief operations cannot be studied in isolation of 
the environments in which they take place and as such they are open systems. The second 
premise is that the complexity of the context of relief operations, the multiplicity of actors and 
their varied mandates, resources and organizational structures proscribe the establishment of 
formal rules and procedures and of fixed division of labor, as such relief operations are organized 
as networks not as hierarchies. The third premise is that relief operations display all the 
characteristics of complex adaptive systems and accordingly the best way to study them is 
through their interactions and relational data. The fourth premise is that the environment in 
which relief operations take place has a very strong impact on their structure and on how they 
function and at the same time, the environment is shaped by the actions and interactions of the 
different members of a relief operation – accordingly, it deserves to be properly analyzed and 
understood. The fifth premise is that social network analysis is a means to understand the 
complex behavior of numerous, diverse actors in a dynamic setting.  
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This theoretical framework allows for studying the relief operation in a CHE as a network 
of interrelated and interdependent subsystems. The many interactions between the subsystems 
and the individual members of the operation lead to the emergence of new structures and the 
evolution of the already existing ones. The new structures are not static and as time passes and 
conditions change, the system adapts and the structures evolve through the interactions of the 
members of the operation. In this process of continuous change and adaptation, the environment 
itself is shaped.  
The IAD framework introduces the environment as an exogenous factor impacting on the 
interactions among the different actors. At the same time, the framework shows that these 
interactions lead to changes in the environment and specifically in the structures or institutions 
that govern the interactions themselves. Some new institutions emerge while others, that proved 
not beneficial or have already served their purpose,  may disappear. This is very relevant to the 
context of relief operations where the structures emerging from the interactions between the 
different organizations evolve over time.  
Complex adaptive system theory informs that through interactions, different 
organizations and the system as a whole adapt more readily to the environment. The need for 
adaptation by the different entities making up a relief operation and for creating adaptive systems 
in response to humanitarian emergencies has been voiced by many practitioners and researchers. 
Donini (1996) mentioned that the coordination bodies in any crisis  
are aware of and respond to the changing requirements of the humanitarian 
community as a crisis evolves; structures and mechanisms that were useful at the 
peak of the crisis will need to be phased out or adapted as their utility decreases and 
becomes redundant. … The transition process is not necessarily linear: the motto of 
the coordination entity should be ‘adapt or die (p. 126). 
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 I take Donini’s statement further and state that the motto of any relief operation and 
any of its members is ‘adapt or die’. Without adaptation, entropy will set in and the 
organizations and the system as a whole will risk being rundown and eventually disappear.  
 Against this theoretical framework, the next chapter will present the research design 
and methodology of the study.  
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is an exploratory investigation of the multiorganizational relief operation in the 
protracted CHE in Southern Sudan.  The overall goal of the research is to gain a better 
understanding of how complex adaptive systems, such as the multiorganizational networks, 
constituted of a large number of diverse and interacting actors, responding to CHEs  and 
confronted with a complex and unpredictable environment, are structured and how they evolve 
and adapt over time.  To achieve this goal, the research will examine the relief operation in 
Southern Sudan and explore its emergence and adaptation over time. The research will analyze 
the context in which the relief operation has been taking place, identify the structure of the 
operation, how interaction and coordination between its members take place, and investigate its 
relationship with its environment and how the environment impacts the operation and vice versa. 
Following on the discussion of CHE provided in Chapter One and the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter Two, this chapter reiterates the research questions, presents the 
propositions to be confirmed or refuted by the research and details the research design and 
methodology. The methodology section explains both the descriptive analysis and the network 
analysis and introduces the network measures that will be used in analyzing the network. These 
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measures will be further elaborated in Chapter Five. The chapter also provides information on 
the data collection and analysis process. 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As stated in chapter one, the research questions of this study are as follows: 
1. How do agencies involved in a relief operation coordinate their work as revealed by their 
interactions? 
2. What is the underlying structure of the relief operation? 
3. How does a relief operation evolve over time to adapt to the changing conditions of the 
emergency? And 
4. How and why do certain institutions emerge and then disappear? 
To answer these questions, the research proposes to conceptualize the relief operation as 
a complex adaptive system and examine it at different points in time.  The IAD framework 
provides a means for studying the relief operation in Southern Sudan as an action situation 
located within other much broader action arenas. Being a sub-system within a larger system with 
which the relief operation and its members continuously interact has its impact on the structure 
and process of the relief operation.   
In answering the research questions, the research goes beyond the analysis of the 
different actors and their mutual relationships to an analysis of the aggregate patterns of these 
relationships. Using social network analysis, the research will examine the repeated interactions 
of the participating organizations.  Although the actors are numerous and different in many 
respects, they are bound together by the same set of environmental constraints and opportunities.  
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By analyzing the structure of the network as a whole and the network position of the different 
actors and their connectedness, the analysis seeks to explore the social structure of the network 
and how it impacts the problem of coordination and adaptation.  Examining the relief operation 
at different points in time allows us to see how its structure has evolved to adapt to the changing 
conditions of the emergency. It also sheds light on why certain institutions emerge and then 
disappear while others may persist. 
3.3 PROPOSITIONS 
The diverse organizations working in a relief operation function under dynamic and uncertain 
conditions, face the same set of environmental constraints and opportunities and share the same 
common goal of providing relief assistance to the war- and famine- affected populations).  At the 
same time, they are separated by their different organizational cultures, mandates, interests, and 
competition over funds. These two sets of factors represent forces pulling the organizations in 
different directions – cooperation and coordination of their efforts and non-cooperation and 
working individually. Working in an insecure and unpredictable environment, organizations 
realize that they have to transcend their differences, to cooperate and coordinate their efforts in 
order to achieve their goals.  
In line with the conceptual framework, this study is conducted under the following propositions:  
1. The attributes of the individual actors:  
a. The larger the organization, the more varied the programs and activities in which 
it is involved, and the more interactions it has with other organizations.  
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b. The longer the involvement of the organization in the relief effort in Sudan, the 
more repeated interactions and the better coordination it has with other 
organizations. 
2. The position of the different actors within the network:  
a. The higher the frequency of interaction between an actor and other actors, the 
more central the position of the actor and the bigger the role the actor plays in 
communication and coordination.  
b. The more peripheral the position of an actor, the smaller the role it plays in 
coordination. 
3.  The humanitarian actors and their environment are strongly interconnected: 
a. The global structure of the operation, has to a large extent, been shaped by the 
interactions among the different actors at the local level.  
b. Interaction between the actors and their environment lead to changes both in the 
relief operation and in the environment.  
 4. External factors beyond the control of the organizations have a strong impact on the relief 
operation. 
a. The more stable the security situation and the less the intensity of fighting, the 
more the organizations are able to carry out their activities. 
b. The more cooperative the relationship between the humanitarian agencies and the 
political and military authorities, the more secure is the humanitarian space. 
c. The more restrictions imposed by political and military authorities, the more 
difficult it becomes for the humanitarian agencies to carry out their work.  
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5. The relief operation evolved over time to create a better fit with its environment and the 
changing conditions of the emergency. 
a. The focus of the operation and its assistance programs changed overtime. 
b. The relationship with the political and military authorities changed during the 
different stages of the operation. 
c. New organizations with different mandates joined the relief operation reflecting 
the changing needs of the affected population.  
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.4.1 Case Selection 
The case selected for this study is the relief operation that has been ongoing in Southern Sudan 
since 1989. Between 1989 and 2005, when the war in Southern Sudan ended, the relief operation 
was known as Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).  Since 2005, OLS as a specific structure ceased 
to exist but most of its constituent organizations, in addition to other organizations that joined the 
relief and recovery effort after the signature of the peace agreement, are still working in Southern 
Sudan under different structures established in the post-conflict era. The case will be studied by 
focusing on three points in its lifetime 1989, 1998 and 2009. Details about the case and the 
selection of the specific points in time are provided in Chapter Four.   
The case is selected because it is a relief operation taking place in the context of a typical 
CHE where conflict, poverty, famine and disease led to great human suffering and destruction of 
livelihoods for large segments of the population. The case also reflects the complexity of the 
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political situation which the providers of humanitarian assistance have to contend with in many 
CHEs.  The long duration of OLS, its continuation until the peace agreement was signed in 2005 
and its eventual disappearance into the new coordination structures provide rich grounds to study 
the processes of coordination and adaptation of relief operations in a changing context. The case 
will also shed light on how and why certain institutional structures emerge, evolve overtime and 
eventually disappear.  
Notwithstanding its idiosyncrasies which make it an important case to study, the relief 
operation in Southern Sudan represents a broader phenomenon of multiorganizational networks 
of relief operations that has been taking place since the 1980s.  Exploring the structure of this 
particular case and understanding its processes of coordination and adaptation will shed light on 
the other cases. The relief operation in Southern Sudan, being a forerunner in humanitarian 
intervention in an active war zone, “… has national, regional and global significance” (Karim, et 
al., 1996). 
3.4.2 Unit of Analysis and Unit of Observation 
In studying the relief operation in Southern Sudan, this research focuses on the organizations 
participating in the relief effort and their interactions among themselves and with the external 
factors in their environment. As such the unit of analysis in this study is the organization 
participating in the relief effort in Southern Sudan. In this research, an organization is defined as 
a group of people organized to meet certain needs or to pursue collective goals. This definition 
takes into consideration both formally established organizations such the UN and international 
NGOs and informal organizations such as CBOs, community groups and armed groups. Based 
on this broad definition, the organizations in this study include humanitarian agencies, 
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government and political authorities, local groups whether community groups or armed groups in 
addition to neighboring countries and donor countries; as well as multi-member organizations 
specializing in certain sectors. In short, any collectivity of individuals that is involved with the 
operation, whether cooperatively or non-cooperatively, is considered an organization. Some of 
the organizations taking part in the relief operation are involved from a distance and are not 
physically present where the relief operation is taking place; examples are donor countries and 
the headquarters of UN agencies and international NGOs. 
Organizations are observed through their reported interactions; as such the unit of 
observation is the interaction between any two or more organizations. Whenever two 
organizations or more communicate, convene or carry out activities together or are involved in 
any transaction, this is considered an interaction. The study takes into consideration the 
documented transactions reported in the situation reports which are the source of relational data 
for the Social Network Analysis.  
3.4.3 The Exploratory Case Study 
Given the nature of the problem studied, the multi-theoretical conceptual framework of the study 
and the fact that the research aims at understanding the structure of a complex adaptive system 
and exploring the processes of coordination and adaptation within this system, a qualitative 
exploratory case study research design and a quantitative social network analysis, are selected for 
this study.  An exploratory case study is the appropriate methodology to use in cases where the 
available literature or the knowledge base is not adequate or when the researcher is using some 
methodological innovation for the particular problem investigated (Yin, 1998, p. 236).  Social 
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Network Analysis allows for an empirical examination of the relationships among the actors in 
the system.  
There are several reasons for the selection of this research design. The first is that the 
study is exploring a complex adaptive system and a linear methodology which looks into cause 
and effect and reduces the system into independent and dependent variables will not take into 
account the complex interactions between the multiple parts of the system. In other words, it will 
look into the parts of the system but not into their interdependencies or the system as a whole 
while in CAS, the “whole is more than the sum of the parts” as it is both the parts and their 
complex interactions among themselves and with their environments that make up the whole. In 
a CAS, all variables (actors) have an impact on each other and an action by one of the actors 
might have ramifications far beyond the direct impact of the action.  De Vaus (2001) points out 
that “case studies are designed to study wholes rather than parts” (p. 231). A research design that 
takes into consideration the parts (entities making up the system) and their attributes, but 
disregards their relationships and ensuing interactions which shape the system (the whole) will 
not adequately address the research questions. The qualitative case study and the social network 
analysis together will allow for a better understanding of the phenomenon under study.  
 The second reason for using this research design is that relief operations take place in 
dynamic contexts, whereby the context has strong impact on the operation while at the same 
time, the operation plays a role in shaping the context. According to Maxwell (1998), two of the 
research purposes for which qualitative studies are especially useful are studies aimed at 
understanding “the particular context within which the participants act, and the influence this 
context has on their actions” and “the processes by which events and actions take place” (p. 77). 
Making the same point, Yin (1993) mentions that “A major rationale for using [case studies] is 
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when your investigation must cover both a particular phenomenon and the context within which 
the phenomenon is occurring either because (a) the context is hypothesized to contain important 
explanatory information about the phenomenon or (b) the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context are not clearly evident” (p. 31). In the case of a humanitarian relief operation, 
both of these situations apply. The context, which is the CHE, contains important information 
about the relief operation and the boundaries between the relief operation and its context are not 
clearly evident given the continuous interactions between the elements from both. The 
importance of context in studying social phenomena underscores the inadequacy of using a 
reductionist linear research design that separates part of the reality from its context to study and 
understand it (Creswell, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Stake, 2000; Yin 1994).  
The third reason for using a qualitative exploratory case study is that the research aims at 
understanding change and evolution over time. Popping (2000) states that “a qualitative 
approach is very important when the investigator wants to describe a specific situation, change, 
or development in a case study” (p. 5). As this research explores the process of adaptation of 
relief operations by studying the operation at three points in time, the case study approach allows 
for providing a detailed description of the operation and its environment at these three points in 
time. Social Network Analysis allows for the mapping of the structure of the operation at the 
different points in time by quantifying the relationships and interactions between the actors.  
The fourth reason is that the questions that this research aims to answer are ‘how and 
why’ questions that seek to explore and understand a certain phenomenon.  According to Yin 
(1994), case study design is appropriate for studying how and why questions. Since the objective 
of this research is to understand and give a detailed account of the circumstances that led to the 
emergence of the relief operation as a multi-organizational network and its adaptation through 
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time, the qualitative case study with the wealth of details it provides is the appropriate design to 
achieve this objective.  
One of the very important points to take into consideration in conducting case study 
research is that it must to be guided by a theoretical framework. De Vaus (2001) mentions that 
“the problem of any description is where to begin and where to end” (p. 224). The theoretical 
framework provides the boundaries within which the description is made. The importance of 
theory in guiding inquiry and in the collection and analysis of information from case studies has 
been emphasized by many scholars. (De Vaus 2001, p. 221; King, Keohane & Verba, 1994;Yin 
1994).  
Based on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter Two, the research will 
examine the relief operation at three points in time focusing both on the relief operation as a 
complex adaptive system and on its context and how the relief operation interacts with the 
context using the IAD framework and applying social network analysis methods.  
Succinctly summarizing the importance of context and theory in case study research 
design, Yin points out that “… you would use the case study method because you deliberately 
wanted to cover contextual conditions – believing that they might be highly pertinent to your 
phenomenon of study” and that the case study “… benefits from the prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 1994, 13). The findings of 
the study will either confirm or refute the propositions made earlier in the chapter. 
The case study design focuses on the following: nature of the case, the case’s historical 
background, the physical setting, and other contexts e.g.  the political context (Stake, 2000; Yin, 
1994).  As Stake, (2000) mentions, “within its unique history, the case is a complex entity 
operating within a number of contexts” (p. 439) which are very important in understanding it. 
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The exploratory process 'will give a detailed description of the relief operation and its constituent 
members, how it came into being and how it evolved through time. It will also cover the 
contextual factors impacting on it. The case is a ‘bounded system’ (Flood in Fals Borda cited in 
Stake, 2000, p. 436); it is specific, it has working parts, it is purposive, and it is an integrated 
system. In case studies, “it is common to recognize that certain features are within the system, 
within the boundaries of the case, and other features are significant as context” (Stake p. 436). 
3.4.4 Intrinsic or Instrumental Case Study 
The case study design poses a number of issues that need to be examined. One of these questions 
is what type of case study is it – intrinsic or instrumental.  As Stake (2000) puts it, the case can 
be studied because of its uniqueness, i.e. an intrinsic case study or because it illustrates a broader 
class of cases, i.e. an instrumental case study. 
The case for this study falls within both categories – it is instrumental because it 
represents a phenomenon that has been in the increase since the 1980s in many parts of the 
world. Understanding this particular case will shed light on other cases of relief operations in 
complex emergencies. At the same time, although CHE share common characteristics, each CHE 
is unique within its own context.  Accordingly the relief operation responding to it is unique as 
well – in terms of its composition, activities, relationships with authorities, structure and the 
broader political influences affecting it.  Yet, there are some commonalties that can be examined, 
such as the complex environments in which relief operations take place, the relief operations are 
more or less constituted of the same set of international actors, and are non-hierarchal forms of 
organization. Stephenson describes international humanitarian assistance as follows, “while 
constructed anew in each emergency in its particulars, UN humanitarian aid network 
 63 
interventions are always structurally without a single steersman with operative hierarchical 
control” (Stephenson, 2004, p. 6). 
3.4.5 Generalizability (External Validity) 
The other important issue related to case studies is their generalizability to other cases.  Some 
scholars criticize the case study research design because it is not possible to generalize from the 
particular case to a population. Ragin and Becker (1992) stresses the significance of the question 
of “what is it a case of”. His point is that studying a particular case is justified “… only if it 
serves an understanding of grand issues or explanations”. On the other hand, Stake (2000) 
underscores that a case study design “… draws attention to the question of what specifically can 
be learned from the single case…  [and] designing the study to optimize understanding of the 
case rather than generalizations beyond” (p. 435-6).  
Most of the scholars who advocate the use of the case study make the point that it is 
possible to generalize from case studies and the most useful generalizations from case studies are 
analytic and theoretical, not as a sample to populations or universes (Firestone (1993) cited in 
Matthew & Huberman,1994; Flick et al., 2004; Yin 1994). The insights gained from studying a 
particular case helps in developing theoretical propositions that can be observed and tested in 
other cases. 
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3.5 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research is a mixed methodology consisting of both a qualitative 
descriptive analysis and a quantitative empirical social network analysis. Using mixed methods 
will allow for a better understanding of the phenomenon under study.  
3.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive analysis will cover the nature of the case, the case’s historical background, its 
setting and the wider context in which it is taking place (Stake, 2000; Yin, 1994). The descriptive 
analysis will particularly focus on how the relief operation emerged and evolved overtime to 
adapt to its changing context. In the descriptive analysis, ideas and concepts from the IAD 
Framework and Lewin’s Force Field Theory will be used to untangle the context identifying the 
exogenous factors, both driving and restraining forces, the action situation and the participants. 
The analysis will also highlight the role played by rules in shaping the patterns of interactions of 
the participants leading to the emergence of certain institutions and how these complex 
interactions may result in changes in the rules that shaped them in the first place. In this analysis, 
the question of humanitarian space, which is of crucial importance in relief operations, and 
relations with military and political authorities, will be tackled. 
This descriptive analysis is important to understand how the relief operation came into 
being and how it evolved.  As Flyvbjerg (2001) mentions “case studies often contain a 
substantial element of narrative. Good narratives typically approach the complexities and 
contradictions of real life” (p. 84). It is through narrative that the complexities of a relief 
operation and its context will become clear. The descriptive analysis will be guided by the 
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theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, which will provide the boundaries of the case and 
gives direction to which aspects of the environment to focus on.  
The descriptive analysis will cover the background to the relief operation including the 
relief efforts before the establishment of OLS. It will give a detailed account of the conditions 
that led to the emergence of this particular operation in the continuous relief effort in Southern 
Sudan which has been ongoing before the establishment of OLS and is continuing after it came 
to an end. It will cover the critical issues and critical actors in OLS, the environmental factors 
and the larger organizational setting of which OLS is just a subset. In this analysis, different 
documentary sources and publications, including UN documents, independent reviews, studies of 
the operation and news articles will be used.  Triangulating the sources will give as accurate an 
account of the case as possible, as Stake (2000) mentions “triangulation serves … to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen” (p. 444). 
The descriptive analysis will cover three stages of the operation represented by three 
distinct time periods. The first stage is the initial stage is during the year 1989 when the 
operation was created and at the time envisioned as a short term quick relief operation to avert 
the food shortages in Southern Sudan and to provide relief to war affected populations both on 
the government side and the rebel movement side. The second stage is represented by the year 
1998, nine years into the operation when Southern Sudan faced a similar famine like the one it 
faced in 1989 and led to the establishment of the operation. What is significant about this second 
stage is that a famine reoccurred in Southern Sudan in the presence of an active relief operation. 
In addition, there was a de facto division of the country into government held territories and 
rebel held territories and the focus of the operation was on the rebel-held territories.  The third 
stage is represented by the year 2009 when OLS as a structure ceased to exist but all most of its 
 66 
constituent members were still operating within the post conflict coordination structures and in 
many ways still undertaking the same activities as before, in addition to new activities created by 
the post-conflict situation.  
3.5.2 Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques will be used to examine the interactions between the 
different organizations participating in the operation. SNA focuses on both the actors and their 
relationships as such it goes beyond the conventional analysis which focuses only on the actors 
and their attributes.  Another advantage of SNA is that it allows the researcher to examine the 
data at several levels of analysis with the actors embedded at the lowest level.  It allows the 
analyst to examine “how the individual [or organization] is embedded within a structure and how 
the structure emerges from the micro-relations between individual parts” (Hanneman, 2001, p. 5-
7). The actors (nodes in the terminology of SNA) interact with each other and their relationships 
are known as links, ties or edges. Networks may be small or large with numerous actors and the 
actors may have more than one type of relationship with any other actor. 
This research will examine the relief operation at three points in time and describe its 
size, density and structure. Through a network analysis of the interactions of organizations, the 
patterns of interconnectedness between the different organizations and their positions in the 
network will be identified. This will reveal who are the key actors in terms of their centrality and 
prominence which indicates their role in communication and coordination. It will also uncover 
the structure of the network and how strongly or loosely connected are its different members. 
Examining the network overtime will show how its structure has evolved over time and whether 
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key actors remained the same and retained their positions within the network or they have 
changed. 
 One of the important issues in conducting network analysis is to determine the 
boundaries of the network (Hanneman, 2001; Knoke & Kuklinksi, 1982; Scott, 2000; 
Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In many networks, boundaries are ‘… imposed or created by the 
actors themselves… so, in a sense, social network studies often draw boundaries around a 
population that is known, a priori, to be a network” (Hannenman, 2001, p. 5). The network under 
study has natural boundaries as the organizations participating in the relief organization are 
known a priori.  
3.5.3 Network Measures 
Different Network measures will be used, including density and measures of centrality whose 
definitions are given below. The definitions of other network measures used in this study are 
provided in Chapter Five. 
Density is a characteristic of the whole network. It describes the overall level of 
connections among the different organizations in the network and as such it is a measure of 
‘group cohesion” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 181). It is a proportion whose value ranges 
from zero, a totally disconnected network to one, a totally connected network. It is calculated as 
the number of all ties actually occurring in a network divided by the number of all possible ties.  
Centralization indicates the overall cohesion or integration of the network around 
certain organizations (Freeman, 1979; Scott, 2000). It is a measure of the power structure in the 
group as the more central organizations have more connections with other organizations and 
accordingly can play a significant role in communication and coordination. At the same time, 
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having more connections with other organizations give them access to information that less 
connected organizations will not have.  
While centralization is a measure of cohesion of the whole network, centrality measures 
indicate the links that a specific organization has with other organizations in the network. Three 
of the centrality measures are: 
Degree centrality is calculated as the total number of organizations to which a specific 
organization is connected. A high degree centrality indicates that the organization is well 
connected within the network. Degree centrality takes into consideration only the direct links 
between the organization and other organizations rather than the indirect links to all other 
organizations. It might be the case that an organization is very well connected but only locally 
since the other organizations to which it  is  linked are disconnected from the network as a whole 
(Hanneman, 2001; Scott; 2000). This is why it is important to look at degree centrality together 
with the other measures of centrality such as closeness centrality and betweenness centrality.    
Closeness centrality focuses on the geodesic distance (shortest path) between an 
organization and all others in the network. It is calculated as the sum of the geodesic distances 
between the focal organization and all other organizations (Hanneman, 2001; Freeman, 1979; 
Scott, 2000b). An organization with a low sum distance is more central since it is ‘close’ to a 
large number of organizations in the network.  
Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which an organization falls on the 
geodesic paths between other pairs of organizations in the network. The more times this is the 
case, the more favorable the position of the organization and the more power and control it has, 
as other organizations depend on it to reach others in the network (Freeman 1979; Hanneman, 
2001; Scott 2000).  Betweenness centrality is also referred to as structural holes by Burt (1992), 
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as both emphasize the importance of the role of intermediaries. A structural hole exists where 
two points are connected at distance 2, but not at distance one, i.e., through an intermediary 
(Scott, 2000, p. 87). As Hanneman (2001) puts it, “typically, some actors have lots of 
connections, others have fewer. Particularly, as populations become larger, not all possible 
connects are present – there are ‘structural holes’” (p. 38). Actors with high betweenness 
centrality bridge the structural holes in the network.  
Eigenvector centrality is a measure an organization’s influence based on who its 
neighbors are. An organization is central to the extent that its neighbors are central. Eigenvector 
centrality is different from degree centrality because it takes into consideration the overall 
network including both direct and indirect links between the organization and other organizations 
and it “… weights contacts according to their centralities”.   As such, it “… can be seen as a 
weighted sum of not only direct connections but indirect connections of every length” 
((Bonacich, p. 2007, p. 555). 
These measures will help me identify the structure of the operation. Calculating them at 
three points in time will reveal whether how the structure has changed over time. The measures 
will also allow me to see how connected the actors were, their position in the network, and the 
availability of pathways between them. This will shed light on how the different organizations 
interacted and coordinated their relief effort.  
3.5.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
3.5.4.1 Data Collection 
The data for this research come from documentary sources and archival records covering 
the three periods at which the relief operation is studied. Documents and archival records are 
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important sources of data in studying organizations and multiorganizational networks where the 
focus is more on relationships between the different entities rather than the attributes of the 
individual entities. Ventresca & Mohr (2002) mention that the increasing importance of the use 
of archival records as sources of data to be analyzed accompanied the “… the shift away from 
analytic projects that emphasize organizations as independent objects towards the measurement 
of relations among objects and inherent connectivity of social organizations” (p. 811). The 
advantage of using documents and archival records is that they are rich repositories of 
information on organizational life as they capture events and “… represent forms of social 
discourse – literally, ways of communicating, producing, and enacting organizational life” 
(Riles, 2000; Smith (1984) cited in Ventresca & Mohr, 2002, p. 806). 
 Relational data extracted from documents and archival records are used to 
identify the structure of the operation, and the ties that link the different entities together, and to 
describe how the structure evolved through time. Compared to sociometric data used to define 
relationships, documents and archival records have several advantages. They are inexpensive and 
in most cases easily accessible, the data are not restricted to a physical respondent who many not 
be available to provide the information, the data obtained are unbiased by the interests of actors 
whom interactions are described, and most importantly, “… the data can be used to describe 
transformations in network structure over enormous periods of time” (Burt, 1983, p. 163). 
It is worth noting that at the earlier stage of this research, several attempts have been 
made to collect network data from the staff members of the organizations involved in the relief 
operation through a survey questionnaire to capture any information that might be missing from 
the documentary and archival sources. Unfortunately, the response rate was very low in spite of 
repeated communications with the potential respondents. Out of 78 survey questionnaires sent 
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out and followed with several reminders, only four completed questionnaires were received. 
Since this number is too small and using the data from the four completed questionnaires in the 
analysis will give a very incomplete picture of the network, I decided not to use the survey 
questionnaire and to obtain the network data from documents and archival records.  
Situation reports covering the three stages of the operation are the main source for 
network data. Situation reports covering the formative period of the operation in 1989 were 
obtained from the records of the Sudan Open Archive of the Rift Valley Institute. Situation 
reports covering the year 1998 were obtained from the Reliefweb website, while those covering 
the 2009 period up to August were obtained from UN OCHA Sudan website.  
3.5.4.2 Data Analysis  
Data Analysis for this research was conducted through several steps. The first step was a 
review of all the collected documents and archival records to gain general knowledge of the 
operation and to identify the distinct stages that are covered by this research. This first step of the 
analysis, guided by the IAD framework, provided the information that is used for the descriptive 
analysis of the operation presented in the next chapter. 
The next step was to conduct content analysis coding to extract the relational data for 
network analysis from the situation reports covering the three stages of the operation. Three sets 
of data were created, each covering one of the stages of the operation. The purpose was to 
identify the actors, sectors and location of the operation at each stage in order to see how they 
changed or remained the same and how the network evolved over time and adapted to the 
changing conditions of the emergency.  As Burt (1983) mentions in the content analysis of 
archival records, “the inference … [is] that actors embroiled in the same events are more likely 
to have relations with one another than actors involved in different events’ (p. 163).  
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The content analysis coding of the situation reports aimed at identifying the following: 
1. The organizations taking part in the operation as documented in the situation reports. 
2. The interactions among these organizations. 
3. The sectors in which they interacted (e.g. food provision, health, education, security, 
transportation … etc.). 
4. The locations or geographic areas they covered. 
5. The context in which these interactions occurred. The context provided the organizations 
with challenges and opportunities which impacted on their interactions.  
The content analysis of the situation reports was carried out manually and was coded into 
Microsoft Office Excel 2007 spreadsheets. It went through three rounds of ‘cleaning’ to make 
sure that the coding is consistent among the three stages. Each organization was given a system 
number when it was first mentioned in the situation reports and it carried this number through in 
the three datasets.  In conducting the content analysis, interactions were defined as joint actions 
in which two or more organizations are involved. If more than two organizations were involved, 
the interaction was coded more than once to take into account all the involved organizations. If 
two organizations were involved in an interaction in more than one sector or more than one 
geographic area, the interaction is coded more than once to take account all the sectors and all 
the geographic areas. In coding each interaction, there was a distinction between organizations 
on the basis of whether the organization initiated the action or responded to it, i.e. initiating 
organization vs. responding organization.  
One of the challenges faced when coding the situation reports was that some actions were 
reported as carried out by NGOs collectively as one entity, without naming the NGOs involved 
individually. I coded the initiating or responding organization in these cases as “NGOs”. At the 
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same time, other reported actions were carried out by individual NGOs, whose names were 
provided in the situation reports and in this case, I used the actual names of the NGOs in the 
coding. Accordingly, the list of organizations in the dataset used in the network analysis includes 
“NGOs” as on entity as well as the individual NGOs. The term, “NGOs,” includes any number 
of the individual NGOs.   
To conduct the network analysis, the coded data was imported into the Organizational 
Risk Analyzer (ORA) software which is a network analysis tool that detects an organization’s 
structure (Carley et al., 2009).  The network measures generated using the three datasets allowed 
me to identify the overall structure of the network, the positions of key actors, and how the 
structure and the positions changed and evolved overtime. 
3.6 SUMMARY  
The chapter presented the research design and research methodology. The research design is an 
exploratory case study while the methodology is a descriptive analysis based on the IAD 
Framework and Lewin’s Force Field Theory and a Social Network Analysis of the relational data 
of the relief operation at three points in time. The overall research design and methodology is 
guided by the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two. 
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4.0  DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASE  
This chapter will give an overview of the civil war in Sudan and describe the humanitarian relief 
efforts, of which Operation Lifeline Sudan was the most significant, against the background of 
the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and Kurt Lewin’s Force-Field Theory 
and within the context of the international aid system. The first section will introduce the 
framework for the descriptive analysis. The second section is an overview of the civil war in 
Sudan and the environmental disasters which led to the CHE to which the international 
community responded by providing humanitarian assistance. The third section will cover the 
relief efforts in Sudan starting with the early relief efforts preceding the establishment of OLS, 
the creation and evolution of OLS, its eventual disappearance after the signing of the peace 
agreement in 2005, and the humanitarian situation and response as of 2009 in Southern Sudan. It 
will highlight the complex environment in which the relief operation came into existence and 
how the operation evolved and adapted to the changing conditions of the emergency. The fifth 
section will provide an overview of the humanitarian situation and the response as of 2009 in 
Southern Sudan. The chapter will be concluded in the fourth section. 
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4.1 FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
4.1.1 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
The descriptive analysis in this chapter is guided by the IAD framework as presented in Chapter 
Two. The IAD framework, which incorporates a number of institutional and organizational 
factors, enables me to describe the relief operation at different levels of analysis and to account 
for both factors endogenous to the operation and factors exogenous to it that impacted it. Based 
on the framework, I describe the relief operation as a nested set within a larger set of relief 
efforts taking place in Sudan since the mid-1980s and being continuously influenced by the local 
conditions of the emergency in addition to global developments. Even the larger set of relief 
efforts within Sudan is also a sub-set of an international aid system, which has been in existence 
for a long time, but has changed significantly with the end of the Cold War. Once of the 
manifestations of this change is the establishment of large relief operations in active war zones 
(Duffield, 2000, p. 112). 
4.1.2 Lewin’s Force Field Theory 
The description is also based on Lewin’s Force Field Theory whereby the driving forces and the 
restraining forces impacting the relief operation will be analyzed.  As Kurt Lewin wrote "an 
issue is held in balance by the interaction of two opposing sets of forces - those seeking to 
promote change (driving forces) and those attempting to maintain the status quo (restraining 
forces)" (Accel-Team, 2009). For Operation Lifeline Sudan, the fact that it continued for such a 
long time beyond its early envisioned three months duration means that the restraining forces 
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which maintained the status quo (continuous relief effort) are much stronger than the driving 
factors, which attempted to change the situation by addressing the causes of the emergency that 
created the need for humanitarian assistance in the first place. The restraining forces can be 
summarized in the continuation of the state of emergency and the dire need for relief assistance, 
the interests of different stakeholders, including relief agencies attracting money from donors, 
donors avoiding political intervention through a continuous humanitarian effort, and different 
warring factions benefiting from the relief assistance and finding that the population is provided 
with basic needs while they can continue their fight. The driving forces can be summarized in 
efforts to find a political solution and end the conflict and the long-term interests of the 
beneficiaries which will be better served by peace and development instead of a continuous relief 
effort. The fact that Southern Sudan is still in need of humanitarian assistance, although it is in a 
post-conflict era after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 attests to the 
strength of the restraining forces (IRIN, 2009). 
4.1.3 Interaction between IAD Framework and Lewin’s Force Field Theory 
The combination of the IAD Framework and Lewin’s Force Field Theory enables us to 
understand, within the wider international aid system and within the relief effort in Sudan, “… 
why and how some policies, rules, norms, practices, procedures, and processes at different levels 
of action are institutionalized and why others are not…” (Imperial, 2005, p. 207-8 quoted in 
Hardy & Koontz, 2009, p. 394). The fact that some policies, norms, and practices continue and 
become institutionalized while others demise means that there are different forces pushing 
towards the continuation and institutionalization of the first and working against the continuation 
and institutionalization of the second. The importance of rules, both formal and informal, in the 
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context of relief operations in general, stems from the fact that they dictate to organizations 
participating in the international relief system which emergencies to respond to, what actions to 
take, what types of resources will be made available, who can participate, what support they can 
get or what constraints they may face?  (Imperial, 2005, p. 307-8 quoted in Hardy & Koontz, 
2009, p. 395). Rules can be considered as driving and restraining forces, which, in interaction, 
can either maintain or change the status quo.  
 When a relief operation is viewed through the lens of the IAD framework and 
Lewin’s Force-Field Theory, it is a collection of actors who take actions in an “action arena” and 
whose actions are governed by a set of rules which can drive the actors in opposing directions. 
Actors continue to interact and their actions either drive towards a certain situation or restrain 
away from it. This dynamic will continue until an equilibrium is reached, when either the driving 
forces or the restraining forces are powerful enough to overcome the other.  In the case of the 
relief operation in Sudan, there are rules that led to the creation of Operation Lifeline Sudan in 
1989, rules for joining it, rules on how the operation as a whole functions, rules that led to its 
continuation (against those that would have shortened its lifespan), rules that shaped its activities 
(types of sectors in which relief agencies work, the interactions of relief agencies with each other 
and with warring factions etc.) and rules that finally led to its eventual demise in 2005 and its 
replacement with alternative structures suitable for the post-conflict era. During the period of 
organized relief effort in Sudan in war time, from 1989 to 2005, the driving forces that looked 
beyond the relief efforts and attempt to find a long term solution to the conflict and to end the 
state of emergency were weaker than the restraining forces maintaining the status quo, 
continuation of the state of emergency and the relief operation. Although a peace agreement has 
been signed and the relief operation as it was known has come to an end with the focus on 
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recovery and post-conflict reconstruction, yet the emergency, caused by tribal conflicts and 
environmental factors, is still in place, requiring large scale relief effort.   
4.1.4 The International Aid System 
  The International Aid System has both a supply side and a demand side. The 
supply side is represented by donor countries and the international aid organizations which 
provide both humanitarian aid and development aid. The demand side is represented by the 
developing countries whether those in conflict or battling with poverty and attempting to provide 
a better standard of living for their citizens.  The origins of the aid system goes back to the 
establishment of the ICRC in 1876 (ICRC, 2009), and then the relief efforts in Europe after the 
First and Second World Wars where, with the Marshal Plan, huge sums of money were pumped 
from the US into the European Economies to recover from the impact of the War. During the 
early 1980s, with the open market economies and the policies of Reagan and Thatcher and the 
belief in small governments, aid, which used to be provided directly to governments, was 
increasingly channeled through NGOs and civil society organizations at the expense of 
governments. Accordingly, the role of non-state entities such as UN organizations and NGOs, 
both national and international, expanded significantly since the 1980s both in conflict situations 
where humanitarian assistance is provided and also in normal conditions where development aid 
is provided.  
With regard to humanitarian assistance during conflict, and notwithstanding its long 
history, its nature and structure changed with the change of the international order at the end of 
the Cold War. As Duffield (2000) mentions many factors including the growth of NGOs, the 
largely deregulated aid market, attempts at greater coordination within the UN system, together 
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“have produced large integrated relief operations in situations of on-going conflicts” (p. 112).  
The integrated relief operations replaced the earlier scattered relief efforts by individual 
agencies. The different parts of these integrated operations are connected through layers of 
linkages at different levels, for example, between the suppliers of aid, there are linkages between 
donor countries, UN agencies, between the NGOs belonging to the same country, between the 
federations (confederations) of NGOs such as the OXFAM, CARE International, Save the 
Children and World Vision International (Webster & Walker, 2009). As such the structure of the 
international aid system is not a hierarchical or a linear structure, but more of a complex system 
composed of numerous actors, which form their own sub-structures connected with each other 
through a multiplicity of linkages and forming parts of the superstructure – which is the 
international aid system.  According to Duffield (2000), “due to the linkages, networks and 
cross-cutting ties within such structures, together with their strategic nature, they are a good 
example of the move from government to the networks of governance that characterize 
globalization” (p. 112). Since the international aid system is not a hierarchical system with a 
clear chain of command and governed by a clear set of rules, this creates room for different 
driving and restraining forces to impact on the system and the relief operations that form part of 
it.  
The essence of the idea of a network is that it defies centralized decision making. Despite 
the fact that the different actors are part of a large superstructure, yet they are independent 
decision makers and they are accountable to different constituencies and accordingly are 
governed by different sets of rules and norms and different agendas and interests. Although they 
are independent entities when it comes to decision making, yet they are interdependent and need 
each other so that the international aid system can function. Describing the structure of the aid 
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system, Duffield (2000) mentions “the organizational structure of the present aid system contains 
a wide range of decision making networks, some of which are in competition. It is also 
characterized by entropy. That is, the increasing difficulty of reaching and enforcing collective 
decisions” (p. 112). Within the overall superstructure (the international aid system), some actors 
are more powerful than others because of the resources they possess, whether economic 
resources or political leverage.  These actors are mainly donors from the rich industrialized 
countries and the large coordinating bodies such as the UN. Duffield (2000) describes these 
strong actors as the ‘prime movers within the aid system’ (p. 112). These prime movers are one 
of the powerful forces behind the creation and growth of relief operations.  Although the dire 
situation of citizens suffering during CHE calls for a relief effort, if the prime movers are not 
interested, then the relief effort will not take place.  Without donor resources, the good willing 
NGOs and relief workers will not have much to offer, especially in the context of large 
integrated relief operations.  
An understanding of this international aid system is important to understand the response 
to any emergency.  In addition to the humanitarian imperative which the drive behind relief 
operations, there are the different interests of the respondents to an emergency that have to be 
taken into account. These interests, in many situations, act as the restraining force against the 
change of the status quo and lead to the continuation of relief operations even at times when 
there are driving forces calling for moving beyond the mere provision of relief assistance and 
lifesaving aid and trying to find long term solutions to the emergencies.   
The demand side for aid is represented by the developing countries and their citizens, 
particularly those suffering during emergencies. Although the demand side is significant, yet it is 
not the most powerful driving force. The is proven by the case of what is referred to as 
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“forgotten emergencies” where there is human suffering and a real need for humanitarian 
assistance, yet the situation is ignored or at least not given the same weight and importance as 
similar situations in other areas of the world. The statistics of aid to different emergencies in the 
world attest to this fact. The case of forgotten emergencies is where the interests of the powerful 
players, the prime movers of the system, and how these interests govern the system becomes 
very apparent (ILO, 2007, p. 19). As Brusset (2000) mentions describing the case of Sudan, but 
can be broadly applied, the research “… for different donors, at different times and for different 
reasons, aid has been used both to reduce and to intensify the conflict. This is despite the fact that 
the avowed objective of all actors in the conflict (whether aid donors or not) was to promote a 
lasting peace” (p. 131). 
 Within the international aid system – humanitarian assistance came to take central stage 
even at the expense of development aid. No one can argue with its noble objective of saving lives 
and reducing suffering, but as Loane (2000) mentions “one of the problems of humanitarian 
assistance is the failure to recognize and understand the relationship between humanitarian 
assistance, politics and aid. This failure leads to undermining either the humanitarian or the 
political response on their own right” (p. 18). Failure to understand this relationship or a 
conscious decision by the providers of aid to ignore it led in many situations to the prolonging of 
emergency situations and the negative impacts of aid widely documented in the literature, such 
as prolonging of conflict, aid dependency, and abuse of aid by warring factor.   
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4.2 THE ACTION ARENA – THE COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY IN 
SUDAN  
The complex humanitarian emergency is Sudan was caused by violent conflict that has been 
raging in Southern Sudan since the mid-1950s. In spite of the long duration of the war, the 
environmental disasters that hit the country such as the drought of 1984 and 1985 and the early 
relief efforts, it was only in 1989 that a major coordinated relief operation has taken place after 
an agreement was reached among the two warring factions and the UN to allow relief aid to 
reach the affected population on both sides of the conflict. 
4.2.1 CONFLICT IN SUDAN 
4.2.1.1 Dynamics of Conflict in Sudan 
Sudan, the largest country in Africa, was the first African country to gain its 
independence from British colonial rule after the Second World War and it was also the first to 
experience a civil war (Johnson, 2003, p. 21). Sudan is the home to nearly 600 ethnic groups, 
belonging to 50 major ethnic groups speaking more than 100 languages (Deng and Minear, 1992, 
p. 12; Metz (Ed), 1991). Sudan’s ethnic diversity coupled with its history, especially under 
British colonial rule and its policy of closed areas in Southern Sudan in 1922, in addition to the 
differential developmental policies in the Northern and Southern parts of the country, led the 
creation of a rift in the North-South relationship. Broadly speaking, Sudan is viewed as being 
divided into a Muslim Arab North and a Christian African South, although in reality the division 
is not so clear cut, as neither is the North completely Arab and Muslim nor is the South 
completely Christian. This general dichotomy – which also reflects Sudan’s unique location as 
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the ‘gateway’ between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab World – coupled with Sudan’s history 
came to reflect a clear divide between the North and the South.  It also came to denote 
differential economic and political power (between a politically powerful and wealthy north and 
a politically underrepresented and underdeveloped South). This resulted in the marginalization of 
the South described by Tipo (2009) as “a process when certain communities are deprived of the 
basic rights in terms of development, economic and political power in their country.”  
This dichotomy, according to Sidahmed (2008) is “… an oversimplification of a very 
complex situation in historical, socio-economic, and political terms. Sudanese society is 
characterized by multiple regional disparities as well as multiple ethno-religious and cultural 
identities, at times converging, and at others diverging along these fault lines.” (p. 73)   The 
dichotomy, which depicts the north as politically powerful and wealthy and the South are 
underrepresented and underdeveloped, is not completely true and it misrepresents the situation in 
Sudan.   As Sidahmed (2008) mentions, the current conflict in Darfur between the central 
government and the rebel groups defies this dichotomy and reflects “… the complexity of the 
Sudanese situation and its political dynamics.” (p. 73)   To the conflict in Darfur, can be added 
the low-impact conflict that has been taking place in Eastern Sudan because of political 
marginalization and lack of economic and social development until 2006 when the Eastern 
Sudan Peace Agreement was signed. These conflicts in the East and West, which geographically, 
belong to the northern part of the country, clearly reveal that underdevelopment and 
underrepresentation are  not along ethnic and religious lines, as the East is predominantly Arab 
and both the East and West are predominantly Muslim. Accordingly, the North-South conflict is 
more a result of economic and political disparities between a powerful center and a marginalized 
periphery. Colonial powers played a significant role in creating the disparity in the first place and 
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the successive national governments that took over power after independence did not do enough 
to address the wealth and power disparities between the center and the different regions, and in 
particular the southern region.  
4.2.1.2  Sudan First and Second Civil Wars 
 
The violent conflict in Southern Sudan, which began with a mutiny of the military corps 
in the Southern town of Torit in August 1955, four months before Sudan’s independence on 1st 
January 1956, has been going on intermittently until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between the Sudan Government and the rebel Movement, Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was signed in 2005. Although the conflict began in the middle of 
the last century, yet its origins go back in history to the nineteenth century with the Turko-
Egyptian conquest of Sudan. According to Johnson (2000), “it was during this time that patterns 
of economic exploitation were established, and a religious division was introduced, which 
interlocked with the distribution of political, economic and social rights and contributed to the 
evolution of civil conflict as a form of expression” (p. 45). It was in the 1920s, during British-
Egyptian Condominium Rule of Sudan, that the British introduced the ‘Closed Areas Act’ which 
separated the North from the South and resulted in an uneven development between the two parts 
of the country. According to Deng and Minear (1993), the British separatist policy “… kept 
Arab-Islamic influence out of the South and preserved the people [of the South] in their 
indigenous state, without any development, except for the modest ‘civilizing’ influence of the 
Christian missions” (p. 16). It was only in the 1947 Juba Conference, that the Northern and 
Southern parts of the country were brought together again after more than 20 years of separate 
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administration and separate development (Johnson, 2003, p. 25). As such the seeds of conflict 
had already been sown.   
The long armed conflict is divided into two main periods. The First Civil War from 1955 
to 1973, when the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed and resulted in a ten-year period of peace 
and relative development in Southern Sudan (Johnson 2003, p. 39; Sidahmed, 2008, p. 79). The 
Agreement resolved the security and political questions and resulted in the formation of the 
Southern Regional Government (Johnson, 2003, p. 39). In spite of the fact that during the ten-
year period of peace from 1973 – 1983, some developments took place in Southern Sudan, both 
politically and economically, yet issues of economic development, oil, and borders became very 
contentious and resulted in the eruption of fighting again in 1983, ushering Sudan into the 
Second Civil War from 1983 to 2005.  
The Second Civil War between the Government of Sudan and the People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) ended in 2005, but the South continues to be in a state of complex 
humanitarian emergency requiring humanitarian intervention because of inter-clan and inter-
tribal conflicts and attacks by the Lord Resistance Army2 which claim the lives of hundreds of 
people and destroy people’s means of livelihoods. In August 14, 2009, the UN Deputy Resident 
Coordinator in Sudan reported that “since January of … [2009], more than two thousand people 
in Southern Sudan have been killed as a result of inter-tribal conflict and a quarter of a million 
people … have been displaced across the ten states [of Southern Sudan]” (Sudan Watch, 2009). 
In spite of the fact that Southern Sudan is considered to be in a post-conflict state where recovery 
                                                 
2 Ugandan Group formed in 1987 and engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ugandan Government. The LRA 
operated in northern Uganda but also in Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord's_Resistance_Army and  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/lra.htm 
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and rehabilitation efforts in addition to institution building initiatives are taking place, yet it is 
still in a complex humanitarian emergency situation where violence, hunger, disease and 
displacement still affect  considerable numbers of the population (IRIN, 2009).  
The root causes of the two conflicts are multi-faceted and complex. Although authors 
writing about Sudan civil wars agree on the complexity of the factors behind the wars, they focus 
on different factors as root causes of the conflict. Rolandsen (2005) mentions that “some stress 
the radically different cultures and identities of the North and the South, while others emphasize 
the long history of marginalization and exploitation of Southerners within successive Sudanese 
state structures. … Northern Sudanese scholars tend to present a somewhat similar version, but 
here the source of conflict is the colonial intervention which, through its separation policy, 
hindered the development of a unified state” (p. 15-16). Generally, it is agreed that the causes of 
conflict include historical, socio-economic and political aspects that go back to the British 
colonial policy in Sudan, development disparities between the North and the South, and 
mobilization of political support along ethnic lines (Ahmed, 2008; Johnson, 2003).  In the early 
1980s, additional factors such as “the discovery of oil in South Sudan; the division of the South 
into three smaller regions; and the incorporation of aspects of Islamic Shari’a laws in Sudan’s 
criminal justice system” fueled the conflict which has been dormant for a period of 10 years 
(Verney, et al. cited in Sidahmed, 2008, p. 79).  
The impact of the Second Civil War, which like the first civil war was fought in Southern 
Sudan, was huge in terms of the human toll, the destruction of infrastructure and the disruption 
of livelihood activities in addition to straining the country’s economy. It led to massive internal 
displacement of the people of Southern Sudan to the Northern part of the country and large 
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numbers of people fleeing the war zones and settling in neighboring countries as refugees 
(Ahmed, 2008; Johnson, 2003; Verney, et al. cited in Sidahmed, 2008, p. 82).  
4.2.2 The Actors 
During the two civil wars, the two main actors were the Central Government in Khartoum and a 
number of rebel groups formed from different tribes in Southern Sudan. The rebel groups were 
not one homogenous or invariant group as they had come together and had split many times 
during the war along tribal lines or along different viewpoints and ideologies (Johnson, 2003; 
Rolandsen, 2005). The second civil war was complicated by what Johnson (2003) refers to as 
‘multiple civil wars’ whereby “multiple local grievances have created numerous motives for 
armed confrontations, and shifting alliances within the wider conflict produced a pattern of 
interlocking civil wars, … being fought on different levels” (p. 127). In addition to these front-
line actors, there were many other actors behind them supplying them with resources and arms. 
Although on the face of it, the war is between a disenfranchised and marginalized group against 
a dominant group, yet at the time, it was also a reflection of more broader and global issues such 
as The Cold War confrontations between the United States of America and the then USSR. Each 
of the two superpowers, in pursuit of their national interest and global dominance, supported 
warring parties in many internal conflicts around and world and Sudan was no exception. It is 
noteworthy that the civil wars in Sudan continued, except for the period of 1973-1983 following 
the signing of Addis Ababa Agreement, in spite of the several regime changes in Sudan from 
military to democratically elected government and vice versa. This testifies to the fact that the 
successive governments failed to address the root causes of the conflict. In addition, it also gives 
credence to the more global dimension of the war.   
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Another important group of actors, which played a significant role in the conflict, was the 
neighboring countries which gave refugee to the rebel groups and supported them with arms and 
resources. This can be seen clearly when neighboring Ethiopia with its communist regime 
provided support to southern rebel groups including the SPLM/A during the early years of the 
rebellion (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 26). With the end of the communist regime in Ethiopia and the 
improvement in the relationship between Ethiopia and the central government in Sudan, this 
support was reduced. In 1996, when the relationships between Ethiopia and Khartoum 
deteriorated, Ethiopia was again ready to provide military assistance to the SPLM/A (Rolandsen, 
2005, p. 125).  With the rise of an Islamist government in Sudan – antagonistic toward the US in 
the mid-1980s and with the demise of the Soviet Union, the rebel movement drew its support 
from the US. Although the war is an internal war fought within the boundaries of one country,  it 
indirectly represents global and regional dynamics and national interests which had a strong 
impact on the course of the war. 
As it can be seen, the conflict in Sudan cannot be understood in isolation of the regional 
and global dynamics affecting it. The conflict as an action–arena is a sub-set within a wider and 
more inclusive action-arena and the actors, who are part of the conflict either directly as warring 
parties or indirectly as supporters of the warring parties, belong to the wider action-arena – at the 
local, regional and global levels. The actors interact across the different levels, the local actors 
draw support from the regional and international actors while at the same time they serve the 
interests of international actors at the local level. The relationship between the actors is not linear 
or unidirectional as they are linked through numerous ties and their actions are mutually 
beneficial whereby they serve each other’s interests while pursuing their own agendas.  
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4.2.3 Drought and Famine 
In addition to the violent conflict in Southern Sudan, droughts and famines caused by both 
environmental factors such as insufficient and below average rainfall and manmade factors, such 
as unsustainable land use, food policies and grazing practices, played a significant role in 
creating the complex emergency in the country. Abdel Ati (1988), in discussing the process of 
famine in east Sudan in the 1980s, argues that “economic policies, rather than ‘natural 
conditions’ were to blame” (p. 270). Nevertheless, Sudan is a sub-Saharan African country prone 
to both droughts and floods. Droughts, in particular, have a strong negative impact on the 
livelihoods of the communities which depend on rain-fed agriculture. The 1980s witnessed such 
a drought when, “…, the annual rainfall in Sudan was far below the average for the twentieth 
century” (Burr & Collins, p.3). This resulted in serious food shortages for groups of population 
who depend primarily on rainfall for their livelihoods.  The drought occurred in Western Sudan 
in 1983 and resulted in the 1984-85 famine which spread to the Red Sea Coast and Eastern 
Sudan (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 3; Johnson, 2003, p. 137), and later spread to Southern Sudan. 
Coupled with the on-going conflict and conflicts over grazing lands, the situation worsened and 
resulted in more deaths and displacement and people lost their cattle, the main source of 
livelihoods (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 4; Johnson, 2003, p. 82). 
The action-arena, the complex emergency where relief operations take place, has its two 
main defining features in the armed conflict and famine which feed into each other to make the 
crisis even worse. As Burr and Collins (1995) describe the situation “both the interminable 
conflict and social upheaval were made worse by repeated cycles of drought, accompanied by 
starvation and disease, all of which escalated the number of civilian deaths and contributed to the 
dissolution of the state” (p. 3)  
 90 
The complex emergency is not only an armed conflict between a central government and 
a rebel movement but a reflection of much broader and more complex geo-political and 
economic aspects in which the interests of many actors are played out – and this undoubtedly has 
its impact on the relief effort. In addition, food politics, which is a significant contributing factor 
to famine, also impact relief operations whose primary aim is the provision of food aid to save 
lives. The beginnings of the emergency in Southern Sudan and specifically the famine were 
much earlier than the large scale response in 1989, but the broader context during the early 1980s 
and the dire need in Western Sudan made the focus of the international community and 
government more on Western Sudan than on the Southern part of the country. 
Within this broad action arena, the action situation is the relief efforts that have been 
ongoing in Sudan since the early 1980s. 
4.3 THE ACTION SITUATION – RELIEF EFFORTS 
4.3.1 Pre-Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Relief Effort 
This subsection, which draws mainly from Burr & Collins 1995 book Requiem for the Sudan: 
War, Drought & Disaster Relief on the Nile, will cover the earlier attempts to provide relief aid 
by the different actors, including NGOs, and the failed coordinated relief operations, “South 
Sudan Relief Operation” and “Operation Rainbow” which preceded the establishment of OLS. 
The subsection depends heavily on the information contained in Burr and Collins book because 
this information is not readily available elsewhere, as it falls within what is known as Gray 
Literature defined as “… a body of materials that cannot be found easily through conventional 
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channels such as publishers, ‘but which is frequently original and usually recent” (M.C. 
Debachere cited in Gray Literature, 2010). The authors acknowledge in the Preface to the book 
that the writing of the books was made possible only because of the access they had to 
documents which are unlikely to be public. 
It should be noted that the provision of relief aid is not a neutral enterprise based on 
humanitarian needs only and in spite of the principles of humanitarianism, neutrality and 
impartiality, it is strongly connected to the causes of the emergency, the policies of the host 
country and those of the providers of relief.  As Burr & Collins (1995) puts it “… war, drought, 
and relief must be seen as intimately connected to the policies of the government of Sudan, the 
United Nations, and the Western Donors” (p. 3). 
Relief efforts in Sudan started as early as the 1970s when international NGOs such as 
World Vision partnered with organizations such as the African Committee for Rehabilitation of 
Southern Sudan (ACROSS) to provide emergency relief aid to war affected families in Southern 
Sudan following the first civil war.  These early relief efforts in Southern Sudan focused on the 
reconstruction of community hospitals, provision of medicine and supplies, and education in 
preventive health (World Vision, 2009).  The early relief efforts were localized and 
uncoordinated. With the period of relative peace during 1972-1982, the presence of NGOs in 
Southern Sudan continued but their role shifted from the provision of relief aid to that of being 
contracted by the new Regional Government in Southern Sudan to provide social services and re-
build the infrastructure destroyed by the civil war (Johnson, 2003, p. 50). 
4.3.1.1  Relief in Northern Sudan 
The presence and activities of relief organizations, in areas other than Southern Sudan 
intensified in the 1980s in response to the 1984-85 famine in Western and Eastern Sudan. It has 
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to be noted that a number of NGOs have already been working with UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in Eastern Sudan  providing relief aid to the refugees fleeing the Eritrean – 
Ethiopian conflict and entering East Sudan (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 2; Deng & Minear, 1992, p. 
50-52). At the beginning of the famine of 1984-85, the Sudanese Government was reluctant to 
allow humanitarian assistance into the country as it was refusing to open its doors to aid workers 
and international journalists. The influence of politics and the role that donor countries played 
became clear when, as Burr and Collins (1995) mention “Numayri [the President of the Republic 
of Sudan at the time] – whose government depended greatly on the West and the United Nations 
for financial and material assistance – was eventually forced to accept the subsequent 
proliferation of Western nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations 
(PVOs), as well as personnel from the United Nations” (p. 3). A government dependent on 
financial and material assistance from the West could not afford to keep its doors closed as it was 
governed by rules outside its direct control. In spite of the weakening of the government 
resistance to the presence of relief aid workers in the country, the provision of relief in Sudan 
was not an easy undertaking.  It was faced with many other challenges such as denial of access 
for reasons of security to bureaucratic inefficiencies, in addition to the lack of basic 
infrastructure, the inhospitable terrain and the geographic and natural isolation of the most needy 
areas (Deng & Minear, 1992, p. 66-67; Burr and Coolline, 1995, p. 4-5 & 27).    
The mid 1980s was a period of expansion of relief work in Sudan, which continued until 
the present. In spite of the early government resistance to the presence of relief agencies, “by 
1986 the Western humanitarian agencies in Sudan numbered over one hundred and represented 
all ideological and religious persuasions – many nondenominational, others nonnational, and 
some simply philanthropic.” (Burr and Collins, 1995, p. 5). USAID was the first international 
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agency to respond to the news of the drought in Western Sudan (North Darfur) by sending a 
team to investigate the news of crop failures and eventually sending the first shipments of food 
aid in 1984. As the drought continued, food shortages became more acute and the crisis became 
known to the outside world, international PVOs such as CARE and OXFAM began working in 
West Sudan and reporting on the worsening situation of the population there (Burr & Collin, 
1995, p. 20-21). CARE was contracted by USAID to supervise the distribution of its food aid in 
Western Sudan. During the same period, UNICEF and OXFAM were active in El Obeid 
(Kordofan) where they “… established a Drought Monitoring and Nutritional Surveillance Unit 
to direct food supplies to the neediest towns, villages, and congregations of displaced persons”.  
Sudanese Red Crescent was active and the European Community funded Cargo helicopters to 
supply inaccessible areas along the Chadian boarder (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 24–26). It is worth 
noting that this disaster relief effort, which was mainly funded by USAID, was operating in 
Northern Sudan only. Please see the pre-July 2011 map Sudan in Figure 4-1 below. 
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Source: http://geology.com/world/sudan-satellite-image.shtml 
 
Figure 4-1: Map of Sudan in 2007  
 
How the rules are set at different levels impacts the relief effort. The very presence of the 
PVOs and NGOs was very much dependent both on the policies of Sudan Government and the 
policies of foreign governments towards Sudan and in particular the policies of the USA, one of 
the biggest foreign aid providers to Sudan at the time. Foreign governments were driven by their 
own national interests and the pressure exerted by their citizens in response to crises around the 
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world. The Government of Sudan, dependent on the West for financial assistance, could not 
resist for long. The direct providers of relief, the NGOs and PVOs are not independent actors and 
in spite of being non-governmental,  their activities depended on a large extent on governments 
which are the source of the relief aid they deliver to the people in need.  
The multitude of actors playing a part in this early relief effort attests to the complexity of 
any relief operation, even if it was not as integrated as in the case of OLS.  The actors are 
situated at different levels, the local, the national and the international, with varying degrees of 
power and with different amounts and types of resources and of course with different motives 
and agendas. They are governed by different set of rules, some over which they have control and 
others completely outside their control, as they are determined at different levels of the action 
situation.  
4.3.1.2 Relief in Southern Sudan 
During the mid-1980s and as the relief effort was concentrated in Western Sudan, the 
situation was worsening in Southern Sudan as a result of renewed fighting, drought and 
insecurity caused by the movement southward by cattle herders from Western Sudan because of 
drought and grazing land scarcity in their own territories (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 31-32; 
Johnson, 2003, p. 81-82). The resulting food shortages led a number of relief agencies to take 
action. Two of the first organizations to respond were the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which, in 1985, produced a report on the 
extent of the famine in Southern Sudan but “the NGOs, enmeshed in a complicated western relief 
program, were slow to respond to the … [report] recommendations and the need for famine relief 
in Southern Sudan” (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 34).    
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Despite the focus of the government and donors, as well as many NGOs  on Northern 
Sudan (Western and Eastern parts of the country), some international NGOs working together 
with small national NGOs had started relief efforts in Southern Sudan.  The war had already 
erupted again in 1983 and the situation was negatively impacted by the drought and shortage of 
food that hit Western and Eastern Sudan and Ethiopia. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a U.S. 
nonprofit NGO whose mission is to support Catholic Church charities abroad, was among the 
first NGOs to react to the famine in the South (Catholic Relief Services, 2010). It launched its 
operation from Kenya and worked closely with the Sudanese NGO Sudanaid, the relief agency 
of the Catholic Church in the Sudan (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 34-36). The Norwegian Church 
Aid initiated a food-for-work program among some of the Southern tribes. During the same time, 
the UN World Food Program (WFP) was organizing a large relief effort aided by the Catholic 
Relief agencies (Burr and Collins, 1995, p. 36). All of these relief efforts were scattered and 
carried out by different NGOs working in different parts of the vast area of Southern Sudan with 
no coordination among them.  
4.3.1.3 Combined Action Relief Team (CART) 
In response to the magnitude of the need following the mid-1980s in Southern Sudan, 
“…. the NGOs met in Juba … to coordinate their efforts to meet the growing need for food 
assistance in 1985. Representatives from OXFAM, BAND AID, African Committee for the 
Relief of the Southern Sudanese (ACROSS), Norwegian Church Aid, Sudanaid, the indigenous 
Protestant-dominated Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) gathered in Juba to form the Combined 
Action Relief Team, or CART, which would solicit, receive, and distribute international food aid 
to the needy in Equatoria.” (Burr and Collins, 1995, p. 37).  Notwithstanding the fact that 
individual NGOs have been working together and with UN agencies, CART can be considered 
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as the first attempt at a coordinated relief effort in Southern Sudan. CART, as a consortium of 
relief-providing NGOs, drew its strength from its strong material basis as it was funded by the 
EC and the fact that its operations were based on joint logistical facilities possessed by its 
different members (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 52-53). 
In spite of its strength and the legitimacy of its mandate, CART operations faced a 
number of obstacles,  chief among them are insecurity in the areas of operations caused by the 
continuous attacks by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), closure of the roads to Juba 
where  large numbers of internally displaced people had taken refuge, and political hindrance 
caused by the refusal of the Government of Sudan to allow relief aid to reach the affected 
population in the areas controlled by the rebel movement (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 52-53). 
Using Lewin’s Fore Field analysis, the formation of CART can be considered as a 
driving force towards ensuring that relief is delivered to the people in need, but the actions of 
both the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan constitute a restraining force to the delivery of 
aid. While CART consortium members were driven by the humanitarian imperative and the 
neutrality of relief aid, both the SPLA/M and the Government of Sudan were motivated by their 
political and military agendas which focused on weakening the other in order to achieve a 
military victory. The rules governing the provision of relief aid were set by the warring factions, 
each trying to stop relief from reaching the other faction’s areas. The relief agencies, as actors 
within the action situation, did not have control over the rules but were governed by them.  In 
spite of their good intentions and their concerted effort, their operation failed to achieve its 
objective because of limitations on the humanitarian space caused by imposition of rules by the 
warring factions. 
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4.3.1.4  Southern Sudan Relief Operation (SSRO) and Operation Rainbow 
Pre-OLS attempts at coordinating relief efforts, in addition to CART, include also the 
Southern Sudan Relief Operation (SSRO) and Operation Rainbow. These attempts coincided 
with the fall of Numeri’s regime in Khartoum and the change of Government in 1985. The new 
ruling body, the Transitional Military Council (TMC), took over power and gave more freedom 
to international humanitarian agencies to provide relief aid (Medley, 2000, p. 167). The rules of 
the game have changed, resulting in a widening of the humanitarian space and better access by 
the relief providers to people in need.  Following the change of Government, both the UN and 
Government of Sudan took the task of coordination of humanitarian assistance more seriously. 
The UN established the Office of Emergency Operation in Sudan (UNEOS) and the Government 
of Sudan set up the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), the coordinating body of 
humanitarian assistance within the Government of Sudan (Medley, 2000, p. 175). At the same 
time that these coordination bodies were established in Khartoum, the NGOs in Southern Sudan 
joined their efforts.  By asserting the principles of humanitarianism and neutrality of aid and 
through advocating for a “food truce”, the NGOs tried to gain greater access to the South in the 
face of SPLA threats of blockade. A constellation of different factors and actors and changing 
rules of the game gave momentum to these earlier attempts at coordinated relief efforts.  
The first of these attempts, Southern Sudan Relief Operation (SSRO), was initiated based 
on a request by the national NGOs, Sudanaid and the Sudan Council of Churches when they 
requested the Government Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to support a “food aid 
truce” in Southern Sudan. UN agencies, UNICEF and WFP and a number of International NGOs 
including Oxfam and Doctors without Boarder (MSF-France) in addition to a number of donors 
responded to the request and together with the RRC representatives formed a Technical 
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Coordination Committee (TCC) to discuss food aid and relief issues. The South Sudan Relief 
Operation which was based on the principle of neutrality came under the leadership of the UN 
Office of Emergency Operations. Notwithstanding the noble idea and good initiative, SSRO 
failed shortly after its establishment. Again the resisting forces leading to its failure were the 
high cost of transporting food to Juba as it had to be airlifted, the huge of amounts of food aid 
required, and the unwillingness of donors to commit to the operation, and the fact that SPLA, 
which was not part of the operation, was completely against it and threatened to attack airplanes 
using airfields in Southern Sudan (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 55 – 56; Medley, 2000, 175). Since 
the operation was orchestrated by the central government in the North and although its focus was 
the provision of relief aid in the South, the SPLA saw that the humanitarian food aid has only 
helped the government (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 58).  
The second attempt at coordinated relief effort was Operation Rainbow, which was a 
“food aid program” initiated in late 1986.  It was led by WFP representative in Sudan, Head of 
UNEOS and the director of RRC. Its significance stems from the fact that it attempted to give 
equal importance to the problem of disaster relief in both the North and the South, contrary to the 
SSRO focus on Southern Sudan only. It also attempted to work with both sides of the conflict 
which gave it its international significance as “… each side appeared ready to accept the 
principle of the neutrality of food aid – something unheard of in the history of warfare” (Burr & 
Collins, 1995, p. 59).  Operation Rainbow introduced the idea of ‘neutral corridors’  through 
which food aid can be transported and distributed and it was based on the idea of food aid parity 
where food will be lifted to towns controlled by government and by the SPLA at the same time 
(Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 59 – 60).  
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Like the Southern Sudan Relief Operation, Operation Rainbow failed because of 
insecurity and political blockade by both SPLA and the Government of Sudan. The SPLA 
threatened that it will attack airplanes flying without its permission and “… the government 
announced that it could not guarantee the security of the airports in Southern Sudan.” (Burr & 
Collins, 1995, p. 62). The Government had also rejected the Principle of Parity and was against 
any donor arrangement that included the SPLA and any discussions between UN officials and 
aid agencies on one side and the SPLA on the other side about food aid (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 
64). At the same time, recognizing that food aid was delivered to the government controlled 
areas only, an SPLA commander announced that if “the relief planes carry supplies, food, and 
medicine to only one side, we shall consider them hostile to us” (Burr & Collins, 1995, p. 67).  
Medley (2000) summarizes the obstacles facing relief efforts as technical problems, open 
obstruction, and hidden obstruction. The technical problems include the difficulty of 
transportation through difficult terrain while the open obstruction includes policies and tactics of 
both the Government and the SPLA/M which led to the obstruction of the delivery of relief aid. 
The hidden obstruction which can be disguised as either technical problems or open obstruction 
included lack of cooperation from military officials, transport workers or government officials, 
for example, denial of security clearance (p. 171-72). All these obstacles led to the failure of 
Operation Rainbow. 
The restraining forces to Operation Rainbow were much stronger than the driving forces. 
The driving forces were the plight of the populations affected by war and food shortages and the 
humanitarian imperative and readiness of the relief agencies to join their efforts to reach affected 
populations on both sides. The restraining force were the refusal of the Government of Sudan to 
reach an agreement with the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A threats that without such an agreement, it 
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will attack relief planes. With this threat and with the lack of guaranteed safe passage for relief, 
insurance companies refused to insure the planes carrying the food aid; without insurance, the 
UN was unwilling to fly.  The situation can be described, in the words of Medley (2000), as a 
weakness in the mandate of humanitarian agencies (p. 171).  According to Medley (2000), “A 
mandate is – in principle – an order given by an authority to an implementer. The concept 
contains elements of both a duty and a right. It is simultaneously an obligation to serve and a 
license to act” (p. 161). When the mandate is weak, although the obligation to serve and the 
license to act are there, the implementers are faced by many obstacles which hinder their action 
and which they were not able to overcome. 
The lack of agreement between the two sides of the conflict on a set of rules to govern the 
operation led to its early failure. The perception of either side that relief aid is provided to the 
other side led to a negative reaction towards relief. A former SPLA soldier commented “The 
SPLA thought that if people were not contributing to liberation, why should they benefit from 
relief? If assistance is about relief, peace or development, then the question of whose relief, 
peace or development leaves room for interpretation” (Zoe, 2006, p. 6).  Although this comment 
is made in reference to the early 1990s period, it is equally applicable to the earlier relief efforts 
and the actions taken by both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A at the time.  
The significant role of political will of both sides of the conflict in the success or failure 
of any relief effort, in addition to the weakness of the humanitarian imperative if not supported 
by a strong political will is clear in the case of Operation Rainbow. In spite of its failure, one of 
the advantages of Operation Rainbow was that it “had placed the plight of the Southern Sudanese 
on the world map and had highlighted a civil war of which few in the West had been aware and 
few governments had noticed” (Burr and Collins, 1995, p. 65).  Also, apparent in these early 
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relief efforts is the failure of donor governments to exert enough pressure on the Government of 
Sudan to get humanitarian aid delivered to different parts of Southern Sudan because of the 
strategic ties they had with the Government of Sudan and their need to protect their interests in 
the area (Medley, 2000, p. 173). 
4.3.1.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the action arena in which humanitarian relief was taking place was very 
complex – not just as a result of the multiplicity of actors but also as a result of their different 
allegiances and political agendas. These different allegiances and political agendas resulted in 
the rules that governed the course of the relief operations and determined their success or failure. 
At the time of these early relief efforts, the main donors were USAID and the EC. The USAID 
came to play a major role in the response to the food crisis through Public Law 480 – Food For 
Peace Program (PL480) and the provision of food aid, which as a policy tool used to support 
their allies in developing countries. The EC’s role was mainly in the provision of planes and air 
lifts of food aid in areas where access through roads was very difficult. 
Since the early relief efforts were a response to the food shortages and the famine that hit 
Western and Eastern Sudan when there was no war or violence, access was mainly hindered by 
administrative obstacles, the geographic and natural barriers, and the debilitated infrastructure – 
unlike in Southern Sudan where violence, the denial of access to relief agencies by the warring 
factions and the use of relief aid as a warring strategy were major obstacles. The change in the 
nature of the crisis itself, where a famine was now coupled by armed conflict resulted in more 
stringent rules being set and enacted. The change of government in 1985 led to a change in these 
rules as the then new government became more accepting to the presence of foreign aid agencies 
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and established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in May 1985 to coordinate 
disaster relief in Sudan (Burr and Collins, 1995, p. 40). 
Looking at the actors in the action arena, we find that different UN agencies and the 
ICRC have been present throughout the time when relief effort was taking place, yet their 
presence intensified and their role became more significant during later stages. By far, some of 
the most important actors in any relief effort are the NGOs, both national and international. In 
the case of Sudan, they were the forerunners and spearheads of relief efforts before the formation 
of the UN coordinated relief operations. Because of the way they operate and their relative 
independence from politics and governments, they are able to access areas which might be 
inaccessible to other actors. They have a strong impact on the action arena and action situation. 
Summarizing the pivotal role played by NGOs in relief efforts in Sudan Burr and Collins (1995) 
state: 
Certainly, the NGOs played a crucial part in the development of disaster relief assistance 
in Sudan as they did elsewhere in the world.  They were occasionally threatened by irate 
villagers who wanted them to do more and by government officials who wanted them to 
see, speak, and do less…. Some were expelled for fatuous reasons, usually because they 
took their work very seriously. PVOs were occasionally threatened by Muslim 
fundamentalists, who labeled them “Neo-Crusaders” who had no rightful place. 
Nevertheless, they pioneered disaster relief throughout the Sudan at a time when nothing 
was forthcoming from the Sudan government and the international donors were 
preoccupied with the drought and famine in the North. Finally, in every disaster relief 
program initiated from 1984 through 993 in Southern Sudan, the NGOs were to play a 
pivotal role (p. 37-38). 
  
It is noteworthy that the NGO’s pivotal role in throughout Sudan has continued even 
after the war has come to an end.  
The many interactions between the different actors impacted the course of the relief 
effort, the action situation – on occasions strengthening it and on other occasions, leading to its 
failure. Donors were governed by their foreign policy agendas. This can be clearly seen in how 
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USAID was active in North Sudan (mainly the Western and Eastern parts of the country) 
because of the good relationship between the US Government and the Government of Sudan at 
the time, but it was very reluctant to provide relief in the South. Providing relief assistance in 
the South would entail negotiations with SPLA, which were not encouraged by the US 
Government. Also noteworthy are the interactions of the different relief agencies with both the 
Government and SPLM/A. The Government was in need of the relief aid provided by the relief 
agencies, but it was reluctant to give them access to areas where need was acute because these 
same areas were the sites of fighting and violence.  The Government was afraid that the relief 
agencies would expose the existing violence to the outside world. The change in regime in 1985 
led to change in the rules that governed the provision of relief effort leading to a widening of the 
humanitarian space and more access given to relief agencies. Politics in general had its impact 
on the humanitarian space – sometimes widening and sometimes shrinking it. The two 
political/military powers, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, were not cooperative 
most of the time.  Active humanitarian diplomacy has to come into play at a time when the 
concept of humanitarian diplomacy was not yet properly articulated (Minear & Smith, 2007).  
During these early relief efforts, the role of the media, which later became a very 
important player in any disaster or humanitarian crisis situation in the world, was limited, but 
the more publicity was created, the more NGOs moved in.  
4.3.2 Operation Lifeline Sudan 
This section will describe the establishment and evolution of OLS using the IAD 
framework, explaining what OLS is, describing the broader environment and the specific 
conditions that led to its emergence as a specific structure for the provision of relief aid to the 
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affected population. It will illustrate the institutional, organizational and political factors 
interacting together to influence the course of the relief operation through its history. The section 
will give an account of the multiple actors taking part in the operation and key agencies 
responsible for coordination, their different roles and their interactions which impacted on the 
course of the operation.  
4.3.2.1 What is OLS? 
 
The inauguration of Operation Lifeline Sudan in April 1989 was a watershed event in the history 
of emergency relief assistance in Sudan and worldwide. Before going into the details of the 
establishment of OLS – it is worth discussing what exactly Operation Lifeline Sudan is. Reading 
through the literature on OLS, it has been defined differently by different authors. Some refer to 
it as a negotiated access agreement while others consider it as some sort of organization, 
institution, arrangement, coordination mechanism, or coordinated relief effort (Burr and Collins, 
1995; Deng and Minear, 1992; Johnson, 2003; Karim et al., 1996, Prendergast, 1996). In an 
interesting characterization of and a multi-faceted definition of OLS, Omaar and de Waal (1995) 
describe it as “an agreement brokered by the UN”, as “a banner under which UNICEF and WFP 
get funding from governments; as “operational units inside UNICEF, Khartoum and Nairobi” 
and as “a system through which UNICEF buys a degree of co-operation, regulation and control 
of NGOs” (p. 8). 
Although OLS is a negotiated access agreement, it is also an emergent 
multiorganizational network.  It is emergent because it did not exist before in this particular 
form, shape and content. As Drabek (1987) explains, emergence implies a temporal dimension 
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“… some ‘thing’ is present at time two that was not present at an earlier point” (p. 261).  It is 
also emergent because it was created for a specific purpose, i.e. to respond to a certain event.  In 
the original plan, it was supposed to come to an end once the response to the particular event is 
complete, yet actions and interactions at different levels led to its extension beyond its original 
duration and also to its extension in areas and fields beyond what was originally planned.  The 
interactions of the different actors among themselves and with their environment resulted in a 
situation different from what was originally envisioned, in other words, “individual, localized 
behavior aggregates into global behavior that is, in some sense, disconnected from its origins” 
(Page & Miller, 2007, p. 44). As Drabek puts it, “when such new behavior patterns do emerge, 
they are regarded as having properties that are different from their constituent parts” (p. 261). It 
can be seen that emergence has been a characteristic of OLS since its establishment and until its 
dissolution.  
OLS, as a multiorganizational network, is made up of many sub-networks. These sub-
networks include different UN agencies, International NGOs, National NGOs, Government 
institutions and rebel movement bodies. For example, one of the sub-networks is that formed by 
several NGOs and governed by a network administrative body such as a Steering Committee 
(Sowinska & Fenton, 2005, p. 27). The members of each of the sub-networks interact among 
themselves as well as with members of other sub-networks. In other words, there are intra- and 
inter-network linkages between the different actors. In addition, the sub-networks as entities 
interact among themselves. 
  Although OLS was initiated in 1989 under the leadership of the UN, represented by 
James Grant, the Reprehensive of UNICEF in Sudan at the time (Loane, 2000, p.18), yet it 
cannot be considered as a hierarchical organization as its establishment depended on negotiations 
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and acceptance by both the Government and the Rebel Movement. In addition, its development 
and course of action depended not on a centralized decision making mechanism, but more on the 
interactions of its different members among themselves and with their wider environment. 
Granted there were aspects of the operation where all the humanitarian agencies agreed to 
centralize their decision making and negotiating voice – such as negotiation for access -- but in 
general, their actions and interactions were not controlled, but dependent on each other as in any 
complex adaptive system (CAS). In areas where decisions were centralized, OLS was led by a 
lead agency – UNICEF in Southern Sudan.   
4.3.2.2 Creation of OLS 
 
The Second Civil War in Sudan is a typical example of a CHE that called for an 
international response. In 1988-1989, in response to a specific event within the conflict - the 
famine in Bahr El Ghazal province in Southern Sudan which killed roughly 250,000 people, the 
UN established Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) (Rhodes, 2002; Salinas, 1998; Sidahmed, 2008). 
In describing the conditions that led to an international humanitarian response to the famine in 
Southern Sudan, Sid Ahmed (2008) mentions that 
Due to the collapse of the rural economy, the disruption of the ordinary livelihoods of 
the southern population (in urban as well as in rural areas), and the breakdown of road 
and river transportation networks that linked the south to other parts of the country, 
the situation regarding food supplies and other essentials became very desperate; in 
fact, the whole region came under the shadow of famines and starvation. It was in this 
context that in April 1989 “Operation Lifeline Sudan” (OLS) was conceived by the 
United Nations and other international donors (p. 82).   
 
A constellation of factors at different levels led to the establishment of OLS.  Famine and 
violent conflict are not new to Sudan and OLS can be considered as a new stage in a continuous 
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relief effort that has been ongoing in Sudan since the early 1970s. In addition to the humanitarian 
imperative which is a strong motive for the provision of emergency relief aid, there were other 
factors at the local, national and international level that led to the establishment of OLS at that 
particular time. At the national level, one important factor was the failure of previous relief 
efforts whereby the international community did not manage to convince both sides of the 
conflict to allow access so that relief supplies reach the people in need. Another factor at the 
national level was that, by allowing the provision of aid to the target populations in areas where 
they are currently located, the government was trying to deal with the problem of displacement 
and its destabilizing effect on the capital and the major cities (Background of OLS 1989-1992). 
A third factor was the sense of optimism at the time since the peace process was underway 
(Deng & Minear, 1992, p. 98). At the International level, the donors and the international 
community realized the utility served by such an operation in terms of playing out their foreign 
policies and national interests, saving them from the more difficult task of trying to find a 
political solution to the conflict. (Deng & Minear, 1992, p. 36; Emery, 2000, p. 131)  
From an IAD framework perspective, the establishment of OLS and its operations can be 
viewed through the three levels of analysis of collaborative action, constitutional choice level, 
collective choice level and operational choice level (Hardy and Koontz, 2009, p. 296; Ostrom, 
2005, p. 58-60). The initial establishment of OLS is a ‘constitutional choice level activity’, as in 
the words of Hardy and Koontz (2009), “… the process of forming new collaborative 
organizations is a constitutional choice-level activity” (p. 298). It is an activity taken at the 
highest level of decision making and it involves “… establishing who will participate in 
collective-choice decision making and how it will be carried out” (Hardy and Koontz, 2009, p 
298). In the case of OLS, the operation was established through negotiations among the highest 
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level of the UN, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. Once it was formed, OLS was able 
to operate at the collective choice level, that is, it could modify its institutions, set its own rules 
on who can participate in the next level of decision making, and establish the rights and duties of 
its members (Hardy and Koontz, 2009, p. 298). OLS has also evolved in ways different from 
what it was envisioned and this can be attributed to its emergent character described above.  
 OLS, as a emergent collaborative network, is an agreement of negotiated access among 
the UN, the Government of Sudan, and the opposition movement - Sudan’s People Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A).  OLS is “the first case in which warring factions have agreed over 
a long period of time to allow humanitarian supplies to cross lines of battle” (Prendergast, J., 
1996) and it is also the first humanitarian program that endeavored to assist “internally displaced 
and war-affected civilians during ongoing conflict within a sovereign state” (Karim et al., 1996, 
p. 1). As such, it is the oldest negotiated access agreement, longest as it operated from 1989 to 
2005 and has been described by some observers as one of history’s largest relief operations in an 
active war zone (Africa’s Famine is Big Business, 1998).   
From an institutional perspective, OLS is very significant in the history of emergency 
relief assistance since it brought into existence and consolidated certain norms and rules that 
were not there before. As mentioned by Emery (2000), “… OLS has come the closest to 
establishing a regime of international emergency assistance.” By ‘regime’ here is meant “sets of 
implicit and explicit principles and decision making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area” (p. 152). Although the principles of neutrality, 
impartiality and independence has always been part and parcel of the provision of emergency 
relief assistance,  OLS as a negotiated access agreement and as an emergent multiorganizational 
network introduced new ways of adhering to these principles. As Minear, (2002) states  
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The Sudan experience demonstrated a contribution by humanitarian actors in 
promoting legal norms. OLS imposed a certain discipline on both sets of 
belligerents. The initiative served as a means, at least in 1989, for bringing the 
practice of the Sudan government, a signatory of the Geneva conventions and 
protocols, more nearly into conformity with international humanitarian law. While 
not a party to those agreements, the SPLA expressed its willingness to respect them, 
although the insurgents too, fell short of agreed international standards (p. 91).  
 
Promotion of legal norms and the establishment of an international emergency assistance 
regime is a clear example of how an emergency relief operation as an action situation, through 
the interactions of its different actors and the interaction of the actors with their broader 
environment, changed that environment and led to the establishment of norms (and institutions) 
that have not been there before.   
4.3.2.3 Actors 
 
The main actors within OLS are the government of Sudan, SPLM/A, and the UN which 
took decisions at the constitutional-choice level that led to the establishment of the operation.  
The Government was represented by the High Ministerial Committee (HMC) and the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) while the SPLA/M was represented by its leadership at the 
beginning and until 1990 when the “…, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) 
[the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A] had established a presence in many areas in the Sudan; 
both coordinating relief operations and taking on functions as local governments” (Rolandsen, 
2005, p. 30).  Other important actors are the donors, without whose support the operation could 
have not taken off and without whose power to leverage decisions, access to the people in need 
would not have been granted.  Duffield (2000) writing about the role of donors in OLS 
mentioned that “the history of humanitarian access within OLS operation can largely be written 
in terms of how donor pressure [on the warring parties] has fluctuated,” (p. 112-113) and how 
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the warring parties responded to this pressure.  The donors which supported OLS during its early 
stages included most of the OECD countries. 
Under the terms of the OLS agreement, a number of UN agencies and around 40 NGOs, 
both national and international, provided emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance in Sudan. 
Besides the organizations working under the umbrella of OLS, there were more than ten 
international NGOs in addition to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
providing humanitarian assistance to the war-affected population both in Northern and Southern 
Sudan, but mainly in Southern Sudan (USAID, 2004). NGOs, in particular national NGOs such 
as Sudanaid and the Sudanese Council of Churches, have been instrumental in providing 
information about the situation and in spearheading relief in Southern Sudan even before the 
emergency situation became so widely known and called for a high profile international 
response. As Burr & Collins (1995) mention “historically, most of the valuable information 
concerning the South’s food requirements had been supplied by Sudanaid and Sudan Council of 
Churches” (p. 42).  
Many of the NGOs that later moved to Southern Sudan and became part of OLS had a 
long history of working together, which can be considered as an already established network. 
This experience has facilitated their cooperation and joint efforts later on. It is also worth noting 
that a number of both relief and development agencies such as ICRC, UNICEF, Norwegian 
People’s Aid and some faith based organizations such as Mennonite Central Committee have 
been working in Southern Sudan before the establishment of OLS, but their efforts were 
scattered and their access to the affected populations became very restricted, as the fighting 
between the warring parties intensified. As already mentioned, OLS is not the first attempt by the 
international community to negotiate access to the war affected population with parties to the 
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conflict, but it is the first successful attempt in securing the agreement of both parties to the 
provision of relief aid to the affected population (Burr & Collins 1995; Deng & Minear, 1992).   
4.3.2.4 Maintenance and Institutionalization of OLS 
When OLS was first initiated in 1989, it was conceived as a short-term response to a 
famine in the war zone of Southern Sudan, but the continuation of the war and emergency 
conditions led to its extension first in 1990 and again in 1991. This second extension continued 
until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, when OLS as an 
institution disappeared although the humanitarian relief effort is still ongoing in Southern Sudan 
(Akol, 2005). As such the relief effort in Southern Sudan precedes OLS by many years and 
continues beyond it; but OLS stands out as an ‘institution’ that emerged, at a certain point in time 
and under specific conditions, to mobilize the international community to provide assistance to 
Sudan, to secure access to the affected population, and to bring together the efforts of the many 
relief agencies active in Southern Sudan (Emergency Relief Needs, 1989). OLS has managed to 
stay, to adapt to the changing conditions of the emergency, and to evolve over a period of 16 
years when it finally came to an end with the signing of the Peace Agreement. 
The principles governing OLS are neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian assistance 
and free access to war-affected populations wherever they happened to be (Karim, et al., 1996; 
Minear, et al., 1991). According to these principles, OLS was supposed to operate as a unified 
body in all parts of the country where there are war-affected populations.  This has been the case 
during its early period, but eventually OLS came to operate under “two markedly different 
contractual and operational regimes,” one for Southern Sudan and one for Northern Sudan 
(Karim, et al, 1996). The Northern Sector of the operation managed from Khartoum was very 
much under the control of the government and in many ways ceased to be an active part of OLS, 
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while the Southern Sector managed from Nairobi continued until 2005.  Karim et al. (1996), in 
their comprehensive review of the operation, mention that “an implicit UN understanding 
developed that, in effect, OLS is confined to the Southern Sector” (p. 26). 
The maintenance and institutionalization of OLS entailed decisions at multiple levels – at 
the constitutional choice level, at the collective choice level and at the operational level. The 
constitutional choice level decisions, which were made at the highest policy level had 
implications both politically and operationally as some of these decisions constitute the rules of 
who was doing what and how the operation was managed.  The establishment of OLS and its 
maintenance and institutionalization was premised on the UN taking charge of the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to affected populations on both sides. As Karim et al. (1996) states, “in 
negotiating a conditional transfer of part of government of Sudan sovereignty to the UN for 
humanitarian purposes, an operational division of Sudan into government and non-government 
controlled areas was created”.  
4.3.2.5 Separation into Northern and Southern Sectors 
One aspect of the institutionalization of OLS was that it “… changed from an annually 
negotiated agreement among Khartoum, SPLM/A and the UN to a permanent administration” 
(Rolandsen, 2005, p. 46). This can be considered as a form of adaptation by OLS as an 
institution to the changing environment in which it existed. What was previously envisioned as a 
short term crisis was becoming an extended emergency for which the continued provision of 
relief aid was required. OLS adapted by becoming an established ‘permanent administration’ 
instead of an agreement that was negotiated and renewed annually. 
Another aspect of the institutionalization of OLS was the separation of what was a 
unified operation covering the affected populations in all parts of the country into a Northern 
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Sector operating out of Khartoum and a Southern Sector operating out of Nairobi. This 
separation can be considered as yet another form of adaption by the different actors in the 
operation. Since the Government of Sudan did not have the same control over the South that it 
had over the North, OLS evolved differently in the North and the South. In the former, it was 
very much under the control of the Government while in the South, it enjoyed a degree of 
independence and had to work closely with the local authorities and the SRRA there. This 
separation was caused by many factors acting at different levels. The majority of donors and 
international aid providers believed in ‘humanitarian aid’ per se and were hostile to negotiating 
with the government, which was part of the conflict (Emery, 2000, p. 142). They preferred to 
provide assistance to the people in need in the South without having to interact much with the 
government in Khartoum. The Government, on the other side, accepted this division, in an 
attempt to gain international good will after its support of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 
and in fear of an international intervention similar to that in Somalia in 1992 (Rolandsen, 2005, 
p. 46). This led not only to the split of OLS into a Northern and Southern Sector, but also to a 
split among the aid agencies between those who preferred to work as part of OLS and those who 
preferred to work independently of it.  
OLS is a complex adaptive system and it is clear how the broader context in which the 
operation existed impacted on its development and evolution. It is interesting to note that 
international events such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international intervention in 
Somalia, which may seem irrelevant to an emergency relief operation in Sudan, had their strong 
influence on how the operation evolved. The interactions of the different actors, in response to 
these events and their attempts to serve their agendas, led to changes and adjustments within 
OLS which would have not have happened had the operation existed in isolation from its broader 
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environment. It is noteworthy that the impact goes both ways, as much as the environment 
influenced the evolution of the relief operation, the relief operation as a complex system had also 
impacted its environment and led to changes in that environment. This influence of the operation 
on its environment was captured by Rolandsen’s (2005) description of how the presence of the 
relief operation encouraged the establishment of some form of an administration in the South. 
Rolandsen (2005) mentions, “While the … [Khartoum] government in the North maintained a 
hostile approach towards the relief operations, it was in OLS’s and foreign NGOs’ best interest 
to encourage the SPLM/A to establish a more explicit claim for the right to administer the areas 
under their control. A quasi-autonomous region in the South would make the humanitarian 
apparatus less dependent on approvals from Khartoum” (p. 46). As in any complex adaptive 
system, the interactions among the different actors and their environment led to the emergence of 
structures quite different than those that initially existed.  
4.3.2.6  Extension into Different Sectors 
Another aspect of the institutionalization of OLS is its shift in orientation from a 
predominantly food relief operation to an operation covering different sectors and its change 
from an emergency approach to a chronic disaster that marginalized the local community into 
projects that mobilized the communities.  Some NGOs in Southern Sudan, such as the German 
NGO, Aktion Afria Hilfe (AAH), shifted their focus from the provision of emergency assistance 
to building community-based projects in primary education, primary health care and food 
security (Erasmus, 2001, p. 253). The shift in orientation is also a manifestation of the 
emergence characteristic and adaptive feature of the operation. 
OLS, which began in 1989 as a food relief program in response to a nutritional disaster 
exacerbated by war, broadened its programs extensively as a result of the changing perception of 
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the emergency by aid agencies. As the emergency situation continued, the concern of aid 
agencies shifted from emergency assistance to developmental relief (Duffield, 2000, p. 118).  By 
1996, OLS programming covered areas such as “household food security, including 
rehabilitation of agricultural production and livestock, roads, water and sanitation, primary 
education, capacity building, and promotion of humanitarian principles (Karim et al., 1996, p. 
75).  This is in response to a change in the conceptualization of the situation from “a war related 
nutritional emergency” to a situation “defined institutionally in terms of problems of household 
food security and lack of local organizational capacity” (Duffield, 2000, p. 118).  Different 
NGOs covered different sectors in different areas throughout Southern Sudan. The Southern 
Sector became very complex with a very large number of actors. Part of this complexity can be 
explained as the adaptation by the Operation to the changing political situation in Southern 
Sudan. Karim et al. (1996) attributes the increase in the number of actors implementing programs 
in the different sectors to the “rise of factionalization within opposition movements, and the 
simultaneous rise of potential new counterparts to OLS” (p. 78).   
4.3.2.7 Humanitarian Space and Agreement on Ground Rules 
 
A third aspect of the institutionalization and maintenance of OLS was the endeavors to 
secure humanitarian space through the “Agreement on Ground Rules”. The Agreement on 
Ground Rules was signed in 1995 between the Head of OLS Southern Sector and the different 
Southern factions including SPLM/A, the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army 
(SSIM/A) and in 1996 with SPLM-United (Bradbury et al., 2000, p. 6). When OLS was created, 
the humanitarian principles constituted its foundations but they were not explicitly mentioned as 
part of the agreement itself.  But as the operation was taking place, there were violations of 
 117 
human rights and misuse of humanitarian assistance by the rebel armed groups, this led OLS to 
negotiate and agree with the rebel groups on a framework of collaboration which integrates 
humanitarian principles and the protection of civilians in OLS mandate and actual operations. 
The opening paragraph of the agreement states: 
 This agreement is intended to lay out the basic principles upon with Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) works and to lay out the rules and regulations resulting from 
such principles. It seeks to define the minimum acceptable standards of conduct for 
the activities of OLS Agencies and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, 
as the official counterpart in the areas controlled by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (SPLM/OLS Agreement on Ground rules, 1995, p. 1).  
 
The overarching purpose of the signature of the agreement is to improve the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians in need as such it reinforces the idea of 
establishing a regime or norms of humanitarian assistance and it goes beyond just norms to 
formalize them. Although SPLM was a rebel movement and did not represent a sovereign 
government, yet through this agreement it expressed its support to the Geneva Convention of 
1949 and the 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions in addition to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1989 (Bradbury et al., 2000).    
The idea of Ground Rules was a step towards the institutionalization of OLS because it 
was not only an attempt to organize the interaction between the relief operation and its 
environment but also an attempt to influence that environment by making it more principled and 
by imposing the respect of international principles and conventions on the rebel groups. It 
reflects the attempt of the UN and the NGOs to “change the warring factions’ attitude towards 
the civilian population and the relief aid activity” (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 47).   The idea of Ground 
Rules can be considered as a driving factor towards ensuring proper and quality delivery of 
humanitarian assistance against the restraining forces of violence, unruliness, obstruction to 
access and divergence of relief assistance practiced by the different warring factions and rebel 
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groups. By agreeing on the rules, the objective was to commit all parties and to ensure that they 
are mutually responsible first and foremost for securing ‘humanitarian space’ which is “the 
sphere of action of humanitarian agencies [both in a geographic and political sense]” without 
which humanitarian action will be very difficult (Bradbury et al., 2000, p. 9).   
The need for securing access, ensuring the safety of aid personnel and non-interference 
from warring parties led the aid agencies to be in a state of continuous negotiation with the 
warring factions. Although relief operations usually claim their independence of the political 
sphere, yet to achieve their goal of successfully delivering aid, they have to negotiate with 
warring factions to gain access to the people in need, to ensure the safety of aid providers and the 
security of the operation. As Rolandsen (2005) mentions, “The need to improve … [the insecure 
and unsafe] situation became one of the main reasons that humanitarian organizations deemed 
necessary to influence political developments in the Southern Sudan” (p. 47).  
4.3.2.8 1998 Famine 
 
One of the major events in the history of OLS was the famine of 1998. Nine years into 
the life of OLS and after it became an established and institutionalized entity, another famine 
struck Bahr el-Ghazal province in Southern Sudan, whereby up to 2 million people were “… at 
risk, i.e. dependent on some form of external assistance to survive” (Murphy & Salama, 1998;  
Rhodes, 2002, p. 1). In addition, an estimated 100,000 people died in spite of the presence of the 
Operation (Rhodes, 2002, p. 2). The reasons for this crisis are not very different from those that 
created the crisis in 1989. They include the armed conflict and natural disasters which continue 
to negatively impact and stress the fragile livelihoods systems of people living in Southern 
Sudan. Added to these factors, the years leading to the 1998 famine were characterized by 
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“looting and deliberate crop destruction, in combination with three consecutive years of poor 
crop harvest …”; “curtailment of trade routes and exchange relationships”; and “military attacks 
on areas of population concentration” (Murphy & Salama, 1998). Added to these factors, Rhodes 
(2002), mentions the political vacuum in Southern Sudan as a factor that made the efforts to 
prevent famine almost non-existent (p. 8).   
The fact that this crisis happened exposed many weaknesses within OLS in addition to 
factors outside the control of OLS. Obstructions by warring factions, including the flight bans by 
the Government of Sudan in the first quarter of 1998 in addition to the intensification of fighting 
among the different warring parties and their continuous attacks on relief sites were two of the 
problems faced by the operation and over which it had little control. Other problems internal to 
OLS include scarcity of steady funding by donors, logistical problems and lack of coordination 
between the different agencies. The response to the emergency has been described as an 
uncooperative and poorly planned relief response (The Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan, 1998, p. 5; 
Murphy & Salama, 1998; Rhodes, 2002, p. 1).  
The 1998 famine brought into question the ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ that have been established 
through the OLS agreement itself and the Agreement on Ground Rules with the different rebel 
movements. The ‘denial’ of access through flight bans by the Government of Sudan and the 
continuous looting of relief supplies by the rebel movements amount to a break in the ‘rules’ 
agreed upon among the parties and to the vulnerability of humanitarian space. It also testifies to 
the challenges of providing relief aid in a war zone. It reveals that the political and military 
agendas take precedence over the humanitarian considerations and in serving their interests the 
warring parties did not have any inhibitions against inflicting harm on citizens. It also brings into 
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focus the role played by donors, as a major actor, in the success or failure of any relief operation 
as funding was a major constraint to the relief effort in 1998.  
4.3.2.9 Dissolution of OLS and the Post-OLS Relief Effort as of 2009 
OLS continued post the 1998 famine to operate in Southern Sudan until the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Since OLS was an agreement of negotiated 
access in a war zone, the end of the war has automatically brought it to an end since, 
theoretically, in the post-conflict era access is no more a problem.  Although OLS as a specific 
emergent multiorganizational network ceased to exist, it is noteworthy that the end of active 
fighting did not signal the end of the emergency and the dissolution of OLS did not mean the end 
of the relief effort which, in 2009, was still continuing in Southern Sudan. The situation is still 
precarious and the need for relief aid continues.  An IRIN report in July 2009 states “Southern 
Sudan could face a food crisis this year because of erratic rainfall in several states, insecurity 
disrupting framing patterns, and poor infrastructure affecting aid delivery…” (IRIN, July 2009). 
Examining this situation through the lens of Lewin’s Force Field Theory, we find that the 
driving forces leading the continuation of the emergency are much stronger than the restraining 
forces that could lead to its end. Although the war between the central Government in Khartoum 
and the SPLM/A came to an end in 2005, tribal conflicts continued leading to insecurity which 
negatively affects people’s livelihoods.  The failure of the long term relief effort, although in its 
long history it moved from being only emergency relief to developmental relief,  to address the 
causes of the emergency leads to its reoccurrence. It is worth noting that the factors that led to 
the emergency in 1989 and 1998 are the same factors that lead to the emergency in 2009.  
Humanitarian agencies continue to operate in Southern Sudan but in a different context. 
During the six-year, post-conflict interim period in Sudan, tribal and ethnic conflicts continue to 
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inflict Southern Sudan “… putting tens of thousands of vulnerable people at risk of being cut off 
for help…” (IRIN, June 2009). The post conflict period  witnessed some economic recovery and 
the revival of markets and trade activity, in addition to substantial population movement 
resulting from the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees” (Maxwell and 
Burns, 2008, p. 7; Sharp, 2007, p. 104).  The focus of humanitarian agencies in the post conflict 
period is on “assisting return, continuing to protect the most vulnerable, and promoting the 
transition away from emergency to livelihoods recovery” (WFP 2008a – EMOP cited in 
Maxwell and Burns, 2008, p. 7). Yet, given the security situation and food shortages, the need 
for emergency food relief remained acute.  
In addition to the old actors, new actors came to the scene. Most significant among them 
in the United Nations Mission in Sudan, the UN peacekeeping force deployed to Sudan in 2005, 
in addition to UN agencies UNHCR and International Governmental Organizations such as the 
International Organization of Migration (IOM). UNMIS is a “multidimensional peace support 
operation, consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, 
including more than 700police officers”.  The mandate of UNMIS includes among other things 
the facilitation and coordination of the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and 
refugees and humanitarian assistance (UNMIS, 2010).  The UNHCR and IOM, which were not 
active during the earlier periods, are playing a significant role in Southern Sudan because of the 
large number of returnees both from within Sudan and across the borders. The role of some 
actors has changed; SPLM is no more a rebel movement but a partner in the Government of 
National Unity and the leading party governing Southern Sudan.  
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NGOs continue to operate in Southern Sudan but they are now facing more pressures 
from the local governments and local communities to do more. Odhiambo (2006) cited a field 
operations director with one of the big international NGOs, saying “NGOs represent the only 
organized systems the people know and the people have begun expecting NGOs to provide 
services that only governments can provide”.  Brauman (2006) mentions that the NGOs have 
been invited to contribute the rebuilding of Southern Sudan but they ‘… have neither the 
mandate nor the means …” to carry out these tasks. This is quite a challenge for NGOs as it 
reflects the dependency of the post-conflict government and local communities on international 
relief assistance to undertake tasks that are the responsibility of the government to provide. 
This reflects a change in the rules of the game as a result of a change in the context in 
which the NGOs are operating.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
The chapter provided a description of the case study using the IAD framework and Kurt Lewin’s 
Force Field Theory within the context of the international aid system. It gave an overview of the 
civil war in Sudan and described the humanitarian relief effort which continues since the 1970s 
to the present day. The chapter answers the research question of why and how certain 
institutional arrangements or multiorganizational networks emerge and evolve. The main 
argument the chapter is making is that a relief operation is a complex adaptive system whereby 
its constituent parts are continuously interacting with each other and with their broader 
environment. As a complex adaptive system, a relief operation is an action situation existing 
within broader and interacting action arenas. It is continuously impacted by these action arenas 
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and at the same time it influences what is happening within them. The repeated interactions of 
the different actors among themselves and with their environment define the structure of the 
operation and its adaptation over time. The chapter also reveals how, through the actions and 
interactions of the participants in the action arena, the relief operation, as an emergent 
multiorganizational network, adapts to the frequently changing conditions of the emergency. 
OLS had begun as a three-month emergency food assistance program, continued for 16 years and 
covered broad sectors and large geographic areas. After OLS came to an end in 2005, the relief 
operation continued in Southern Sudan because of the continuation of the state of CHE.  
Operation Lifeline Sudan is a nested set, not only within a larger organizational set of 
humanitarian agencies, but also within a broader context of national and international politics. 
Regime changes in Sudan, events in neighboring countries and other seemingly irrelevant events 
such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the American intervention in Somalia all have their 
impact on the operation. Donor countries and their foreign policy agendas played a strong role 
not only through the funds they provide but also through pressure they exert on the Government 
of Sudan and the rebel movements to allow humanitarian agencies access to the people in need. 
The broadening or shrinking of humanitarian space, depended on donors leverage as much as it 
depended on humanitarian diplomacy practiced by the providers of relief aid in their direct 
negotiations with the warring factions.  
With regards to humanitarian relief effort in Sudan, certain common features characterize 
it throughout its long history. It can been clearly seen that the same set of challenges such as 
administrative obstacles, geographic and natural barriers as well as debilitated infrastructure 
continued to hinder the provision of relief aid throughout the years. Insecurity and intensification 
of fighting between different factions led to the shrinking of humanitarian space. The 
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humanitarian agencies were no longer dealing with two warring factions, but with a large 
number of warring factions controlling different parts of Southern Sudan. This required a state of 
continuous negotiations between the humanitarian agencies and the political and military 
authorities in order to gain access to the people in need. In spite of humanitarian aid’s claim of 
its independence from politics, the humanitarian agencies find themselves involved in politics in 
order to be able to carry out their relief effort.  
Against this descriptive analysis of the case, the next chapter will present the findings of 
the Social Network Analysis.  
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5.0  STRUCTURE OF THE RELIEF OPERATION IN 1989, 1998 AND 2009 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four explained the historical background to the case study and provided a descriptive 
analysis of the provision of relief assistance in Sudan since the early 1970s. The descriptive 
analysis of the case was based on the IAD framework and Lewin’s Force Field Theory looking at 
the multiple levels of analysis, the interaction of actors across these levels and the driving and 
restraining forces impacting the relief operation in the context of a complex humanitarian 
emergency caused by war and famine. Although the complex humanitarian emergency was at the 
local level and relief assistance was provided in specific regions within the country, yet the 
dynamics of the emergency and the policies impacting the provision of relief assistance span 
different levels and reflect much broader international and regional dynamics.   
This chapter presents the findings of the Social Network Analysis (SNA) generated from 
relational data using the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) computer program. The findings 
represent a modeling of the structure the relief operation as a network during the three points in 
time identified in Chapter Four - 1989, 1998 and 2009. The relief operation is described using 
the following network measures - Size, Density, Centrality, Krackhardt’s Hierarchy measures, 
Measures of Fragmentation and Cohesion as defined in section 5.5.1 of this chapter. The SNA 
will enhance our understanding of both the specific characteristics of the different actors and the 
 126 
overall structure of the relief operation as a complex adaptive system. It will provide answers to 
the following questions “what is the system in question, what are the entities composing it and 
how do the entities combine and organize to produce the system itself?” (Smith, 1997).  Based 
on the results of the network analysis, I will be able to report on the different actors and identify 
which actors are more central and accordingly occupy positions of power in terms of controlling 
the flow of information and interaction among other actors; which actors work together and 
describe the patterns of their interaction and how these interaction patterns changed or remained 
the same at the three points of time. The importance of understanding the interaction patterns 
among actors in a network is underscored by Stephenson (2006)  when he stated that developing 
“… a context-sensitive description of humanitarian network action”  required charting “… the 
range and character of continuing significant patterns of communication and ties among network 
stakeholders” (p. 49).  
The next sections will present a description of the data used in the analysis, a description 
of the network in 1989, 1998 ad 2009, the Social Network Analysis Program used and 
subsequently the findings of the analysis.   
5.2 DATA USED 
Social Network Analysis uses relational data which takes into consideration both the actors and 
their interactions in contrast to the data used in conventional statistical analysis which focuses on 
the actors only (Hanneman, 2001, p. 3). The source of the relational data used for the SNA is the 
situation reports (sitreps) produced by OLS in 1989 and 1998 and by UN OCHA in 2009. OLS 
was the main coordination mechanism of the relief operation in 1989 and 1998. UN OCHA took 
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over the coordination of humanitarian relief in Southern Sudan after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the eventual demise of OLS as a specific structure. The 
data from the situation reports was manually coded as described in Chapter Three. 
The numbers of sitreps coded for the three periods are as follows: for 1989, 14 sitreps 
were coded covering the period 11 April 1989 to 20 September 1989; for 1998, 17 sitreps were 
coded covering the period 7 June 1998 to 22 December 1998; and for 2009, 26 sitreps were 
coded covering the period 11 January 2009 to 30 August 2009.  It is worth noting that for the 
first two periods; these are all the available reports that could be located. 
The 1989 sitreps cover the formative period and the initial weeks of the operation when it 
was established and then extended beyond the initially envisioned three months’ period.  The 
1998 sitreps cover the period at the height of the famine crisis in that year, which was the second 
major famine in Sudan since the 1989 crisis which led to the establishment of OLS in the first 
place. The 2009 sitreps signal the beginning of another serious food crisis in Southern Sudan 
four years after the peace agreement was signed. The common characteristic between the three 
periods is that they are periods when serious food shortages and widespread hunger were 
threatening large numbers of the population in Southern Sudan. In addition to the food shortages, 
the three periods are also characterized by violence as even after the peace agreement was 
signed, the year 2009 witnessed violent tribal clashes and increased activity by the LRA in 
Southern Sudan.  Although, the 1989 period signals the beginning of the large scale, integrated 
and internationally-coordinated relief effort in an active war zone in Sudan, it is by no means the 
first time that relief assistance was provided in Sudan. The significance of the 1998 and 2009 
periods is that in spite of the well-established and long-standing relief operation, yet again 
famine was striking the very same areas as before.  
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The content analysis enabled me to identify the organizations that participated in the 
relief operation, the interactions among them and between them, and the political/military 
authorities on both sides of the conflict. Also through content analysis, I was able to map the 
locations and sectors in which the relief operation was taking place, how the 
significance/importance of the sectors changed over the three periods of time reflecting the 
changing needs on the ground and how the operation adapted to these changing needs. From a 
network perspective, the interactions between the different entities are not considered as 
properties of the entities themselves, but rather as characteristics defining the system (or the 
action situation) and connecting it into the larger action arena in which it exists (Knoke and 
Yang, 2008; Ostrom ,2005; Scott 2000). The interactions define the system as a complex 
adaptive system operating at multiple levels and continuously changing in response to changes in 
the action arena. The interactions themselves are not independent of the broader environment as 
they are very much affected by what rules govern the operation at the time and what forces push 
towards or against more interactions.  
The coding of the data took place in Microsoft Excel. For each transaction, the coding of 
the data  listed the date of the transaction, the article (sitrep) title, the initiating organization, its 
type and source of funding, the transaction itself, the responding organization, its type and source 
of funding, the location of the transaction, and the sector to which the transaction is contributing.  
When the coding was completed, the total number of transactions coded and the total number of 
organizations participating in the relief operation during the three periods are as follows:  
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Table 5-1: Total Number of Transactions and Organizations 
 Number 
Item 1989 1998 2009 Total 
 N % N % N %  
Transactions (All) 1480 32.6 842 18.6 2212 48.8 4534 
Total no. of organizations 
 
93 29.9 138 43.4 228 71.7 318 
The total number of organizations is generated using the list of organizations in Excel where data were coded. It is 
not the sum of the actors in 1989, 1998 and 2009 because many of the actors were parts of the operation during 
the three periods. 
 
The next step, before running the SNA, was to remove all transactions that have only an 
initiating organization and no responding organization, i.e. all transactions involving a single 
actor were removed from the excel sheet. The resulting total number of transactions and 
organizations is as follows:   
 
Table 5-2: Number of Transactions Involving More Than One Organization  
 Number 
Item 1989 1998 2009 Total 
 N % N % N %  
Transaction (involving two 
actors)  
962 30.8 579 18.5 1586 50.7 3127 
Total no. of organizations 93 29.2 
 
71 22.3 228 71.7 318 
The total number of organizations is generated using the list of organizations in Excel Sheet where data were 
coded. It is not the sum of the actors in 1989, 1998 and 2009 since many of the actors were parts of the operation 
during the three periods. 
5.3 Description of the Network in 1989, 1998 and 2009 
Different actors participated in the relief operation or formed part of the environment in which 
the relief operation existed during its long history. Table 5-3 provides a list of the types of actors 
and their numbers during the three points in time and their total for the three periods. It should be 
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pointed out that the types of actors and their numbers reflect both individual actors and groups of 
actors working together and reporting their action as one entity. This is what is referred to in the 
table below as “Mixed”. 
Table 5-3: The Actors 
 Number & Percentage 
 1989 1998 2009  
Item  N % N % N % Total (3 
periods)* 
Transactions (or Interaction involving two 
actors) 
962 30.8 579 18.5 1586 50.7 3127 
Total No. of Actors 93 29.2 71 22.3 228 71.7 318 
Type of Actor        
Armed Group 1 50 1 50 2 100 2 
Civil Society Organization 1 9.1 3 27.3 8 72.7 11 
Community Authority 0 0 1 100 1 100 1 
Community based Organizations 0 0 0 0 11 100 11 
Consortium of INGOs and NNGOs 1 50 0 0 1 50 2 
County Government 0 0 0 0 7 100 7 
Diplomatic Representation 1 100 0 0 0 0 1 
Donor  27 79.4 4 11.8 11 32.4 34 
Donor coordinating mechanism 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
International Media 1 100 0 0 0 0 1 
International NGO 25 34.7 30 41.7 48 66.7 72 
International Organization (ICRC) 1 50 1 50 2 100 2 
International Organization (UN) 9 32.1 7 25 27 96.4 28 
Militias  0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
Mixed (different types of actors) 6 23.1 12 46.2 12 46.2 26 
National Government Body 3 100 1 33.3 1 33.3 3 
National Humanitarian Agency 1 100 0 0 1 100 1 
National NGO 4 21.1 3 15.8 13 68.4 19 
Neighboring Government 4 66.6 0 0 3 50 6 
NGO (group of NGOs e.g. by sector) 1 25.0 3 75 2 50 4 
Opposition Army 1 100.0 1 100 1 100 1 
Opposition Movement 1 100.0 1 100 1 100 1 
Peace Keeping Mission 0 0 0 0 8 100 8 
Political & Military Authorities 0 0 1 100 1 100 1 
Political Party 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
Private Sector 4 80 1 20 2 40 5 
Rebel Humanitarian Agency 1 100 1 100 0 0 1 
Regional Government 0 0 0 0 22 100 22 
Regional Organization 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
State Government 0 0 0 0 39 100 39 
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UN Common Service Facility 0 0 0 0 1 100 1 
UN Team 0 0 0 0 2 100 2 
*Except for the total number of transactions, column 5 of totals for the three periods is not the result of the addition 
of columns 2, 3 and 4. This is because many of the actors remained part of the operation during the three periods. 
Summing up the number of the actors over the three periods will result in double counting. The total number of 
actors is generated using the list of organizations in Excel Sheet where data were coded.  
 
The total number of actors, of all types, that participated in the relief operation at the 
three points in time is 318. The actors listed above are only the actors covered by the situation 
reports. It should be noted that some actors operated independently of the coordinated relief 
operation and did not report regularly and hence they are not included in the situation reports. 
Accordingly, this number might not be covering all actors working in Southern Sudan during the 
three periods of time.  Nevertheless, it covers the majority of actors and all those participating in 
the coordinated relief effort.  
With regards to the total number of actors, some organizations remained as part of the 
network during the three periods while others dropped from the network. By looking at these 
basic statistics, a number of facts emerge. The two main types of respondents are UN agencies 
and NGOs, both national and international, who were on the ground providing relief assistance 
during the three periods. The minimal, almost non-existent, role played by government 
authorities during the 1989 and 1998 periods in directly providing relief is very noticeable. This 
can be explained by the fact that relief assistance was provided in an active war zone in which 
the government was one side of the conflict. Hence, it was not conceivable that it would provide 
relief to affected populations on both sides of the conflict. Another noticeable fact is the large 
number of international NGOs, and the fact that their number has been increasing from one point 
in time to the other. It is also notable that the number of national NGOs increased from 3 in 1998 
to 13 in 2009, and the number of community based organizations which were non-existent 
during the two earlier periods was 11 in 2009.   
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 Table 5-3 also shows that the network in 2009 has the largest number of actors as 
compared to 1989 and 1998. In 2009, the network was operating in a post-conflict situation as 
compared to 1989 and 1998. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, 
government institutions at the local level were established and became active in responding to 
the needs of the population. The large number of actors in 2009 is, to a large extent, attributable 
to the presence and active role of the government and local administration whereby state 
governments and county authorities started playing an increasingly important role in the relief 
effort. In 1989 and 1998 such local administration units did not exist, and most of the relief effort 
was carried out by international relief organizations. In addition, in 2009 and with the end of 
fighting many national organizations, both NGOs and CBOs, became active in the relief and 
recovery effort. The number of local organizations (CSOs in general and CBOs in particular) 
increased considerably as many people returned to Southern Sudan from other parts of the 
country as well as from abroad and started organizing themselves to assist in the relief and 
recovery effort.  
Another significant group of actors is donors. It can be seen that in 1989, their number 
was much higher than in 1998 and in 2009. This can be explained by the fact that 1989 was the 
beginning of a large, internationally-organized relief operation and much of the effort then 
depended on donors, their willingness to support the relief effort both financially and 
diplomatically by exerting pressures on the two sides of the conflict to allow assistance to reach 
the affected populations. In 1998, with the relief operation well established, the focus was more 
on the question of humanitarian space and access to the people in need as access was a major 
constraint in 1998. As such, the major activities were more on negotiating the humanitarian 
space and securing access to affected populations. In 2009 and after the signature of the peace 
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agreement, donor resources became available on a large scale to fund the relief and 
reconstruction effort. 
The analysis of the situation reports reveals that some of the new actors that became part 
of the network after 2005 became very prominent. These new actors include the United Nations 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the peace keeping mission established by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004 (UNMIS, 2010).  UNMIS, with its many sections and units, in 
addition to some UN agencies which were not active in Southern Sudan before, such as UNHCR, 
became major actors in the relief operation in 2009.  UNHCR played a prominent role in 
resettling refugees who returned from neighboring countries to Southern Sudan. International 
organizations, such as the International Organization of Migration (IOM), played a prominent 
role in resettling the IDPs returning from different parts of Sudan to the South. While some 
actors remained constant during the three periods, the changing situation after 2005 and the 
changing nature of the needs to which the relief operation responded brought in additional actors 
with different mandates and skills. This is part of the evolution of the relief operation and 
adaptation in responding to a changing environment.  
5.4 ORGANIZATIONAL RISK ANALYZER (ORA) 
To conduct the network analysis, the data coded in Microsoft Excel was imported into the 
Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) software which is a network analysis tool that detects an 
organization’s structure (Carley et al., 2009). In ORA, entities and their relationships are 
represented by the ‘Meta-Matrix’ which is a collection of networks including actors, tasks, 
locations, resources... etc. the Meta-Matrix is the main input used in analyzing the structure of 
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the overall network. Analysis is based on graph theory, matrix algebra, formal logic and discrete 
and continuous equations to calculate measures of connections among the actors and different 
other entities in an organization (Carley & Reminga, 2004). ORA generate graphical 
representation of the network structure and yields reports on the different network and actor 
measures. These network and actors measures taken at three points in time will allow me to 
identify the overall structure of the network, the positions of key actors and how these changed 
and evolved overtime. 
Appendix A provides the names of the organizations and the acronyms used in the 
network analysis. 
5.5 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is used to study the patterns of interactions between entities 
such as individuals, organizations and computers and to help understand their relationship to 
each other. The basic assumption on which SNA is based is that the relationships among 
interacting units are as important as the units themselves (Gretzel, 2001).  A network may be of 
any size with a small or a large number of actors and the basic idea of SNA is to understand the 
patterns of interactions between the entities through an analysis of their relationships and the 
frequency of their interactions. The defining feature of network analysis compared to 
conventional statistical analysis is that it describes actors by their relations instead of their 
intrinsic attributes and views them as interdependent rather than independent, autonomous 
entities (Gretzel, 2001; Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 4).   
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Studying the relationships between actors reveals the structure of the network, how actors 
are located, or “embedded,” within that structure as well as how the network structure itself 
emerges from the individual choices made by the actors and their numerous interactions 
(Hanneman, 2001, p. 3).  Network measures that shed light on the location of the actors and the 
overall structure of the network include the number and lengths of pathways among the actors in 
a network. These measures show the patterns of connections among the actors. Networks in 
which the actors are strongly connected are better coordinated and information flows faster 
among them. This means that they are able to respond faster to any change in their environment 
than networks that are weakly connected (Hanneman, 2001).  
5.5.1 Network Measures 
This section will present the results of the SNA which was conducted using ORA. The network 
measures used are both macro and micro level measures. The macro level measures, which are 
measures of the overall network, include Size and Density, Fragmentation and cohesion and 
Krackhardt’s Hierarchy Measures. The micro level measures, which pertain to actors, include 
measures of centrality and power. Network measures are calculated for the Meta-Matrix which 
includes organizations, locations and sectors covered by the relief operation at the three points in 
time. 
The Size of a network, which is determined by the number of actors (nodes) and the 
potential number of ties among the actors, is an important measure to consider since the larger 
the size of a network, the more resources are required to keep it connected. As Hanneman (2005) 
puts it, “size is critical for the structure of social relations because of the limited resources and 
capacities that each actor has for building and maintaining ties. As a group gets bigger, the 
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proportion of all of the ties that could (logically) be present, which is the density of the network, 
will fall, and the more likely it is that differentiated and partitioned groups will emerge” (p. 41). 
Fragmentation of a network will show up when two or more subgroups of the network do not 
share members (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 284).  
In relief operations in complex humanitarian emergencies, where actors are responding to 
unpredictable crisis situations in a continuously and rapidly changing environment, the size and 
density of the network are important factors. Density, in particular, which describes how 
connected the actors are, indicates how quickly organizations can exchange information and 
resources to be able to respond to the changing situation. 
The micro level measures describe how each actor is connected to the other actors in the 
network. An actor with many connections is an actor who has a ‘central’ advantageous position 
as it has more access to information and resources which will enable it to respond to changes in 
its environment more rapidly. Fewer connections indicate an isolated actor with reduced access 
to information and resources and hence slower response to changes in its environment. This is 
the degree centrality of the actors. 
Other measures of centrality of the actors which are also important are closeness and 
betweenness centrality which give an indication of the power wielded by an actor. More central 
actors have structural advantage either because of their closeness to others enabling them to have 
a strong influence on other actors or because of their intermediary position between other actors 
which will enable them to control the flow of information and resources.  
Table 5-4 lists the different macro and micro level measures calculated for the network 
and the actors and their definitions. 
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Table 5-4: Network Macro and Micro Measures and Their Definitions 
Type Measure Definition 
Macro Size Number of nodes and potential ties in the network. 
 
Density Proportion calculated by dividing the number of observed ties 
in a network by the number of all possible ties. It is an 
indication to how close a network is to a fully connected 
network where all the possible connections between the nodes 
exist.  
 
Network 
Fragmentation 
Is a count of the number of components. The maximum 
fragmentation in a network occurs when every node is an 
isolate, that is, when there are as many components as nodes 
in the network.  
 
Krackhardt’s graph 
theoretical dimensions 
of hierarchy 
Four individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
for the pure ideal type of hierarchy defined as an ‘out-tree’ 
graph in which all points are connected and all but one node 
(the boss) has an in-degree of one.  
 
Krackhardt 
connectedness 
If all actors are connected in the same component and 
embedded in the same unitary structure, the graph is more 
hierarchical and is an out-tree graph which is a pure, ideal 
typical hierarchy.  
 
Krackhardt efficiency This dimension measures the extent to which actors have a 
single boss. 
 
Krackhardt hierarchy To be a pure hierarchy there should not be any reciprocated 
ties. Reciprocal relations between two actors imply equal 
status which denies pure hierarchy.  
 
Krackhardt 
upperboundedness 
Is the extent to which all actors have a boss in common.  
Reciprocity How strong is the tendency for one actor to “choose” another, 
if the second actor chooses the first?  It is an important 
property of the social structure because it relates to both the 
balance and to the degree and form of hierarchy in a network. 
Percentage of nodes in a graph that are bi-directional. 
 
Centralization Centralization measures express the degree of inequality or 
variance in the network as a percentage of a perfect star 
network of the same size. The larger the centralization index, 
the more likely that a single actor (or group of actors) is quite 
central, with the remaining actors considerably less central. 
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Lower scores indicate that communication is more distributed. 
If all nodes were linked to only once central node (star graph), 
the score would be one. If all nodes were linked to each other 
(a complete graph), the score would be zero.  
 
Average tie length 
(characteristic path 
length)  
 
Mean distance between nodes in the network. A lower 
average tie length indicates that information is communicated 
faster as it is transmitted through fewer intermediaries in the 
network.   
 
Clustering coefficients 
 
Clustering is the tendency towards dense local networks. It is 
a measure used to determine whether or not the graph is a 
small-world network, i.e. networks that will have sub-
networks that are characterized by the presence of connection 
between almost any two nodes within them.  It is the average 
of the densities of the neighborhood of all the actors.  
 
 
Micro Centrality The nearness of a node to all other nodes in a network. It 
displays the ability to access information through links 
connecting to other nodes. 
 
In-degree centrality Is the normalized in-degree of a node. It indicates the in-links 
which are the connections that a particular node receives from 
other nodes. 
 
Out-degree centrality Is the normalized out-degree of a node.  It indicates the 
connections that a particular node sends to other nodes. It is a 
measure of how influential the node may be.  
 
Total Degree centrality Number of direct ties that a node has. It indicates how likely a 
node is to receive what information/material flows through 
the network.  It is the normalized sum of a node’s in- and out-
degrees. 
 
Eigenvector centrality It is a type of degree centrality which shows connections to 
centrally located nodes. It indicates that a node is central to 
the extent that its neighbors are central. It helps in identifying 
those who can mobilize others (or play an interlocutor role). A 
node that is connected to many well connected nodes will 
have a high score, while a node connected to many isolates 
will have a low score, even if it has a high total degree 
centrality.  
 
Closeness centrality It is the average closeness of a node to the other nodes in a 
network. Loosely, closeness is the inverse of the average 
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distance in the network between the node and all other nodes.  
Betweenness centrality It is the degree to which a node lies between other nodes in 
the network which are not directly connected to each other 
(i.e. a node acting as an intermediary or broker located on the 
shortest paths between other nodes). It indicates the number 
of times that nodes must pass through a certain node in order 
to be connected.  A high betweenness centrality indicates an 
influential position.  
 
Hub-centrality 
measures 
A node is hub-central to the extent that its out-links are to 
nodes that have many in-links. An organization is hub-central 
when it is sending information to a wide range of others, each 
of whom has many others reporting (sending links) to them. It 
is a generalization of Eigenvector centrality.  
 
Authority centrality A node is authority-central to the extent that its in-links are 
from nodes that have many out-links. It is another 
generalization of Eigenvector centrality. Organizations that 
are authority-central receive information from a wide range of 
others each of whom sends information to a large number of 
others, i.e. its in-links are from agents that are sending links to 
many others.  
 
Information centrality A network measure that takes into consideration both indirect 
paths as well as shortest (geodesic) paths among entities.  It 
goes a step beyond betweenness centrality, which considers 
only the shortest paths, and takes into consideration the 
indirect paths. Entities high in information centrality are more 
likely to get more information and to get it faster.  
 
Clique membership 
count 
A clique is a sub-structure that is defined as an identifiable set 
of nodes where every node is connected to every other node 
with relatively fewer connections to those in other groups. 
The clique count is the number of distinct cliques to which 
each node belongs.  Organizations which are high in the 
number of cliques are those that belong to a large number of 
distinct groups.  
 
Simmelian Ties These are ties embedded in cliques and are often associated 
with brokers inside such cliques. Two nodes are Simmelian- 
Tied to one another if they are reciprocally and strongly tied 
to each other and strongly tied to at least one third party in 
common. 
Source: compiled from the following sources: Borgatti (2006), Carley et al. (2011), Faust and Wasserman (1994), 
Hanneman (2005), Knoke and Yang (2008), Scott (2000). 
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These measures will help me to identify the structure of the operation and the locations of 
the actors within that structure. Calculating the measures at three points in time will reveal how 
the structure has changed over time and which actors retained their central positions and which 
became more peripheral. 
5.5.2 Overall structure of the Network in 1989 
 
Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A.  
Figure 5-1: 1989 Relief Operation - Organizations Network 
 
The structure of the relief operation is revealed by the pattern of interconnections between the 
actors.  The visual image of the 1989 relief operation presented in Figure 5-1 and the network 
measures presented in Table 5-5 show the relief operation as a complex system with a web of 
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interconnections among the different actors. The Network resembles the ‘star network’ with a 
number of key core actors having many ties to the other actors who are not necessarily connected 
to each other. These core actors, by virtue of their central location in the network, tend to play a 
significant role in communication and coordination among the other actors. The graph shows 
many peripheral actors who are not tightly connected and who are not part of the dense core of 
connections at the center of the network but yet, they are not completely isolated. It can be seen 
that there is no fragmentation in this network and component count is one – i.e. only one network 
exists. Even the peripheral actors are still loosely connected to the other actors.   
 
Table 5-5: Network Level Measures of the 1989 Network 
Measure Value Measure Value 
Row count 86 Network fragmentation 0.0 
Column count 86 Krackhardt connectedness 1.00 
Link count 382 Krackhardt efficiency 0.932 
Density 0.052 Krackhardt hierarchy 0.678 
Isolate count 0.000 Krackhardt upperboundedness 0.894 
Component count 1.000 Degree centralization 0.903 
Reciprocity 0.210 Betweenness centralization 0.258 
Characteristic path 
length 3.837 Closeness centralization 0.002 
Clustering coefficient 0.685 Reciprocal 20% of the links are reciprocal 
Network levels 
(diameter) 22.00 
  
 
Looking at the network level measures of the 1989 Network, we find that the clustering 
coefficient of 0.685 is quite high compared to the density of 0.052 which indicates that local 
networks are much more densely connected than the global network, i.e. the relief operation is a 
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small-world network whereby although most nodes are not directly connected, yet they can be 
reached from every other node by a small number of steps (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The low 
global density indicates limited interdependencies in the sense that the actors are still largely 
independent from each other.  
Krackhardt measures of hierarchy are generally high with a Krackhardt efficiency score 
is 0.93. Although the relief operation is not a formally (or officially) established hierarchical 
structure, yet all actors are embedded in the same unitary structure and are mostly connected to a 
central group of actors which act as the ‘boss’. What makes the network deviate from a pure 
hierarchy is the Krackhardt hierarchy and upperboundedness scores of 0.678 and 0.894 
respectively. The former measure indicates that many actors have reciprocal ties which imply 
equal status between the actors denying pure hierarchy. This is to be expected, given that the 
actors are quite diverse and do not report to the same central authority. 
The measures of centralization (degree, betweenness and closeness) are 0.903, 0.269 and 
0.01 respectively.  Degree centralization in particular is very high approaching a value of 1 while 
betweenness centralization is also significant. This indicates that there is significant variation in 
the power of individual actors given their positions in the network. It is very clear, even from the 
visual representation of the network, that the positional advantages in the network are unevenly 
distributed, with some actors occupying very central positions and others in the periphery of the 
network.  
Moving from the measures of the overall structure of the operation to the micro-level 
measures of individual actors, the bar diagram in Figure 5-2 below shows the Top Ranked 
Organizations  in 1989, which are the organization at the center (hub) of the above graph. The 
diagram shows the nodes that are repeatedly top-ranked in a number of centrality measures, as 
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defined in Table 5-4, including total degree centrality, In-degree centrality, out-degree centrality, 
Eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, hub-centrality measures, 
authority centrality, information centrality, clique membership count, Simmelian Ties, and 
clustering coefficients.  The value shown is the percentage of measures for which the nodes are 
ranked in the top three.  
 
 
Figure 5-2: Recurring Top-Ranked Organizations in 1989 
 
Legend to Figure 5-2 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
hmc High Ministerial Committee ols Operation Lifeline Sudan 
icrc International Committee for the Red 
Cross 
un United Nations  
jp Government of Japan unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
ngos Non-Governmental Organizations wfp World Food Programme  
 
ICRC  is the top ranking organization,  followed by UNICEF, OLS,  NGOs, WFP, EEC, 
UN (which refers to the UN at the constitutional choice level of Analysis in terms of negotiations 
with the Government and the Rebel Movement/Army), then HMC (High Ministerial Committee, 
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Governments of Norway and Japan. This result falls in line with what is expected, as both ICRC 
and UNICEF played the main role in establishing the coordinated relief effort.  ICRC, with its 
mandate to work in war zones, played a significant role during the early period of the operation 
and UNICEF has been instrumental in establishing the relief operation and acted as its lead 
agency.  OLS is the coordination mechanism of the relief operation. NGOs collectively were 
among the top ranking actors followed by WFP, given its mandate and the prominent role it 
plays in food crises, then donors such as EEC, Norway and Japan. The High Ministerial 
Committee was a Committee established by the Government of Sudan to deal with the crisis in 
the South and was the Government of Sudan’s interface in coordinating with the international 
community in organizing the relief effort in Southern Sudan.   
5.5.2.1 Key Organizations 
Table 5-6 shows the top scoring nodes side-by-side for selected measures. These are 
critical actors in the operation. Among the top 5 ranking actors are UN agencies, OLS, ICRC, 
different donors, such as the EEC, Japan, Italy, Canada, USA, Finland, and NGOs, collectively, 
as one actor and some individual NGOs such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and 
the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). 
Looking at the actors below the top 5 ranking ones, we find other NGOs such as Norwegian 
Church Aid, Lutheran World Federation, Norwegian People Aid, World Vision, and the Sudan’s 
People’s Liberation Army. 
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Table 5-6: Key Organizations in 1989 
Rank Betweenness centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
In-degree 
centrality 
Out-degree 
centrality 
Total degree 
centrality 
1 ols eec icrc icrc ols icrc 
2 wfp irc ngos ngos icrc ols 
3 unicef jp unicef wfp unicef ngos 
4 srra It ols ols usaid wfp 
5 crs ca srra srra ngos unicef 
6 un fin eec unicef wfp srra 
7 nca finc un lwf un lwf 
8 spla frc wfp npa srra npa 
9 icrc grc spla spla lwf un 
10 fr gnc dc wv spla spla 
11 usaid jpnc npa un wv gos 
12 ngos nlc it nca nca wv 
 
Legend to Table 5-6 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
ca Government of Canada  jpnc Japan National Committee 
crs Catholic Relief Services lwf Lutheran World Federation 
dc Donor Community nca Norwegian Church Aid 
eec European Economic Commission ngos Non-Governmental Organizations 
fin Government of Finland nlc Netherlands Committee 
finc Finland Committee npa Norwegian People Aid 
fr Government of France  ols Operation Lifeline Sudan 
frc France Committee spla Sudan People Liberation Army 
gnc Greek National Committee srra Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association 
gos Government of Sudan un United Nations  
grc Germany Committee unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
icrc International Committee for the Red 
Cross 
usaid United States Agency for International 
Development  
irc International Rescue Committee wfp World Food Programme  
it Government of Italy  wv World Vision 
jp Government of Japan   
 
Table 5-7 presents the number of cliques to which actors belonged, the clique 
membership count, for the 1989 Network.  
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Table 5-7: Clique Membership Count in 1989 
Rank Actor Value 
1 ols 38 
2 unicef 34 
3 wfp 33 
4 icrc 26 
5 ngos 24 
6 un 20 
7 nca 17 
8 srra 15 
9 spla 11 
10 usaid 11 
11 across 10 
12 crs 8 
Actors full names are provided in legend to Table 5-6.  
The clique membership count shows the number of cliques or sub-groups to which each 
of the central actors listed in Table 5-6 belong. The larger number of cliques an actor belongs to, 
the more connected it is and the bigger the role it plays in communication and coordination.  
As mentioned earlier, the main input into ORA is the meta-network which includes the 
actors, sectors and locations network. When the two later networks are added to the actors’ 
network, the resulting overall relief operation network is provided in Figure 5-3.  
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Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A. 
Figure 5-3: 1989 Relief Operation - Network of Organizations, Sectors and Locations 
 
When the locations and sectors are added to the actors’ network, the result is a more 
densely connected overall network. This implies that actors who were not directly connected in 
the actor x actor, in the overall network they become connected by virtue of working in the same 
location or in the same sector or both. Figure 5-3 provides a graphical representation of the 
overall complexity, which is the density of the meta-matrix as opposed to density, which a 
measure of the connectedness of the actor x actor network only.    
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5.5.2.2 Main Sectors (Tasks) in 1989 
The main sectors (tasks) in which the different organizations working in Southern Sudan 
in 1989 focused are provided in Table 5-8 below in the order of importance of the different 
sectors. The table shows the centrality column degree whereby the Input network(s) are the 
Organization x Task (Sector) Networks. 
 
Table 5-8:  Main Sectors (Tasks) in 1989 
Rank Task (Sector) Value 
1 Food donation, delivery and distribution 1.00 
2 Funding 0.516 
3 Transport-air 0.150 
4 Cooperation and Coordination 0.131 
5 Agriculture 0.128 
6 security, safety and access 0.103 
7 Immunization 0.103 
8 Health 0.094 
9 Relations with Authorities (military and political) 0.081 
10 Media 0.059 
11 Non-Food Programs 0.056 
12 Overall Operation 0.053 
 
The table shows that the food sector, including food donations from different donor 
countries, delivery and distribution was the most important sector in which the organizations 
worked. This is followed by funding. It is worth noting that during the early days of the 
operation, funding and the pledges made by different donors were very important and were a 
determining factor in the success of the operation. Air transportation of food and the other items 
required was also an important sector, given the dire situation on the ground and the importance 
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of moving food and other items fast enough to meet the needs. In addition, the inaccessibility of 
some areas by road made air transportation the main means of transporting food to these areas.  
Cooperation and coordination was also an important sector, given the large number of 
organizations working together and the fact that the different processes have to be coordinated at 
different levels and in different geographical locations such as in the UN headquarters in New 
York, in Khartoum, in neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. Sectors such 
as security, safety and access, and relations with authorities were also important given that relief 
was provided in an active war zone where there were serious concerns about access to the 
affected populations and about the safety and security of the providers of relief assistance. These 
conditions led to continuous negotiations with the authorities on both sides of the conflicts.  
Health and Immunization were also important sectors as well as agriculture and non-food 
programs. The distribution of agricultural inputs was viewed as an important activity to try to 
encourage the local populations to produce their own food to avoid similar food shortages in the 
future.  
5.5.2.3 Main Locations for Relief Assistance in 1989 
The main locations in which the actors focused their effort in 1989 are provided in Table 
5-9 below in the order of importance of the different locations. The table shows the centrality 
column degree whereby the Input network(s) are the Actor x Location Networks. 
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Table 5-9: Main Locations in 1989 
Rank Location Value 
1 Southern Sudan 1.000 
2 Sudan 0.896 
3 Eastern Equatoria 0.738 
4 Central Equatoria 0.650 
5 Jonglei 0.383 
6 Western Equatoria 0.295 
7 Nairobi 0.290 
8 SPLA-held areas 0.153 
9 Khartoum 0.137 
10 Warrap 0.093 
11 Adddis Ababa 0.087 
12 New York 0.077 
 
Southern Sudan as a location includes many of the other locations mentioned in the table 
such as the Equatoria States, SPLA-held areas, Jonglei and Warrap States as shown in the map in 
figure 5.4.  Many of the activities carried out by the different organizations were located 
throughout Southern Sudan. Some organizations worked in specific areas such as Jonglei or one 
of the Equatoria States. Sudan as a location refers to the overall operation taking place at 
different levels, the constitutional choice level where policy decisions were made, collective 
choice level and operational level. Nairobi and Addis Ababa were important locations as capitals 
of neighboring countries that took part in the relief effort since its early days. New York as the 
headquarters of the UN was also an important location at the constitutional choice level, where 
early negotiations about the establishment of the relief operation took place.    
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Source: OCHA (2009). Sudan Map Centre  
 
Figure 5-4: Map of Southern Sudan 
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5.5.3 Overall structure of the Network in 1998 
 
Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A.  
Figure 5-5: 1998 Relief Operation - Organizations Network 
 
In 1998, the structure of the relief operation, as revealed by the actors’ network in Figure 
5-5 and the network measures in Table 5-10, is still characterized by a densely connected center 
and a number of peripheral organizations. The resemblance to the star network remains, but with 
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a number of core actors at the center instead of the sole actor in the ideal star network. The relief 
operation continues to be a cohesive one with no fragmentation as all actors are connected 
together. 
Table 5-10:  Network Level Measures of the 1998 Network 
Measure Value Measure Value 
Row count 65 Network fragmentation 0.000 
Column count 65 Krackhardt connectedness 1.000 
Link count 350 Krackhardt efficiency 0.891 
Density 0.083 Krackhardt hierarchy 0.543 
Isolate count 0.000 Krackhardt upperboundedness 0.938 
Component count 1.000 Degree centralization 0.901 
Reciprocity 0.238 Betweenness centralization 0.150 
Characteristic path length 2.925 Closeness centralization 0.027 
Clustering coefficient 0.384 Reciprocal 23% of the links are reciprocal 
Network levels (diameter) 9.000   
 
The number of actors in 1998 is 65 with a link account of 350.  The clustering coefficient 
is high compared to the density (0.384 compared to 0.083) which reveals that the pattern of more 
densely connected local neighborhoods compared to the global network still remains.  
Krackhardt’s measures of hierarchy remain high revealing that the network is generally 
hierarchical with all actors embedded in the same structure and connected to a central group of 
nodes. 23% of the ties among the nodes are reciprocal revealing an equal status among many of 
the actors and negating the existence of a pure hierarchy where the relationships are 
unidirectional. Reciprocal ties reflect an exchange relationship whereby actors send and receive 
information as equals.  The measure shows that almost one quarter of the links in the network are 
reciprocal.  
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The measures of centralization (degree, betweenness and closeness) are 0.901, 0.150 and 
0.027 respectively revealing that the variation in the positional advantage and power of 
individual actors continues.  
Moving from the measures of the overall structure of the operation to the micro-level 
measures of individual actors, the bar diagram in Figure 5-6 below shows the Top Ranked 
Organizations  in 1998, which are the organization at the center (hub) of the graph in Figure 5-5.  
 
Figure 5-6: Recurring Top-Ranked Organizations in 1998 
 
Legend to Figure 5-6 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
ols Operation Lifeline Sudan una United Nations Agencies 
oxfam-gb Oxfam-GB unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
oxfam-us OXFAM-US unicef-ns UNICEF Northern sector 
nba Nairobi-based agencies usa Government of United States of America 
scfuk Save the Children Fund - UK wfp World Food Programme  
 
UNICEF is the top ranking organization, followed by OLS and WFP. The Sudan Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), which is the humanitarian wing of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement, is ranked fourth which reveals that in 1998 it was playing a more 
 155 
substantial role in the relief effort than before.  Individual International NGOs such as Save the 
Children UK, Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam USA also ranked among the top actors in 1998. 
The role of organizations working across the border such as a number of UN agencies and NGOs 
working from Nairobi (Nairobi-based Agencies – nba) is becoming more prominent in 1998 as 
compared to 1989.  
It is worth noting that the ICRC was not among the top ranking organizations in 1998. 
This can be attributed to the fact that, after the initial stage of the operation during which ICRC 
had been working closely within OLS, ICRC was working more independently from OLS and as 
such it was absent from situation reports covering the activities of OLS and the different 
organizations working within it.  More information on this point is provided in the “Limitations 
Section” of the last chapter. 
5.5.3.1 Key Organizations in 1998 
Table 5-11 below shows the top scoring nodes side-by-side for selected measures. These 
are critical actors occupying central in the operation. OLS, UNICEF and WFP remain among the 
top ranking actors joined by international NGOs such as Save the Children UK, Oxfam Great 
Britain, Oxfam USA, International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision 
and MSF-Belgium. SRRA appears as a prominent actor in 1998; it ranked second in in-degree 
centrality, third in total degree centrality, and fourth in betweenness centrality. This is an 
indication of the important role SRRA, as the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, came to play in 
the coordination of the relief operation. The role of actors other than the providers of aid is also 
apparent in 1998 whereby one Armed Group (AG) is ranked second in closeness centrality.  This 
shows the impact of the different warring factions and armed groups on the cooperation. In 1998, 
they became an important actor with which the providers of relief have to deal.  Also the role of 
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teams formed from different organizations to support the relief effort such as the Joint Task 
Force which includes members of the OLS (UN and NGOs), the SRRA and the SPLM and the 
Emergency Response Team which includes members from UN agencies and NGOs became 
more prominent. These joints teams carried out different activities such as assessments, logistics 
and the distribution of relief supplies. They also ensured that the distribution targeted the 
neediest and most vulnerable people.  
Table 5-11: Key Organizations in 1998 
Rank Betweenness centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
In-degree 
centrality 
Out-degree 
centrality 
Total degree 
centrality 
1 ols jtf unicef unicef unicef unicef 
2 unicef ag ols srra ols Ols 
3 wfp unicef-ns scfuk oxfam-gb wfp srra 
4 srra wgp oxfam-gb wfp scfuk wfp 
5 wv ert-bor oxfam-us oxfam-us oxfam-us oxfam-us 
6 splm unicef-ss srra scfuk srra oxfam-gb 
7 irc usa wfp ols wv scfuk 
8 msf-b crs ngos ngos oxfam-gb Wv 
9 msf-h unicef/olsls wv wv msf-h gos 
10 oxfam-us wfp medair msf-b medair medair 
11 scfuk splm jtf gos jtf ngos 
12 oxfam-gb across msf-h splm gos msf-b 
 
Legend to Table 5-11 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
across Association of  Christian Resource 
    
oxfam-us OXFAM-US 
ag Armed group scfuk Save the Children Fund - UK 
crs Catholic Relief Services splm Sudan People Liberation Movement 
ert-bor Emergency Reponse Team-Bor srra Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association 
gos Government of Sudan unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
irc International Rescue Committee unicef/olsls UNICEF/OLS Livestock section 
jtf Joint Task Force  unicef-ns UNICEF Northern sector 
medair MEDAIR unicef-ss UNICEF Southern Sector 
msf-b Medicins sans Frontiers-Belgium usa Government of USA 
msf-h medicins sans frontiers-Holland wfp World Food Program  
ngos Non-Governmental Organizations wgp Working Group 
ols Operation Lifeline Sudan wv World Vision 
oxfam-gb Oxfam-GB   
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Table 5-12 presents the number of cliques to which actors belonged, the clique 
membership count, for the 1998 Network.  
Table 5-12: Clique Membership Count in 1998  
Rank Actor Value 
1 unicef 29 
2 wfp 26 
3 ols 24 
4 srra 16 
5 wv 14 
6 oxfam-us 14 
7 msf-b 13 
8 scfuk 12 
9 oxfam-gb 12 
10 msf-h 10 
 
The clique membership count shows the number of cliques or sub-groups to which each 
of the central actors belong. The larger number of cliques an actor belongs to, the more 
connected it is and the bigger the role it plays in communication and coordination. UNICEF, 
WFP, OLS remained among the organizations with the largest number of clique counts 
indicating their central position.  
The graphical representation of the network in Figure 5-7 below shows the overall 
network, including actors, sectors in which the different actors work and locations in 1998. 
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Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A.  
Figure 5-7: 1998 Relief Operation - Network of Organizations, Sectors and Locations 
 
When the locations and sectors networks are added to the actors’ network, a more 
densely connected overall network results. This implies that even if actors are not directly 
connected in the actor x actor network, yet they can still be connected by virtue of working in the 
same location or in the same sector or both. Figure 5-7 provides a graphical representation of the 
overall complexity, which is the density of the meta-matrix as opposed to density, which a 
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measure of the connectedness of the actor x actor network only sectors and locations) as opposed 
to density, which a measure of the connectedness of the actor x actor network only.   
5.5.3.2  Main Sectors (Tasks) in 1998 
Table 5-13 below ranks the main sectors (tasks) in which the different organizations 
working in Southern Sudan in 1998 focused.  The table shows the centrality column degree 
whereby the Input network(s) are the Organization x Sector (Task) Networks. 
 
Table 5-13: Main Sectors (Tasks) in 1998 
Rank Sectors (Tasks) Value 
1 Assessment of food & non-food distribution 1.000 
2 Emergency Response 0.905 
3 Immunization 0.851 
4 Water 0.743 
5 Veterinary & Livestock program 0.703 
6 Nutrition-Feeding program 0.608 
7 Humanitarian situation and needs 0.581 
8 Security, safety and access 0.459 
9 Education/CEDC 0.365 
10 Food distribution & monitoring 0.311 
11 Assessments (humanitarian needs) 0.270 
12 Overall operation 0.135 
 
The food sector remains important, but the focus in 1998 is more on assessments of both 
food and non-food items distribution as in 1998; access and distribution were more of a problem 
than the availability of food itself. The response to the emergency, which included activities such 
as assessments, logistics, and distribution of relief supplies undertaken by different agencies is 
ranked second in importance. New sectors that were not covered in 1989 include water, 
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Veterinary & Livestock program, Nutrition and Feeding program and Education and Children in 
Especially Difficult Circumstances (CEDC). The inclusion of these new sectors reveals how, 
after nine years in existence, the relief operation diversified its programs and expanded from the 
mere provision of relief assistance towards programs that aim at fostering livelihood activities 
and creating longer-term benefits.   
5.5.3.3 Main Locations for Relief Assistance in 1998 
 
In 1998, the focus of the relief operation was Bahr El Ghazal State which is the state most 
severely affected by famine and where the humanitarian space was very restricted because of 
government bans on flights to the area. Southern Sudan as a whole is ranked second, although 
the focus was on Bahr El Ghazal, the operation continued in other parts of Southern Sudan as 
well. Lokichoggio, which is a town in northwest Kenya and only 30 kilometers from the border 
with Sudan, became the host of OLS and a hub and a strategic airbase for its activities especially 
the airdrops of food aid (WFP 2011). Jonglei and Warrap states remained among the main 
locations covered by the operation.  In addition, the States of Western and Northern Bahr El 
Ghazal and Upper Nile and the Nuba Mountains were also covered by the relief operation. 
Nairobi remained a key location significant to the operation. 
Table 5-14 shows the centrality column degree whereby the Input network(s) are the 
Actor x Location Networks 
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Table 5-14: Main Locations in 1998 
Rank Location Value 
1 Bahr El Ghazal 1.000 
2 Southern Sudan 0.388 
3 Lokichockio 0.369 
4 Jonglei 0.224 
5 Western Bahr El Ghazal 0.182 
6 Warrap 0.126 
7 Northern Bahr El Ghazal 0.126 
8 Sudan 0.065 
9 Western Upper Nile 0.065 
10 Nairobi 0.033 
11 Upper Nile 0.033 
12 Nuba Mountains 0.028 
 
5.5.4 Overall structure of the Network in 2009 
In 2009, the relief operation had a significantly higher number of actors resulting in a higher 
number of links counted. The tendency of having a very densely connected center with a large 
number of organizations loosely connected to the center still remains and seems to be a defining 
characteristic of the relief operation throughout its history. 
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Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A.  
Figure 5-8: 2009 Relief Operation – Organizations Network  
 
As shows in Figure 5-8, the 2009 relief network is more fragmented with a component 
count of 5 and a Krackhardt connectedness score of less than one. The nodes isolated from the 
main network but connected together are the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the 
National Congress Party, which are the two parties that signed the peace agreement and are 
operating at a higher level, the constitutional choice level. A second component includes the 
Office of the President – the Government of South Sudan and the South Sudan Legislative 
Assembly.  A third component includes Arrow Boys, which is an armed group, and State 
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Authorities, while the fourth component includes the Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), the Ministry of Transport and Roads – Government of Southern Sudan and the Porter’s 
Union, which is a civil society organization. The fifth component is the main network.   
Table 5-15: Network Level Measures 2009 
Measure Value Measure Value 
Row count 215 Network fragmentation 0.082 
Column count 215 Krackhardt connectedness 0.918 
Link count 816 Krackhardt efficiency 0.977 
Density 0.018 Krackhardt hierarchy 0.665 
Isolate count 0.000 Krackhardt upperboundedness 0.960 
Component count 5.000 Degree centralization 0.961 
Reciprocity 0.190 Betweenness centralization 0.268 
Characteristic path length 3.794 Closeness centralization 0.007 
Clustering coefficient 0.276 Reciprocal 
19% of the 
links are 
reciprocal 
Network levels (diameter) 27.000   
 
The network level measures presented in Table 5-15 show that the clustering coefficient 
of 0.276  is almost 15 times the density of the network of 0.018; showing that the dense local 
neighborhoods compared to global networks continue as a feature of the relief operation, where 
organizations work together; are interdependent in some aspects but still operate largely 
independently. 
Although the Krackhardt Connectedness measure is less than one (0.918) in the 2009 
network, indicating deviation from the ideal type hierarchy, yet the efficiency and 
upperboundedness measures (0.977 and 0.960 respectively) are quite high indicating that a single 
organization or a core group of organizations is playing the lead role in the coordination of the 
operation.  Although these three Krackhardt measures point towards a more hierarchical 
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structure, yet Krackhardt’s hierarchy measure (0.665) is relatively low because of the 
reciprocated ties among the actors. 19% of the ties among the actors are reciprocal indicating 
their equal status which contradicts the ideal type hierarchy where there is only one boss or 
‘leading actor’.  
The Degree centralization measure is of 0.961 is very high reflecting that power and 
positional advantages are unequally distributed in the network.   
The bar diagrams in Figure 5-9 below shows the top Ranked Organizations in 2009.  
UNICEF and WFP remain top ranked and are joined by UNHCR, which in 2009 was playing a 
significant role in the settlement of refugees returning to Southern Sudan.  The South Sudan 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), which replaced the SSRA, UN OCHA and the 
UN Resident Coordinator Support Office (UNRCSO) are among the top ranking organization. 
The three play coordination roles among the different actors.  The SSRRC is the Southern Sudan 
Government body responsible for coordinating relief and rehabilitation throughout Southern 
Sudan. UNOCHA is responsible for”... bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a 
coherent response to emergencies” (OCHA, 2010) while UNRCSO is mandated by the UN 
Country Team in Sudan “… to coordinate recovery and development activities within the 
Framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement 
(ESPA), and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)”  (RCSO, 2009). IFAD, the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development is another key player in 2009 as well as the State Ministry of 
Health – Lake State. It is noteworthy that this is the first time that a State Ministry is among the 
top ranked actors. The National Congress Party, the ruling party in Northern Sudan, and one of 
the signatories of the Peace Agreement is also among the top ranking organizations as well as the 
Sudan’s People Liberation Movement, the ruling party in Southern Sudan and the other signatory 
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of the Peace Agreement. IGAD, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in East 
Africa was another key organization in the network.   
 
Figure 5-9: Recurring Top-Ranked Organizations in 2009 
 
Legend to Figure 5-9 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
ifad UN International Fund for 
Agricultural Development 
unhcr UN High Commission for Refugees 
igad Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development 
unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
ncp National Congress Party unocha UN Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
smoh-ls State Ministry of Health-Lakes unrcso UN Resident Coordinator Support Office 
splm Sudan People Liberation Movement wfp World Food Programme  
5.5.4.1 Key Organizations in 2009 
Table 5-16 below shows the top scoring organizations side-by-side for selected measures. 
In addition to the UN agencies, both which have been operating since 1989 and those joining the 
operation in 2009, the table shows that a large number of government entities at different levels 
are now among the key actors in the operation. These include the Government of Sudan (gos), 
the State Ministry of Health – Lakes State (smoh-ls), the Office of the President – Government 
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of South Sudan (op-goss), Ministry of Transport and Roads – Government of South Sudan 
(motr-goss), and different State Authorities (sa).  The National Congress Party (ncp) and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (splm), the two signatories of the peace agreement are also 
among the top ranked actors. In addition, and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (ssrrc) and the Child Protection Group (cpg), which is group composed of 
Government, UN and ICRC representatives are among the key actors in 2009.  Also among the 
top ranked actors, we find UNMIS and IOM in addition to the NGOs such as Medair, Danish 
Refugee Council (drc) and World Vision (wv). 
 
Table 5-16: Key Organizations in 2009 
Rank Betweenness centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
In-degree 
centrality 
Out-degree 
centrality 
Total degree 
centrality 
1 unicef gos unicef unicef unicef unicef 
2 unhcr smoh-ls ncp wfp unhcr wfp 
3 unocha ifad splm ssrrc wfp unhcr 
4 wfp cpg sa unrcso ssrrc ssrrc 
5 unmis drc ab unocha unocha unrcso 
6 ssrrc ucdc ssla unhcr who unocha 
7 fao mosd-wbgs op-goss iom iom iom 
8 unjlc card motr-goss ngos unrcso who 
9 medair ywca wfp unmis unmis-rrr unmis-rrr 
10 unmis-rrr smest-ls unhcr wv unjlc unmis 
11 goss smosd-us ssrrc medair goss unjlc 
12 unrcso monuc iom unmis-rrr unmis ngos 
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Legend to Table 5-16 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
    
ab Arrow Boys smoh-ls State Ministry of Health-Lakes 
card Community Agency for Research and 
Development 
smosd-us State Ministry of Social 
Development-Unity State 
cpg Child Protection Group  splm Sudan People Liberation Movement 
drc Danish Refugee Council ssla South Sudan Legislative Assembly   
fao Food and Agriculture Organization  ssrrc South Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission 
gos Government of Sudan ucdc Unity Cultural Development Center 
goss Government of Southern Sudan unhcr UN High Commission for Refugees 
IFAD UN International Fund for Agricultural 
Development 
unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
iom International Organization of 
Migration 
unjlc UN Joint Logistics Centre 
medair MEDAIR unmis  United Nations Mission in Sudan 
monuc UN Mission DR Congo unmis-rrr UNMIS Return, Reintegration and 
Recovery Section 
mosd-
wbgs 
State Ministry of Social Development-
Western Bahr El Ghazal 
unocha UN Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
motr-goss Ministry of Transport and Roads-
Government of Southern Sudan 
unrcso UN Resident Coordinator Support 
Office 
ncp National Congress Party wfp World Food Program  
ngos Non-Governmental Organizations who World Health Organization 
op-goss Office of the President-Goss wv World Vision 
sa State Authorities ywca Young Women Christian 
Association 
smest-ls State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology -Lakes 
  
 
Table 5-17 presents the number of cliques to which the actors belonged, the clique 
membership count, for the 2009 Network. 
Table 5-17: Clique Membership Count in 2009  
Rank Organization Value 
1 unicef 113 
2 wfp 60 
3 unhcr 52 
4 ssrrc 52 
5 unocha 45 
6 unjlc 41 
7 unrcso 34 
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8 who 34 
9 unmis 30 
10 medair 26 
 
The central role played by UNCIEF in the relief operation throughout the three periods is 
further revealed by the number of cliques to which it belongs throughout the three periods. 
Although in 2009, there are two UN bodies mandated with coordination, UNOCHA and 
UNRCSO, yet UNICEF continued to play a central role in the relief operation and had a clique 
membership count of 113 while the next organization WFP has a clique membership count of 60.  
Moving from a focus on the actors’ network only to the overall network, the graphical 
representation of the network in Figure 5-10 below shows the overall network, including 
organizations, sectors and locations in which the different actors worked in 2009.  
 
 
Note: The full names of organizations and the acronyms are provided in Annex A.  
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Figure 5-10: 2009 Relief Oepration - Network of Organizations, Sectors and Locations 
 
Adding the sectors and locations resulted in a very densely connected network with 265 
nodes and 1857 links among them.  Unlike the actor x actor network, the complete network has a 
component count of 1 which indicates that actors who are not directly connected to each other 
are connected through the sectors or the locations in which they work.   
5.5.4.2 Main Sectors (Tasks) in 2009 
The main sectors in which the different organizations in Southern Sudan were working in 
2009, as shows in Table 5-18, are security and humanitarian access, food aid, protection, 
population movements, non-food items and emergency shelter, diseases, assessments, nutrition, 
water, sanitation and hygiene, coordination and common service and immunization.  The 
extension of activities to sectors such as protection and population movement is a noticeable 
addition to the sectors in which the relief operation traditionally focused. It is noteworthy that 
although in 2009, the relief operation was taking place in a post-conflict environment, yet, 
security and humanitarian access remained a concern and an important task in which the 
organizations are involved. One would expect that with the signing of the peace agreement, that 
access should become less of an issue than during the time of active fighting. But given that 
tribal conflicts still continue, humanitarian access remained an issue (you can use one of IRIN 
2009 issues)    
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Table 5-18: Main Sectors (Tasks) in 2009 
Rank Task Value 
1 Security and Humanitarian Access 1.000 
2 Food Aid 0.856 
3 Protection 0.723 
4 Population movements (IDPs & Refugees) 0.612 
5 Non-food Items and Emergency Shelter 0.596 
6 Disease Outbreaks 0.511 
7 Assessments 0.463 
8 Nutrition 0.431 
9 water, sanitation and hygiene 0.420 
10 Coordination and Common Services 0.420 
11 Education 0.383 
12 Immunization 0.372 
5.5.4.3 Main Locations in 2009 
The main locations in which the different organizations focused their effort in 2009 are 
provided in Table 5-19 below, in the order of importance of the different locations. The table 
shows the centrality column degree whereby the Input network(s) are the Actor x Location 
Networks. 
Table 5-19: Main Locations in 2009 
Rank Location Value 
1 Southern Sudan 1.000 
2 Western Equatoria 0.928 
3 Central Equatoria 0.609 
4 Jonglei 0.583 
5 Upper Nile 0.339 
6 Lakes 0.261 
7 Eastern Equatoria 0.230 
8 Northern Bahr El Ghazal 0.227 
9 Unity 0.132 
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10 Western Bahr El Ghazal 0.112 
11 Warrap 0.103 
12 Transitional Areas 0.011 
 
In 2009, it is noted that Southern Sudan as a whole was a focus of the operation. A 
number of States in Southern Sudan were also the locations of activities by the different 
agencies. The Transitional Areas, the three states of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile,  
which are the border areas between North and South Sudan, were among the important locations 
whereby relief activities has been taking place.   
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter presented the results of the Network Analysis of the Operation at 3 points in 
time.  Generally, the network displayed more or less the same structure reflected by dense 
connections among a core group of actors and relatively loose connections among the remaining 
actors. This corresponds to O’Toole’s (1997) statement that networks exhibit some structural 
stability (p. 45). The network also showed a high clustering coefficient compared to a low 
overall density indicating that local connections are much stronger than network global 
connections.  
With regards to the sectors, we find that some new sectors were added to the operation in 
1998 and 2009 reflecting its evolution and adaptation to the changing conditions of the 
emergency. As for the locations, the relief operation continued to cover the whole of Southern 
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Sudan with some states, where the food crisis was worse, getting additional attention at different 
points in time.  
The findings presented in this chapter will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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6.0  DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results of the descriptive analysis of Chapter Four and the social 
network analysis (SNA) presented in Chapter Five against the background of complex 
emergencies and in the context of the theoretical framework of the study as explicated in Chapter 
Two. The theoretical framework allows us to study the relief operation as an open, complex 
adaptive system made up of a network of interrelated and interdependent actors.   The descriptive 
analysis and the social network analysis together form the basis for understanding the relief 
operation as an action situation within a broader action arena and for answering the research 
questions of this study, which are: 1. How do agencies involved in a relief operation coordinate 
their work as revealed by their interactions? 2. What is the underlying structure of the relief 
operation? 3. How does a relief operation evolve over time to adapt to the changing conditions of 
the emergency? And 4. How and why do certain institutions emerge and then disappear? 
6.1 COMPARISION OF THE RELIEF OPERATION AT THE THREE POINTS IN 
TIME 
Table 6-1 below reproduces the network measures of the actors’s network as presented in 
Chapter Five side by side for the network in 1989, 1998 and 2009 for the sake of comparison. 
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Table 6-1: Network Measures in 1989, 1998 and 2009  
Network 1989 1998 2009 
Row count 86 65 215 
Column count 86 65 215 
Link count 382 350 816 
Density 0.052 0.083 0.018 
Isolate count 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Component count 1.000 1.000 5.000 
Reciprocity 0.210 0.238 0.190 
Characteristic path length 3.837 2.925 3.794 
Clustering coefficient 0.685 0.384 0.276 
Network levels (diameter) 22.000 9.000 27.000 
Network fragmentation 0.000 0.000 0.082 
Krackhardt connectedness 1.000 1.000 0.918 
Krackhardt efficiency 0.932 0.891 0.977 
Krackhardt hierarchy 0.678 0.543 0.665 
Krackhardt upperboundedness 0.894 0.938 0.960 
Degree centralization 0.903 0.901 0.961 
Betweenness centralization 0.258 0.150 0.268 
Closeness centralization 0.002 0.027 0.007 
Reciprocal 20% of the links are reciprocal 
23% of the links 
are reciprocal 
19% of the links 
are reciprocal 
*produced from the Actors Network using ORA 
6.1.1 Structure of the Actors Network 
To answer the research questions on coordination and the structure of the relief operation, the 
results of the social network analysis at the three points in time presented above are discussed 
below. 
6.1.1.1 Size and Adaptation 
The number of organizations participating in the relief operation during 1989, 1998 and 
2009 was 86, 65 and 215 respectively. As noted earlier, these numbers do not reflect all the 
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actors, but only those reported in the sitreps and those who have interacted with other actors.  
The apparent decrease in the number of actors in 1998 should not be interpreted as a decrease in 
the size of the operation. It is attributed to the fact that the focus of reporting during this period 
was directly on the famine in Bahr El Ghazal State. As such, other areas of the operation and the 
actors working in those areas were not covered extensively by the reports during this time. 
With the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2005, the establishment of government and 
local administration in the different states in Southern Sudan and the presence of the Peace 
Keeping Mission (UNMIS), the number of actors increased dramatically from 86 in 1989 to 215 
in 2009. In 2009, Government institutions which were almost non-existent in the earlier two 
periods became an integral part of the network playing a significant role in the relief effort, hand 
in hand with the other providers of relief. 
One would expect that with the signing of the peace agreement, the end of active fighting 
and the establishment of government institutions, the importance and role of organized relief 
would decline and the number of actors would decrease. On the contrary, since the signing of the 
peace agreement, the relief operation grew in size as some aspects of the humanitarian 
emergency still persisted, in particular, the acute food shortages and as well as violence and 
fighting among different ethnic groups.   In addition, the relief effort was extended to post 
conflict recovery and rehabilitation to support the rebuilding of government institutions and 
social infrastructure in a region emerging from decades of conflicts. This extended role of the 
UN and NGOs, which traditionally provided relief in Southern Sudan during the war time, has 
been questioned by some from within the aid community. In the words of the former president of 
Doctors without Borders (MSF – France), “…. NGOs and the United Nations cannot serve as 
subcontractors for the enormous reconstruction project facing the South Sudanese” (Brauman, 
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2006). While acknowledging that humanitarian needs are still acute and that aid agencies need to 
supplement government activities in meeting the needs of the population, the concern was that 
the aid agencies do not have the mandate nor the means to serve this function and get involved in 
the provision of public services that should be carried out by the government. (Brauman, 2006). 
This expectation from the side of the Government reflects dependency, which is one of the issues 
resulting from the receiving humanitarian assistance for long periods of time.  
The evolving role of the organizations comprising the relief effort reflects their 
adaptation to the changing situation on the ground. Given the broader environment and the 
specific mandates and specializations of these organizations, this adaptation has its critics who 
questioned the limits of the relief effort in relation to the role of the state. In the presence of a 
state and government institutions, the UN and NGOs may need to step out of the role that they 
have been playing during the conflict when there was no functioning state apparatus and to re-
define their role in supporting the Government in meetings the needs of the citizens.  
Operating as an open system in a continuous exchange with their environment, the 
organizations making up the relief operation, individually and collectively changed their 
activities and programs to adapt to the changing conditions on the ground. The organizations 
expanded their activities and added new ones as the need arose. The relief network, being a 
complex adaptive system, did not adhere to pre-determined goals, which are a characteristic of a 
closed system, but continuously adjusted its programs and activities to meet the changing needs 
and to fit with its environment.   
6.1.1.2 Cohesion 
In SNA in general, the concept of cohesion “… is closely related to ideas of dense, 
intimate relations among members embedded in a social group or closed social circle” (Knoke 
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and Yang, 2008, p. 72). Cohesion reveals the extent to which the organizations in a network are 
interconnected which has an implication on how well they share information, coordinate their 
efforts and work together. A cohesive group is characterized by the mutuality and frequency of 
ties among its members and their closeness and reachability” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 
251-2). This is particularly important in relief operations given the continuously changing 
context of the emergency, the need to share information and to be able to respond quickly. 
Measures of network cohesion used in this research are density, centralization, clustering 
coefficient and characteristic path length.  
Throughout the three periods, the overall density of the network was low, 0.052 in 1989, 
0.083 in 1998 and 0.018 in 2009 which indicates that only about 5%, 8% and 2% of all the 
possible ties that could exist between pairs of actors during the three periods had actually existed. 
This reveals that most of the actors in the networks were not directly and immediately connected 
to the other actors. Nevertheless, this does not automatically imply that the network was 
disconnected or not cohesive. The actors in the relief operation were linked through a few core, 
highly connected actors, who had connections to many of the actors who were otherwise 
disconnected. These ‘central’ actors were vital in holding the network together, played a crucial 
role in communication and dissemination of information and generally undertook the 
coordination role, which in emergency situations in highly volatile environments is even more 
important than in normal circumstances.  
Given the organizations’ different mandates, expertise and declared principles, many 
organizations did not find it easy to accept the coordination role of some of the central actors. As 
shown by the results of the social network analysis of the 1998 network, the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A was a central actor 
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during this period as it was the official coordinating body for agencies operating in the areas 
controlled by SPLM/A. All agencies providing relief in the SPLM/A held areas had to work 
closely with the SRRA, but some of the NGOs preferred to disassociate themselves from the 
SRRA so as not compromise their neutrality and be seen as cooperating with one side of the 
conflict (Murphy and Salama, 1998). The heterogeneity of the actors and the complexity of the 
environment whereby relief providers such as UN agencies and NGOs, who are governed by the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, had to interact with warring factions and 
military and political authorities who have an interest in manipulating relief assistance made the 
coordination function even more challenging.  
The cohesiveness of the network is better understood when we consider, together with the 
density, both the characteristic path length and the clustering coefficients of the network as 
density, on its own, does not reflect the full picture. The characteristic path length, which is “the 
median of the average shortest distance (number of links) connecting each…” actor to all other 
actors (Carley et al., 2011), of the three networks was 3.84 in 1989, 2.93 in 1998 and 3.79 in 
2009 showing that although actors are not directly connected, yet they are fairly close and it is 
easy for them to reach each other.  The characteristic path length gives insight into how the 
network as a whole communicated and how information spreads among the actors in a network. 
The smaller the path length, the faster the network is able to communicate and exchange 
information.  
The third aspect of the cohesiveness of the network is the clustering coefficient, which is 
the density of the local neighborhoods. For the three networks, the clustering coefficient is 
significantly much higher than the overall density of the network, 0.69 in 1989, 0.38 in 1998 and 
0.79 in 2009. The small characteristic path length, together with the high clustering coefficients, 
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in addition to the component count of one during 1989 and 1998, show that the network, during 
the three points in time, was cohesive and well connected. Despite the fact that many of the 
members of the network were not directly linked, yet they were able to reach each other through 
a small number of steps. Although the members of the network are independent actors, and may 
not be connected through any formal organizational structure, yet they communicated and 
coordinated their work closely. To be able to deal with the constraints of the complex 
humanitarian emergency in which they operated and to rapidly respond to the changing situation, 
the actors had to communicate and coordinate their effort while at the same time retain their 
flexibility to act individually. Even though coordination did not take place by design, yet each of 
the individual organizations, in its attempt to respond to the changing conditions of the 
emergency,   interacted with the other organizations in a way that resulted in a global pattern of 
communication and coordination.  
With reference to the component count, it was 1 in both 1989 and 1998 indicating that 
there were no isolates. In 2009 it was 5 indicating that some actors were isolated and not part of 
the main network. the 2009 isolated components represented small sub-groups of actors working 
together in isolation  from the overall network containing all the other actors. As noted in 
Chapter Five, once the sectors’ and locations’ networks were added to the actors’ network, the 
four isolated components became part of the overall network by virtue of their involvement in 
the same sectors and locations as other actors.  
6.1.1.3 Structure (Centralization and Power Structure) 
The structure of the relief operation is revealed by analyzing the centralization measures 
and the Krackhardt’s measures of hierarchy. Centralization, as a group measure of cohesion, 
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allows us to easily compare different networks  as it examines the disparity between actors in 
terms of their individual centrality scores (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 176). A group level 
index of centralization “has the property that the larger it is, the more likely it is that a single 
actor is quite central, while the remaining actors considerably less central. It measures how 
variable or heterogeneous the actor centralities are. It can also be viewed as a measure of how 
unequal the individual actor values are.” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 176).  Network 
centralization, in the context of an inter-organizational network sheds light on coordination (Turk 
1977 cited in Hagen et al. 1997) and on how relationships in the network are dominated by a few 
actors (Irwin and Huges 1992 cited in Hagen et al. 1997).  
Comparing the network at three points in time, we find that the degree centralization 
measure is very high 0.903 in 1989, 0.901 in 1998 and 0.961 in 2009 which reveals a very high 
differentiation between the actors in terms of the number of direct ties they have with other 
actors, some of them being quite central with high centrality measures while the others are more 
peripheral. Betweenness centralization is low compared to degree centralization with values of 
0.258 in 1989, 0.150 in 1998 and 0.268 in 2009. This shows less differentiation between the 
actors in terms of those who lie on the shortest path between two other actors implying the 
presence of a few ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘brokers’ but still the measure shows considerable 
differentiation between the actors. Closeness centralization of the three networks is low 
compared to the other two measures of centralization, 0.002 in 1989, 0.027 in 1998 and 0.007 in 
2009, indicating less disparity between the actors in the three networks in terms of how close 
they are to other actors.  
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The centralization measures show that differentiation between the actors existed in the 
network at the three points in time with the presence of a highly central group of actors 
coordinating the network. This conclusion is further confirmed by Krackhardt’s four measures of 
hierarchy, which are another set of measures that contributes towards answering questions 2 and 
3 of the research and allows us to compare the structure of the overall network overtime. 
According to Leblebici and Whetten (1984), “the concept of hierarchy both as a conceptual tool 
and as an empirical measurement can reveal the systemic properties of an interorganizational 
organization” (p. 32). The high values of the measures of hierarchy during the three periods of 
time reveal that a core group of actors has been taking the lead in the network. Although, 
theoretically the relief operation did not have a formally established command center, yet this 
group of central actors played the role of the ‘boss’ and made the structure of the relief operation 
approach that of a hierarchy. The concept of hierarchy referred to in this context is what 
Leblebici and Whetten (1984) refer to as ‘horizontal hierarchy’ as opposed to ‘vertical 
hierarchy’. Horizontal hierarchy refers to the interdependence between actors and the strong 
local density of the sub-systems compared to the global density (p. 34).  
It should be noted that Krackhardt’s hierarchy measure was relatively low, 0.678 in 1989, 
0.543 in 1998 and 0.665 in 2009 and that reciprocity existed between the actors, 21% in 1989, 
24% in 1998 and 19% in 2009, revealing that almost a quarter or fifth of all ties between the 
actors are bi-directional. This means that the structure of the network was not a pure hierarchy in 
the vertical sense of the term.  
This horizontal hierarchical structure, despite the lack of a formal command and control 
organizational structure can be explained by two of the theories of inter-organizational 
relationships, Exchange (Resource Dependence) Theory and Organizational Ecology Theory 
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(Benson 1975 in Alexander, 1995, p. 7 & 9; Marion 1999). The results of the SNA, reproduced 
in Table 6-2, reveal that UNICEF, which has been the second top ranked organization in 1989 
and the first top ranked in 1998 and 2009, has been a central actor during the three periods with a 
large number of clique counts and a very prominent and central position.  In 1989 and 1998, 
UNICEF was the lead organization in charge of OLS. One of the main reasons for this privileged 
position among the other organizations, especially among NGOs, is that the NGOs needed the 
resources that UNICEF, because of its position as the lead agency within OLS, had under its 
command such as air transport, security and an evacuation system in addition to the “legitimate 
cover to work cross-border into non-government areas of South Sudan, … this was especially 
important to NGOs that simultaneously run programs in government areas.” (Karim et al., 1996, 
p. 68).  According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), “… [Resource] dependence exists when a 
needed resource is dominated by relatively few suppliers… “ (cited in Marion 1999, p. 116). The 
fact that UNICEF has these scarce resources under its command resulted in its central position as 
many actors have to interact with it  to have access to these resources without which they will not 
be able to work. In contrast to the reluctance of many NGOs to accept the coordination role of 
the SRRA, they more readily accepted the role of UNICEF in coordination, given the similarity 
of principles and mandates. This highlights the differentiation between the different actors, in 
particular between the providers of relief assistance and the other actors in the network. This 
differentiation can act as an obstacle to effective coordination.   
As revealed by the structure of the network, the relationship between the different actors 
is that of interdependence. UNICEF, although not resource dependent on the other actors, yet it 
still required their cooperation in order for it to carry out its mission.  We can go further and 
describe the relationship between UNICEF as a core organization and the other relief providers 
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as a ‘symbiotic interdependence’ both of behavior and outcome since each actor’s activity 
depended on the actions of another and since the actors were “… mutually dependent on each 
other’s output” (Marion 1999, p. 118). The overall outcome of providing relief to the people in 
need in a CHE cannot be achieved by any one actor in isolation of the others and thus resource 
dependence, in addition to the interdependence among the different actors, is a defining feature 
of a relief operation and a characteristic of its structure.    
Table 6-2: Top-Ranked Organizations in 1989, 1998 and 2009  
Rank 1989 1998 2009 
1 icrc unicef unicef 
2 unicef ols wfp 
3 ols wfp unhcr 
4 ngos srra ssrrc 
5 wfp Scf-uk unocha 
Table 6-2 shows organizations that are repeatedly top-ranked in a number of centrality measures, clique membership 
count, Simmelian Ties and Clustering Coefficients as produced by ORA.  
 
 
Legend to Table 6-2 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
ICRC International Committee for the Red 
Cross 
SSRRC South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations UNHCR UN High Commission for Refugees 
OLS Operation Lifeline Sudan UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
SCFUK Save the Children Fund - UK UNOCHA UN Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
SRRA Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association 
WFP World Food Program  
 
The structure of the relief operation can also be explored through the lens of the 
Organizational Ecology Theory which views inter-organizational relationships as the means by 
which the organizations respond to changes in their uncertain and unpredictable environments 
over which they have no control (Scott 2003, p. 105). Organizational Ecology Theory helps 
explain why the coordination role of certain actors was accepted by the other actors in the 
absence of a formal structure.  
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The coordination role played by UNICEF came to be accepted by the providers of relief 
for the following reasons: 1. the  uncertainty of the environment in which the relief providers 
operated; 2. its continuous and unpredictable change; 3. the fact that the actors were working in 
an active war zone and had to coordinate with uncooperative actors, driven by their own political 
and military agendas; and the need to practice humanitarian diplomacy and to continuously 
negotiate the humanitarian space, the actors came to accept. The relationship between UNICEF 
and the NGOs was formalized through Letters of Understanding (LOUs). LOUs were an 
institutional mechanism for coordination and a set of rules governing the relationship between 
UNICEF and the NGOs (Karim et al. 1996, p. 65). By signing the letters of Understanding with 
UNICEF/OLS, NGOs working in Southern Sudan received the following: A legal status, free or 
subsided logistical facilitates at Lokichoggio, free or subsidized air transport between 
Lokichoggio, Nairobi and Sudan, OLS security clearances with the Government of Sudan, OLS 
communications systems and training workshops and field program support from UNCIEF and 
WFP (Omaar and de Waal 1995, p. 9). This explains the central role of UNICEF, OLS and WFP 
and why they continued to be members of so many cliques throughout the 20 years covered by 
this study as shown in the Table 6-3 below. 
Table 6-3: Clique Membership Count in 1989, 1998 and 2009  
 1989 1998 2009 
Rank Organization Value Organization Value Organization Value 
1 ols 38 unicef 29 unicef 113 
2 unicef 34 wfp 26 wfp 60 
3 wfp 33 ols 24 unhcr 52 
4 icrc 26 srra 16 ssrrc 52 
5 ngos 24 wv 14 unocha 45 
6 un 20 oxfam-us 14 unjlc 41 
7 nca 17 msf-b 13 unrcso 34 
8 srra 15 scfuk 12 who 34 
9 spla 11 oxfam-gb 12 unmis 30 
10 usaid 11 msf-h 10 medair 26 
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Legend to Table 6-3 
Acronym Organization’s Name  Acronym Organization’s Name 
icrc International Committee for the Red 
Cross 
un United Nations  
medair MEDAIR unhcr UN High Commission for Refugees 
msf-b Medicins sans Frontiers-Belgium  unicef United Nations Children's Fund 
msf-h medicins sans frontiers-Holland unjlc UN Joint Logistics Centre 
nca Norwegian Church Aid unmis UN Mission in Sudan 
ngos Non-Governmental Organizations unocha UN Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
ols Operation Lifeline Sudan unrcso UN Resident Coordinator Support Office 
oxfam-gb Oxfam-GB usaid United States Agency for International 
Development  
oxfam-us OXFAM-US wfp World Food Program  
scfuk Save the Children Fund - UK who World Health Organization 
spla Sudan People Liberation Army wv World Vision 
srra Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association 
un United Nations  
ssrrc South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
  
 
The presence of this core group of actors as revealed by the results of the SNA and the 
different measures confirm the conclusions made by Van Brabant (1999) on the discussion of 
whether coordination takes place by command or consensus between the different organizations 
involved.  According to Brabant (1999), “… the coordination process seeks to create a ‘critical 
mass’ of leading agencies” (p. 13). This critical mass of leading agencies ensured that the 
channels of communication remained open between all actors in the network. They also ensured 
that coordination took place.  
It can be clearly seen, by examining the network at the three points in time, that despite 
the changing conditions of the emergency over the twenty-year period, the underlying structure 
of the relief operation has remained unchanged to a large extent.  The structure of the relief 
operation is that of a ‘small-world network,’ having a small number of core organizations at the 
center, identified by their power and privileged position and connecting the rest of the actors. 
The group of core organizations ensures the cohesion of the network and plays the leading role in 
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communication and coordination. A comparison between the clustering coefficients and 
characteristic path lengths of the actual relief network in 1989, 1998 and 2009 and their random 
equivalents, with the same size and density but with links distributed randomly, is shown in 
Table 6-4.   
Table 6-4: Characteristic Path Length and Clustering Coefficient for the Network in 1989, 
1998 and 2009  
 Network Clustering 
Coefficient (C) 
Characteristic Path 
Length (L) 
Ratio (C/L) 
1989 Actual 0.685 3.837 0.1785 
 Random* 0.042 3.034 0.0138 
1998 Actual 0.384 2.925 0.1313 
 Random* 0.07 2.674 0.0262 
2009 Actual 0.276 2.925 0.0944 
 Random* 0.012 4.151 0.0029 
* Random Networks were created in ORA according to the Erdos-Renyi model for generating random graphs.  
 
The Table shows that the actual network, in 1989, 1998 and 2009,  has characteristic path 
lengths close to those of an equivalent random graph and clustering coefficients that are 
consistently much greater than those of the equivalent random graph. This is a defining feature of 
the small-world network (Watts, 1999, p. 508-9). The ratios of the clustering coefficient to the 
characteristic path length of the network at the three points in time are much higher for the actual 
network compared to the random one. This finding reveals that the connections among a small 
core group of actors in the actual networks are much stronger compared to connections among 
actors in the overall network. The importance of this finding is that even small changes in the 
local structure will result in significant changes in the global structure of the network. As Watts 
(1999) puts it, “a set of relatively tiny perturbations to the local structure of a highly clustered 
graph can have a dramatic impact upon its global structural properties” (p.517). Because of the 
high clustering coefficient and the short characteristic path length, small-world networks 
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disseminate information and exchange material and resources faster than their random  
equivalents.  
Comparing the ratios of the clustering coefficient to the characteristic path length at three 
points in time, it can be seen that the ratio in 1989 was significantly higher than in 1998 and 
2009. The high ratio in 1989 implies that the network as a whole, although completely connected 
with a component count of one, was not very integrated. By 2009, the ratio has decreased 
significantly, indicating that the network as a whole is more integrated than before. This can be 
interpreted as a measure of success in bringing organizations to better coordinate their efforts.  
Although the relief operation is a network of diverse organizations, with a minimum pre-
defined formal structure, the presence of the core actors at the center gives it some resemblance 
to a hierarchical structure. This structure, as a horizontal hierarchy, is characterized by the 
interdependence of diverse actors who are also closely connected, the lack of a rigid formal 
structure and the presence of a central, leading group represents the best response of the actors to 
their dynamic environment. The structure, which was not pre-determined in advance, but has 
emerged from the interactions of the actors represents the adaptation of the different 
organizations constituting the relief operation to their environment and the ‘best fit’ between the 
relief operation and it environment. The structure enables the actors to work individually, given 
their different mandates and areas of expertise, but at the same time to coordinate and work 
together and delegate their power to the core organizations whenever that was required.  
 Given the nature of complex emergencies and the fact that in the course of providing 
relief in an active war zone, the humanitarian space has to be continuously negotiated with 
warring factions, a completely horizontal network with no core may have not been able to 
function. The networked type of structure allows for the flexibility and interdependence of actors 
 188 
but it also allows the actors to come together and join their effort when required. 
Interdependency and flexibility, which allow for rapid change and adaptability, are key 
characteristics of the structure of multiorganizational networks such as a relief operation. This 
structure allows the relief operation to function as an open system, with interdependencies 
between its different constituent organizations, which themselves are not closed rational systems 
but also open systems as revealed by their being part of a larger environment. Such a structure 
provides a space for the actors to engage at different levels. Decisions made at the policy level 
(constitutional choice level of analysis) are transmitted through the core actors, such as 
UNICEF/OLS and WFP and NGOs (represented by one body), to the other actors operating at 
the collective choice level and operational level. At the same time and moving in the opposite 
direction, the realities on the ground, which impact the policies made at the higher level were 
communicated to the core actors at the operational level, who in turn, transmitted them to the 
higher levels of decision making.  
This discussion reveals that a networked form of organization and horizontal hierarchy 
are not necessarily incompatible, on the contrary, they enable the organizations to better adapt to 
a dynamic environment such as that of a complex humanitarian emergency.  Everyday work on 
the ground requires a measure of independence, flexibility and ability to take individual action 
while access to the humanitarian space and negotiations requires interdependence and a 
collective voice.  Strong communication and exchange took place among small groups of actors 
more than among the network as a whole as revealed by the SNA measures discussed above. The 
patterns of interactions reveal that coordination takes place through sub-networks, whose actors 
are closely connected with each other and loosely connected with other sub-networks. This result 
is to be expected given the diversity of organizations involved and the spread of the relief 
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operation over a large geographical location and different sectors. Organizations working in a 
certain sector, for example water and sanitation, are likely to be more closely connected among 
themselves and less so with other organizations. Yet they are still linked to other organizations 
and the overall network.  This allows for flexibility to take action but also provides for sharing of 
information and resources. 
A general observation, based on the results of the SNA, is that the patterns of 
communication and coordination did not change much during the three periods in spite of the 
change in the conditions of the emergency, the move from a war situation to a post-conflict era 
and the expansion in the number of actors and the sectors in which they work. The overall 
structure of the operation remained very similar which can be an indication, without making a 
solid generalization, that this is how relief operations are generally structured, not so much by 
design but rather as they evolve in response to  changes in their environment and in adaptation to 
their context. This is what Hanneman (2005) refers to as the duality of social structure ” in which 
individuals [or organizations] make social structures, but do so within a matrix of constraints and 
opportunities imposed by larger patterns” (p. 130).   
The interactions between actors and their environment which resulted in the structure of 
the relief operation are governed by rules spanning multiple levels of analysis. Invoking 
Ostrom’s concept of action arenas, we find that many the large international NGOs that took part 
in the relief effort such as World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE and the Lutheran 
World Federation are members of ‘multi-tiered federations or confederations’ (Webster and 
Waker, 2009, p. 4). This means they are governed by different sets of rules coming from the 
higher policy making (constitutional choice) level of their organizations, in addition to the rules 
governing their operation on the ground and imposed by the environment in which they operate, 
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such as rules on access imposed by the military and political authorities, which in many instances 
constrained the actions by relief providers.  In interacting with other organizations and in playing 
their role in the relief operation, the different organizations had to negotiate the rules governing 
them and setting the boundaries for their actions. 
6.2 META-NETWORK – ORGANIZATIONS, SECTORS AND LOCATIONS 
6.2.1 Adaptation of the Relief Operation 
The meta-network approach that takes into consideration, in addition to actors, other 
elements of the relief operation such as location and sectors, helps in understanding how the 
operation evolved and adapted through time. Looking at the actors’ network in isolation reveal 
the structure of the relief operation and the patterns of communication and coordination between 
the actors but does not give a complete picture of the operation with its different aspects. 
Considering the sectors and locations sheds more light on how the relief operation, as a complex 
adaptive system made up of different elements has changed and adapted, through the interaction 
of these elements,  in response to changes in its broader environment.   
A number of studies on coordination in relief operations in complex emergencies 
reviewed and cited in Chapter One provided different conceptualization of coordination and 
explained the different challenges facing it. The meta-network concept, used in this study, which 
brings together the different networks of organizations, sectors and locations, lends empirical 
evidence to Sommers’ (2000) concept of coordination as “a multidimensional activity that takes 
place among a variety of actors at multiple levels across a range of activities [and as] … a 
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dynamic process, responding to changing political, military, and humanitarian circumstances on 
the ground” (p.5). Including the sectors in which the different agencies worked and the locations 
of their programs and activities, brings out clearly the complexity of the operation, the challenge 
of coordination and the process of adaptation by the relief operation. Complexity reflects the 
interdependence among the different network components. The interactions among the different 
elements at the local level result in changes in the overall operation at the global level.  
The meta-network concept allows us to examine the evolution of the operation and its 
adaptation in response to the changing conditions of the emergency, in terms of changes and 
adjustments in its nature, scope and objective. Although the underlying structure of the relief 
operation did not change much as discussed in the previous section, yet there were changes in the 
network of actors, in the scope of the operation as represented by the sectors in which the actors 
were active and in the objectives it aimed to achieve. The humanitarian imperative still remained 
the main driving force and assisting people in need was still the overarching objective; but an 
envisioned three-month food relief operation in an active war zone is markedly different in 
nature from a nine-year in existence relief operation, with a changed political and military 
landscape that came to include different militias and factions fighting each other in addition to 
the main two warring factions; from a post-conflict huge relief, recovery and rehabilitation effort 
taking place in the existence of a functioning government, a peace keeping mission and large 
population movements of citizens returning to their hometowns after the end of war. One 
common characteristic of the three periods is the continuation of violence, whether on a large or 
small scale and the reoccurrences of food shortages that threatened large numbers of the 
population, both of which are aspects of a CHE.  
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The continuation of OLS and its extension beyond its initial three-month period is 
described in Chapter Four as the ‘maintenance and institutionalization of OLS’, whereby OLS 
emerged as a specific institution and a ‘permanent administration’ instead of a negotiated 
agreement renewed every few months. This process of maintenance and institutionalization 
reflect the adaptation of the relief operation to its context. One of the defining features of this 
institutionalization is the separation of the operation, which was envisioned as a relief operation 
providing assistance to the affected population throughout Sudan, into a Northern Sector and a 
Southern Sector. The Northern Sector remained under the control of the Government of Sudan in 
Khartoum and to a large extent ceased to be part of OLS. The Southern Sector which was 
managed by the UN and has its base in neighboring Kenya (Nairobi and Lockichoggio) was, to a 
large extent, outside the control of the central government in Khartoum. OLS has mainly 
operated on what came to be known as ‘rebel-held’ or ‘non-government’ controlled areas. 
Although the Government of Sudan did not have much control over the day to day running of the 
operation and its management in these areas, yet it was able to exercise some control by limiting 
access, especially permissions to fly for UN planes dropping food in areas non-accessible by 
road, to certain regions within the South. Access to humanitarian space is the arena of 
humanitarian diplomacy and it is where the agencies needed to coordinate their activities and to 
have a lead agency to negotiate with the government and other military and political authorities.  
In spite of the long-life of the operation, the humanitarian space was never completely 
guaranteed and remained under negotiation all through and as such remained an important 
‘sector’ in which the agencies needed to put effort.  
Safeguarding humanitarian space and ensuring access to the affected populations and the 
safety of the relief workers required negotiations, not only with the government of Sudan but 
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also with the different armed groups in the South as the rules of access were imposed by both. 
These negotiations led to the Agreements on Ground Rules between UNICEF/OLS and the 
different armed groups in the south in 1995. The Agreement of Ground Rules is a clear example 
of adaptation by the relief operation to the changing conditions of the emergency. The agencies 
providing relief assistance, through their interaction with the political and military authorities 
realized that to gain access, to ensure the security and safety of relief providers, and to protect 
food aid from diversion by armed groups, they had to attempt to change the rules of interaction 
to make the environment more conducive to the provision of relief aid.  
In 1989 when OLS was negotiated between the two main warring sides, the Government 
of Sudan and the People’s Liberation Movement/Army, these multiple armed groups where non-
existent. Since these groups became active,  they formed a part of the environment in which the 
relief operation was taking place and as such it was inevitable that their activities would impact 
the relief operation and vice versa. Accordingly, they became a significant element that had to be 
taken into consideration. The armed groups formed part of the constraints faced by the network 
of organizations providing relief assistance and given their military power, the armed groups 
were also able to impose their rules on the providers of relief. In such a situation, the negotiation 
of Ground Rules was the response of the relief operation to the challenges imposed by the armed 
groups. Through negotiating the ground rules in 1994-1995, UNICEF/OLS aimed at creating a 
set of rules acceptable to both sides, the relief providers and the armed groups, that will make the 
environment more conducive to the provision of relief assistance to reach its targeted populations 
and not to be diverted for political and military reasons. As such the agreement on ground rules 
was a form of adaptation to the presence and activities of new actors who were not part of the 
network in the earlier period.  
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By 1998, OLS was the main provider of social services for the population in Southern 
Sudan. Its activities covered sectors as diverse as immunization, livestock programs and 
education, in addition to the main sectors related to food and nutrition for which the operation 
was initially established. At the same time, the conflict in the South became more complex as the 
Sudan’s People Liberation Army had split to different military groups fighting among 
themselves as well as against the central government in Khartoum. Food became a weapon, the 
relief sites were continuously attached by the different armed groups and the diversion of food 
aid became a serious issue that the operation had to deal with (Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan, 
1998; Murphy and Salama, 1998; Omaar & de Waal, 1995; Rhodes 1998).  This was also the 
period when the Government of Sudan was imposing flight bans on the UN as a response to the 
diversion of food aid by armed groups. Given this situation, it was clear that the Agreement on 
Ground Rules did not hold and that the political and military actors were more powerful in 
imposing their agendas than the humanitarian actors.   
The trajectory of the relief operation was to a large extent determined by this sort of 
driving and restraining forces with which the providers of relief assistance had to contend 
throughout the long history of the relief operation. The presence of restraining forces represented 
by uncooperative actors aiming at furthering their own political and military agendas made the 
coordination function among the relief providers (cooperative actors) even more crucial. The 
continuous need to face the restraining forces in a challenging environment and negotiate the 
humanitarian space required a coordinated, unified voice representing the relief operation. This 
can be considered as one of the reasons behind the persistence of the horizontal-hierarchical 
structure of the operation.   
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UNICEF/OLS and WFP continued to lead the operation during this time. Given the 
severity of the food shortages and the need to pull efforts together, a number of joint teams such 
as the Joint Task Force which included representatives from the SPLM and SSRA in addition to 
UN agencies and NGOs became very active and played a prominent role in the operation. Bahr 
El Ghazal State was the main state affected by the 1998 famine and as such it was the site of 
much of the activity of the operation during this time. But still the relief effort continued in other 
states as well.  
In 2009 and four years after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the relief operation 
changed significantly in response to the dramatic change in the situation in Sudan. Although 
fighting between the two sides of the conflict came to an end, yet Southern Sudan continued to 
suffer from the impact of conflict, displacement, violence and insecurity. The relief operation in 
Southern Sudan has to deal with new challenges and new needs as hundreds of thousands of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees returned to Southern Sudan. In addition, the 
Lord’s Residence Army (LRA) continued its destructive activities in a number of southern states 
and ethnic conflicts, which were taking place in the  states of Jonglei, Lakes and Upper Nile, 
killed thousands of people and displaced many others (Background Note: Sudan, 2011). This 
state of violence and insecurity, coupled with acute food shortages due to poor rains and the 
disruption of farming activities because of insecurity, the high cost of food items in the region 
and the poor infrastructure, led to the continuation of the state of emergency in spite of the end of 
war (Hunger Warning, 2009; IRIN, 10 July 2009; UNICEF 2009; USAID & FEWS Net).  
In adapting to the changes in its wider environment, the relief operation in 2009 grew  in 
size as more actors joined it and expanded in scope and locations.  By 2009, the relief operation 
was more than just an emergency relief network as concerns for recovery and post conflict 
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reconstruction were taken on board in addition to meeting the basic needs of the population. 
Although food aid remains a very significant sector together with the security and humanitarian 
access sector, yet as revealed by the results of the social network analysis, new sectors such as 
population movements, provision of emergency shelter for returnees and distribution of non-food 
items became important. One sector that gained importance in 2009 as compared to 1989 and 
1998 was the protection sector. According to UNOCHA (2010), “Protection is a broad term for 
activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with 
international law, including international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, regardless 
of their age, gender or social, ethnic, national, religious or other background” (definition 
endorsed by IASC). Although it can be argued that the activities of the relief operation have, 
throughout its history, contributed to protection, yet by 2009, a large number of organizations 
including UN organizations, mainly UNICEF and UNHCR with their mandates in the protection 
of children and of refugees respectively, NGOs and different government entities were involved, 
individually and collectively through working groups, in protection activities. 
Another important sector during 2009 was assessments. Given the changing conditions 
on the ground, many types of assessments to better understand the situation and to estimate the 
needs were carried out by the different organizations individually or jointly. These included 
assessments of food needs, of non-food needs, of the situation of returnees and people displaced 
by renewed conflicts, etc.  With the large population movements and the inadequacy of living 
conditions, disease outbreaks was one of the issues that the relief operation had to address in 
addition to the provision  of water and sanitation.  
Given the increasing number of actors during this period and also the number of agencies 
entrusted with coordination such as OCHA and the Resident Coordinator Support Office, in 
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addition to the presence of the Peace Keeping Mission (UNMIS) with its many sectors and Unit, 
coordination and the provision of common services was also an important sector where a large 
number of actors have interacted.  
With regards to locations and given that population movements were taking place in 
different parts of Southern Sudan, the whole of Southern Sudan was the most important location 
for the activities of the relief operation in 2009. It was followed by States such as Western and 
Central Equatoria, Jongeli, Upper Nile and Lakes States where violence was taking place either 
because of tribal conflicts or the activities of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA).  
6.3 REVISITING THE PROPOSITIONS 
The above discussion shows that the relief operation adapted to its environment at different 
points in time by changes and adjustments in all of the elements constituting the meta-network of 
actors, sectors and locations. Many new actors became part of the network while some dropped 
out. Sectors expanded to address new needs and to match the change of the nature of the relief 
operation from a short term food relief effort to a more comprehensive and diversified relief 
program addressing longer-term needs. Focus on locations changed on where the needs were 
more acute.   
The discussion also revealed that taking into consideration the sectors and locations 
networks in addition to the actors’ network, will clearly reveal how the relief operation has 
adapted to the changing condition of the emergency. During the twenty-year period covered by 
this study, the relief operation changed in nature, size and scope. In the process and through the 
interaction of the different actors among themselves and with their environment, the relief 
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operation has also played a major role in changing the environment in which it operated. The 
relief operation, by becoming a permanent actor in that environment and playing a major  role in 
the provision of services and in meeting the needs of the population, it was able to negotiate the 
rules of engagement and to change them with the objective of creating a more conducive 
environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
Looking at the locations, we find that the headquarters of the humanitarian agencies are 
mostly in the developed world, while their programs are implemented mainly in the developing 
countries (Stapleton et al., 2010a cited in Besiou et al, 2011 p. 79). Policy deliberations and 
decisions are made at a different level, both institutionally and geographically, from the 
operational decisions and actions. This multiplicity of levels confirms that the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework is indeed the suitable framework to study relief 
operations since it addresses these different levels of analysis as the headquarters level is the 
policy making level that sets the strategic direction of the agencies working in the field. The 
operational level is where the day to day operations take place based on the strategic direction 
provided by headquarters but also in response to the changing conditions of the emergency as 
well as in adaptation to the actions taken by other actors. It is worth mentioning that throughout 
the history of the operation, the physical environment and the different locations, where activities 
took place, presented the actors with a number of challenges, including accessibility, safety and 
security of the relief providers, the multiplicity of stakeholders working in a certain location in 
addition to the high levels of unpredictability of the whole situation.  
Revisiting the propositions made in Chapter Three, Table 6-5 below provides the findings 
of the study against the propositions:  
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Table 6-5: Propositions and Research Findings 
Proposition Research Finding 
The attributes of the individual actors:  
The larger the organization, the more varied its 
programs and activities, the more interactions 
it has with other organizations.  
The research findings confirm the proposition. 
During the three periods, the top ranked 
organizations as shown in Table 6-2 were the 
larger, well-funded organizations with more 
diverse programs and accordingly have many 
interactions with other actors. These include 
UNICEF, OLS, WFP, ICRC and NGOs 
collectively and individually. Other central 
organizations are the humanitarian wing of the 
political authorities, SRRA in 1998 and 
SSRRC in 2009.  Although these might not be 
large or well-funded organizations but because 
of their mandate as the government agencies 
responsible for the coordination of relief and 
rehabilitation activities, they tend to be central 
organizations with many interactions with the 
different actors.    
The longer the involvement of the organization 
in the relief effort in Sudan, the more repeated 
interactions and the better coordination it has 
with other organizations. 
 
This is true and confirmed by Tables 6-2 and 
6-4 on Top Ranked Organizations and Clique 
Membership Count respectively. The 
background information provided in the 
descriptive analysis presented in Chapter Four 
shows that the top-ranked organizations as 
revealed by the SNA are those which have 
been involved in the relief effort even prior to 
the start of the integrated, coordinated relief 
operation. Accordingly, they have already 
established relationships on which they were 
able to build during the integrated relief effort.  
 
The position of the different actors within the network 
The higher the frequency of interaction 
between an actor and other actors, the more 
central the position of an actor and the bigger 
the role the actor plays in communication and 
coordination.  
The more peripheral the position of an actor, 
the smaller the role it plays in coordination. 
This is confirmed by the results of the network 
analysis, which reveal that actors with more 
interactions are the actors occupying central 
positions and accordingly better able to play a 
significant role in communication, information 
sharing and coordination.  
The humanitarian actors and their environment are strongly interconnected 
The global structure of the operation has, to a 
large extent, been shaped by the interactions 
True. The dense local connections among the 
actors coupled with the low overall density of 
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among the different actors at the local level.  
 
the network defined the structure of the 
operation during the three periods in time. This 
structure is not formally defined like the 
structure of a typical hierarchical organization 
but has emerged from the interactions among 
the different actors and between the actors and 
their dynamic environment.   
 
Interaction between the actors and their 
environment led to changes both in the relief 
operation and in the environment. 
True and this is revealed by how the relief 
operation adapted to its changing environment 
and at the same time created changes in that 
environment. Examples are the separation of 
the relief operation into a Northern and a 
Southern Sector and the introduction of 
Ground Rules.  
External factors beyond the control of the organizations have a strong impact on the relief 
operation. 
The more stable the security situation and the 
less the intensity of fighting, the more the 
organizations are able to carry out their 
activities. 
 
True. The food crisis of 1998 was partly 
created by the unstable environment, the 
divisions among the SPLA and the 
intensification of fighting. This led to an 
aggravation of the situation and the inability of 
aid agencies to reach the populations in need.  
 
The more cooperative the relationship between 
the humanitarian agencies and the political and 
military authorities, the more secure is the 
humanitarian space. 
 
True. When the relationship is cooperative, it is 
easy for the humanitarian agencies to 
negotiation the humanitarian space and to 
ensure access to the populations in need. The 
initial establishment of OLS and the agreement 
between the Government of Sudan, the 
SPLM/A and the UN on ‘corridors of 
tranquility’ through which relief can be 
delivered to the population in need is an 
example of the cooperative relationship. 
The more restrictions imposed by political and 
military authorities, the more difficult it 
becomes for the humanitarian agencies to carry 
out their work. 
True. The flight restrictions of 1998 is a clear 
example how politically imposed restrictions 
can frustrate the efforts of the humanitarian 
agencies.   
The Relief operation evolved over time to create a better fit with its environment and the 
changing conditions of the emergency. 
 
The focus of the operation and its assistance 
programs changed overtime. 
 
True. As the environment changed, the relief 
operation changed and adapted overtime by 
changing the scope and focus of its programs. 
The relationship with the political and military 
authorities changed during the different stages 
True. The relationship of the relief operation 
and with the Government of Sudan and with 
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of the operation. 
 
the SPLM/A and the different factions that 
split from it went through different phases and 
change.  It fluctuated between being 
cooperative and uncooperative, and sometime 
antagonistic, based on a perceived association 
of the relief operation with one side of the 
conflict.  
New organizations with different mandates 
joined the relief effort reflecting the changing 
needs of the affected population.  
 
True. The changing meta-network in 1998 and 
2009 proves them. In 2009, in addition to the 
Government Institutions at the state and local 
level, local chiefs began to play a role in the 
overall operation.  Furthermore, UNMIS, other 
UN agencies such as UNHCR and some Inter-
governmental Organizations such as the IOM 
also became active members of the network. 
These actors were not part of the network 
before.  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The above discussion clearly shows that to understand how a relief operations is structured,  we 
need to view and model it, not as an isolated system, but as a meta-network and a complex 
adaptive system deeply embedded in its wider environment and impacted by events taking place 
at different levels. At the same time, the relief operation also shapes its environment through the 
interactions of its actors among themselves and with the wider environment. 
The descriptive analysis provided in Chapter Four in addition to the findings of the 
network analysis presented in Chapter Five confirm the propositions made earlier on the basis of 
the theoretical framework of the study.  
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7.0  CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY, ITS LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study analyzed the structure and evolution of relief operations through both a qualitative, 
exploratory case study of the relief operation in Southern Sudan and a quantitative Social 
Network Analysis of the relationships among the actors in the operation, and their evolution over 
time.  The first six chapters presented the problem statement, the theoretical framework, the 
methodology, the descriptive analysis of the case, the results of the social network analysis and 
the discussion of the findings. This chapter addresses the contribution of the study to the body of 
knowledge on relief operations, its implications for policy and practice and concludes with the 
limitations of the study and directions for further research.  
7.1 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Understanding relief operations is important since the number of emergencies and disasters in 
the world have been on the rise, affecting the lives of millions of people and costing billions of 
dollars in terms of the damage caused and also in terms of the official humanitarian assistance to 
respond to them as shown in Figure 7-1 below. The funding for relief operations has, in many 
instances, come at the expense of development assistance. As such, it is important to understand 
how relief operations are structured and how they operate so policies could be devised to 
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increase their effectiveness and to reduce any negative impact they might have.  In addition, the 
complexity of the humanitarian community, the multiplicity of the actors in any relief operation 
and their diversity, their different mandates and agendas call for a better understanding of the 
structure of relief operations and how they evolve in adaptation to the dynamic environments in 
which they operate. 
 
 
     Source: Webster, Mackinnon. & Walker, Peter. (2009, p. 5). 
 
Figure 7-1: Total Official Humanitarian Assistance Expenditure, 1990 – 2006 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, the literature on relief operations in complex humanitarian 
emergencies is mostly descriptive or evaluative and in many cases lacks solid theoretical 
foundations.  This study contributes to the body of knowledge on inter-organizational relief 
operations in the humanitarian sector by mapping, based on theoretical foundations, the complex 
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network that emerges in such relief operations. The research demonstrates the utility of social 
network analysis in studying relief operations, in understanding their structure and their 
evolution through time. The outcome of the study, which was guided by the research questions 
and grounded on the theoretical framework lied out in Chapter Two, is a detailed description of 
the relief operation in Southern Sudan spanning a period of 20 years with a focus on three 
important points in time. The case study contributes to our understanding of humanitarian relief 
operations as complex adaptive systems evolving through time and in response to changes in 
their environment. It also contributes to our understanding of inter-organizational coordination in 
relief operations. 
Analyzing the case through the lens of the IAD framework and Lewin’s Force Field 
Theory allowed for an understanding of the different levels of analysis at which relief operations 
are conceived, designed and implemented, in addition to an understanding of the multiple set of 
rules governing them and how the actors interact among themselves and with their environments 
under these rules and in the process modify both the rules and the environment.  Both the driving 
and restraining forces impacting the relief operations at its different stages were discussed. The 
policy making process and the decisions about the relief operation in Southern Sudan were 
taking place at different levels, institutionally and geographically, such as the UN Headquarters 
in New York, the capitals of the major donors and international NGO Headquarters in the US, 
Europe and Australia, the capitals of neighboring countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. 
At the local level, rules set by the military and political authorities, both on the Government side 
and the rebel movement side, as well as at the level of the different militias and armed groups, 
and obstacles imposed by the physical environment have all impacted the relief operation.   As 
such the main contribution of this study is in the application of the theoretical framework and the 
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social network analysis to a dynamic problem which allows for its understanding from different 
perspectives and at different levels taking into consideration all the factors impacting it.  
Another contribution of the study is a mapping of the structure of the relief operation and 
its evolution through time. Examining the relief operation in Southern Sudan at three points in 
time in a span of 20 years shows that the overall structure of the relief operation, which emerged 
from the complex interactions among the different actors under the constraints imposed by their 
environment, has not changed much although the situation on the ground has changed. The 
evolution and adaptation of the relief operation can be seen in the entry of new actors, the exit of 
some of the old actors, in changes in locations and focus sectors of operation but interestingly, 
the overall networked, horizontal-hierarchical structure, characterized by interdependency and 
flexibility, remained unchanged.   
Another contribution of the study is its analysis of the action arena in a holistic manner. 
In addition to studying the main participants, the relief providers, the analysis included other 
actors such as donors and political and military authorities, as well as the physical environment 
in which they interacted and the rules governing their interactions.  The different actors were 
motivated by their own mandates and agendas, which in many times run contrary to each other 
and create obstacles in delivering relief assistance to the populations in need. Examples of these 
obstacles were food diversion by warring factions and flight bans by the Government in 
Khartoum, which negatively impacted the delivery of food during acute famine. The physical 
environment posed challenges to the relief operation in terms of road conditions which limited 
accessibility to the people in needs, the recurring droughts and floods which aggravated the 
emergency and the limited local livelihood capacities because of the physical environment and 
the active fighting that was taking place. Using a complex adaptive system perspective allowed 
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for taking all these factors and their interactions into consideration as they have impacted the 
relief operation in one way or another. This allowed for a more comprehensive and rounded 
understanding of how the different elements impact each other and the overall operation.  
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
The long duration of the relief operation and its adaptation to the changing conditions of the 
emergency can be viewed both as a sign of its success and but also as a sign of its failure. It is a 
sign of success because the relief operation managed to stay the course, unlike the earlier 
integrated relief efforts that failed soon after their initiation, to continuously evolve and adapt to 
meet the diverse needs of the population it meant to serve. In the face of many obstacles and an 
uncooperative environment, the relief providers worked at multiple levels to carry out their 
mission and to reduce the suffering of those affected by conflict and famine.  It is also a sign of 
failure that the emergency continued for such a long time and the same crises that led to its 
establishment in the first place kept reoccurring.  Granted that these were caused by factors 
outside the control of the relief operation, yet as an emergent structure that has been in place for 
a long period of time and has taken roles beyond the provision of emergency relief assistance, 
the relief operation did not manage to put into place any measures that might prevent or reduce 
the impact of future food shortages.  Although the operation expanded into many sectors, it did 
not manage to sufficiently support the capacity of the local populations to withstand similar food 
shortages in the future. So one important policy implication is that long standing relief operations 
should also focus on preventive measures and building local capacity so that the population is 
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better able to face future food shortages. This will also have the added advantage of reducing 
dependency on relief assistance.   
One of the lessons learned is that, notwithstanding the utmost importance of relief 
assistance, yet it is not enough and the need for it can continue indefinitely if the root causes 
leading to the emergency are not addressed.  A second policy implication of this research is that 
the political and diplomatic effort to address the causes of the emergency should go hand in hand 
with the relief effort. The presence of a large, well-funded, multi-sectoral relief operation is not 
an excuse for actors at different levels and specifically at the policy-making level not to address 
the causes of the emergency. Donor Countries in particular, given their leverage, can play a 
major role exerting pressure on the warring parties to come to the negotiation table. The warring 
parties have depended on the relief operation to take care of the population while they continued 
fighting each other and making the emergency state even worse.    
The above two policy recommendations are not without challenges as they represent two 
of the hotly debated issues related to the provision of humanitarian aid in complex emergencies – 
one of them is the relief – development continuum and the other one is whether humanitarian 
action is to be mixed with political and diplomatic efforts that might compromise its neutrality 
and impartiality. At the same time, ignoring these two issues will contribute to the protraction of 
the state of emergency and the continuation of acute needs requiring relief assistance. As a result, 
the cycle will not be broken, the state of emergency becomes normalized and the presence of a 
relief operation become accepted not only as an “emergent structure” attempting “… to fulfill 
important societal functions made evident by an extreme event,” but more as part of the normal 
structure of society (Drabek & McEntire, 2002, p. 198).  
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The study findings on the structure of the relief operation and how coordination takes 
place illustrated the importance of interdependence, flexibility and horizontal ties between the 
actors.  The findings, which showed the relief network to be a ‘small world network’,  
underscored the importance of having a ‘critical mass’ of lead organizations that can manage 
communication and information sharing, undertake the coordination task and represent the other 
actors when dealing with military and political authorities. The local network of the core group 
of actors is very critical to the overall network and any changes that take place in this local 
network will have profound impact on the network as a whole. This fact has to be taken into 
consideration in the design of relief operations as tapping into the properties of this core network 
and its members and exploiting their strength, which derives from their privileged position 
within the overall network, will definitely lead to better communication and coordination among 
the different organizations participating in a relief operation.  A third policy implication, 
therefore, is that the command and control model of managing organizations does not work in 
the case of relief operations. Because of the participation of many diverse actors, each having 
multiple accountabilities to different bodies and bringing its own value added to the operation, 
successful coordination can only result from consensus, trust and mutual cooperation among the 
actors, who see the value in coordinating their effort. The role of the core group of actors in this 
decentralized structure is very important and has the potential, if adequately understood and 
utilized, for transforming relief operations into a more focused and functional program of 
collaborative action that may lead, not only to better assistance to the affected population, but 
also to reducing the conflict in the long run.  
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7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This research employed an exploratory case study methodology. Although this 
methodology is very useful and has its strength in explaining the specific case, understanding its 
intricacies, and revealing its structure as it emerges through the interactions of the different 
actors, yet one of its limitations is the lack of generalizability or external validity, since it is 
context specific and there is no control of the influences of the various contextual and situational 
factors.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, the relief operation in Southern Sudan is both an 
instrumental and intrinsic case study. It is instrumental because it represents a class of 
multiorganizational networks responding to complex humanitarian emergencies that have been 
on the increase since the 1980s. Understanding this case within the boundaries of the theoretical 
framework of the study will help in understanding other cases of relief operations. The case is 
also intrinsic because it is unique in many respects. Even before the beginning of the coordinated 
provision of emergency relief assistance, many of the UN agencies and NGOs, both national and 
international, have been working individually and jointly in providing relief on a much smaller 
scale in different parts of Sudan including the South. This is why, when the coordinated relief 
effort started in 1989, many organizations found it easier to work together because they already 
have established relationships. One of the unique features of the operation is its very long 
duration and its continuation beyond the conflict period and into the post-conflict era.  This long 
duration offers the advantage of studying the same relief operation over a long period of time and 
under different conditions and understanding how it evolved and adapted. Another two 
interrelated features of the uniqueness of the relief operation is its independence from the central 
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government in Khartoum and its cross-border nature. With the separation of the Northern and 
Southern Sectors of OLS, the organizations working in Southern Sudan operated in close 
coordination with the SRRA, the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, which was in control of 
large areas in Southern Sudan.  The overall relief operation in the South was managed from 
Kenya (Nairobi and Lockichoggio), which was the operational hub of the relief operation until 
the peace agreement was signed in 2005.  
Although the case study is unique and the findings may not be generalizable to other 
relief operations, in the sense of generalizing from a sample to populations or universes, yet the 
framework of analysis, which is one of the main contributions of this study, can be applied to 
other relief operations in different contexts. Insights gained from the study of the relief operation 
will allow for analytic and theoretical generalization (Firestone 1993 cited in Matthew & 
Huberman, 1994; Flick et al., 2004, Yin 1994). 
Another limitation of the study is the data used in the social network analysis. A 
comprehensive data collection tool covering all aspects of the relationship between the actors in 
a relief operation was developed at the earlier stages of this study. Several attempts to collect 
first hand data for the network analysis were unsuccessful and the response rate was very low.  
This is why the network analysis was mainly based on situation reports and archival records.  
The limitation with documentary records is that they only give a snapshot of the relief operation 
at a certain point of time and do not reflect all aspects of the operation. In addition they cover the 
organizations and actors who are willing to report their activities or those whose actions were 
impacting other actors reporting their activities. This limitation is what Tellis (1997) refers to as 
“reporting bias”.  Accordingly, the study makes no claim to covering the overall set of actors 
who took part in the relief effort in Southern Sudan and acknowledges that there are a number of 
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NGOs, both national and international, which were not part of OLS but has played a major role 
in the relief effort but because of data limitations are not covered in this study.   
7.4 DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The limitations outlined in the previous section constitute the starting point for future research. 
One way to advance future research is to have comparative studies of relief operations in 
complex emergencies in different contexts and see if they reveal similar structural features and 
characteristics.  The findings from such studies will provide information on which structure fits 
which context and can inform the design of relief operations taking place in different contexts. 
The network analysis in this study has mainly covered the relief operation operating at 
the field level where the actual provision of relief assistance was taking place. Future studies can 
investigate  the broader network  at different levels of analysis, for example at the constitutional 
choice level of decision making to understand how actors at the higher policy level interact and 
make decisions that are then translated into day to day work at the operational level in the field.  
The persistence of the emergency for decades and the re-occurrence of famines and food 
shortages in Southern Sudan in the presence of a long- and well- established relief operation, 
actively providing humanitarian assistance, in a serious cause for concern. It brings into focus the 
criticisms against humanitarian aid that in its provision, the international community treats 
humanitarian emergencies as short-term crises and at the same time, it neglects to foster a 
political dialogue that may eventually lead to addressing the causes of the emergency (Duffield, 
1994; Goodman & Hulme, 1999; MacFarlane, 2000; Natsios, 1997; Rieff, 2002). Future research 
can expand into how relief operations can be designed in such a way so that while saving lives 
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and responding to the immediate needs resulting from an emergency, they can also play a role in 
preventing future emergencies by using the leverage of central and powerful actors to encourage 
negotiations among the belligerents and to address the root causes of the emergency.  
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APPENDIX A  
ACRONYMS, NAMES AND TYPES OF ACTORS/ORGANIZATIONS 
S/N Acronym  Name of Actor/Organization Type 
1 a/s AWAD/SAAD trucks private sector 
2 aah Aktion Afrika Hilfi International NGO 
3 aah-usa Action Against Hunger-USA International NGO 
4 ab Arrow Boys Armed Group 
5 acf-f Action Contra La Faim-France International NGO 
6 across Association of  Christian Resource 
Organizations Serving Sudan  
International NGO 
7 adra Adventist Relief and Development 
Agency 
International NGO 
8 ag Armed group armed group 
9 ami Aide Medical International International NGO 
10 amref African Medical Research 
Foundation 
International NGO 
11 anla-team Annual Needs and Livelihoods 
Assessment Team 
Mixed  
12 arc American Refugee Committee International NGO 
13 asa Agricultural Sector Agencies Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
14 asmt Area Security Management Team UN team  
15 aus Government of Australia Donor 
16 be Government of Belgium Donor 
17 ca Government of Canada Donor 
18 caa Change Agency Association Community based 
Organization 
19 caa Community Aid Abroad (Oxfam-
Australia) 
International NGO 
20 caaph Community Action Against Poverty 
and HIV/AIDS  
Community based 
Organization 
 214 
21 cac County Aids Commissions County Government 
22 card Community Agency for Research and 
Development 
Community based 
Organization 
23 care CARE International NGO 
24 caritas Caritas International NGO 
25 cart Combined Action Relief Team consortium of INGOs & 
NNGOs 
26 cbahws Community Based Animal Health 
Workers 
Civil Society Organization 
27 cbo-akobo Christian Brothers Community based 
Organization 
28 cbo-akobo Community Based Organization-
Akobo 
Community based 
Organization 
29 cc Catholic Church Civil Society Organization 
30 ccc-a County Commission-Akobo County Government 
31 ccc-ezo County Comission-Ezo County Government 
32 ccc-n County Commission-Nasir  County Government 
33 ccc-te County Commissioner-Twic East County Government 
34 ccm Comitato Collaborazione Medica International NGO 
35 ccs County Commissions County Government 
36 cdc-us Center for Disease Control-US Donor  
37 cdot Catholic Diocese of Torit Civil Society Organization 
38 chd County Health Department County Government 
39 chf CHF International International NGO 
40 chorm Child Hope Restoration Mission National NGO 
41 cma Christian Mission Aid International NGO 
42 cmcm Christ Mission Continuous Ministries National NGO 
43 compass COMPASS Community based 
Organization 
44 concern Concern International NGO 
45 coopi Cooperazione Internazionale International NGO 
46 cosv Coordinating Committee for 
Voluntary Service 
International NGO 
47 cpg Child Protection Group  Mixed (Government, UN, 
ICRC) 
48 crada Christian Relief and Development 
Agency 
National NGO 
49 crs Catholic Relief Services International NGO 
50 cws Church World Service International NGO 
51 dc Donor Community Donor 
52 dcv German Caritas International NGO 
53 dgsc-goss Directorate for Gender and Social 
Change-GoSS 
Regional Government 
54 dk Government of Denmark Donor 
55 docs Department of Correctional Services Regional Government 
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56 docw-mosd Department of Child Welfare-MoSD Regional Government 
57 dot Diocese of Torit National NGO 
58 drc Danish Refugee Council International NGO 
59 drc Democratic Republic of Congo Neighboring Government 
60 drco Drug Committee Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
61 drwss Department of Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation 
Regional Government 
62 echo European Community Humanitarian 
Office 
Donor 
63 ecs/sudra Episcopal Church of the Sudan 
Sudanese Development and Relief 
Agency 
National NGO 
64 eec European Economic Commission Donor 
65 eg Government of Egypt Neighboring Government 
66 emb-sd-ke Embassy of the Republic of Sudan-
Kenya 
Diplomatic 
Representation 
67 eoj Embassy of Japan Donor  
68 ep&r-tf Emergency Preparedness and 
Response task force 
Mixed 
69 ert Emergency Response Team  Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
70 ert-bor Emergency Response Team-Bor Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
71 esc Educational Sub-committee Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
72 et Government of Ethiopia Neighboring Government 
73 fao Food and Agriculture Organization  International Organization 
(UN) 
74 fews Famine Early Warning System 
Network 
Network 
75 fin Government of Finland Donor 
76 finc Finland Committee Donor 
77 fo The French Organization International NGO 
78 fr Government of France  Donor 
79 frc France Committee Donor 
80 gaa German Agro Action International NGO 
81 ged Germany Emergency Doctors International NGO 
82 gnc Greek National Committee Donor 
83 goal Goal International NGO 
84 gok Government of Kenya Neighboring Government 
85 gonu Government of National Unity National Government 
86 gos Government of Sudan National Government 
87 goss Government of Southern Sudan Regional Government 
88 gou Government of Uganda Neighboring Government 
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89 gr Government of Germany/FRG Donor 
90 grc Germany Committee Donor 
91 gs-ees State Government-East Equatoria 
State  
State Government  
92 gwep-cc Guinea Worm Eradication program-
Carter Center 
International NGO 
93 ha Humanitarian Agencies Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
94 hcf Humanitarian Coordination Forum Mixed  
95 hcp Health Sector Partners Civil Society Organization 
96 hhfs Household Food Security Sector Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
97 hi Handicap International  International NGO 
98 hiv/aids-goss HIV/AIDS Commission - GoSS Regional Government 
99 hmc High Ministerial Committee National Government 
100 iaat Interagency Assessment Team Mixed 
101 ias International Aid Services International NGO 
102 icc International Criminal Court International Organization 
103 icrc International Committee for the Red 
Cross 
International Organization 
104 ifad UN International Fund for 
Agricultural Development 
International Organization 
(UN) 
105 igad Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development 
Regional Organization 
106 imc International Medical Corps International NGO 
107 interact Action by Churches Together 
International 
International NGO 
108 interaid INTERAID International  International NGO 
109 iom International Organization of 
Migration 
International Organization 
(UN) 
110 ipch-jp International Peace Cooperation 
Headquarters-Japan 
Donor 
111 ipcs Institute for the Promotion of Civil 
Society 
International NGO 
112 irc International Rescue Committee International NGO 
113 it Government of Italy  Donor 
114 jen JEN International NGO 
115 j-goss Judiciary-GoSS Regional Government 
116 jica Japan International Cooperation 
Agency 
Donor 
117 jiu Joint Integrated Units Peacekeeping Mission 
118 jp Government of Japan Donor 
119 jpnc Japan National Committee Donor 
120 jrs Jesuit Refugee Services/USA International NGO 
121 jtf Joint Task Force  Mixed (OLS, SRRA & 
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SPLM) 
122 la Local Authorities political, military 
authority 
123 lc Local chiefs Community Authority 
124 lca The Loving Club Association Community based 
Organization 
125 lcp Local counterparts Civil Society Organization 
126 lra Lord's Resistance Army Militia  
127 lwf Lutheran World Federation International NGO 
128 maf-goss Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry-
GoSS 
Regional Government 
129 mca Ministry of Civil Aviation National Government 
130 mcc Memmonite Central Committee International NGO 
131 m-con Malaria Consortium International NGO 
132 mdm Medicins du Monde  International NGO 
133 mdra Mundri Relief and Development 
Association 
National NGO 
134 medair MEDAIR International NGO 
135 media  Media  International Media 
136 medic MEDIC International NGO 
137 merlin Merlin International NGO 
138 mest-goss Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology-GoSS 
Regional Government 
139 mest-wes State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology-WES 
State Government  
140 mi Malteser International  International NGO 
141 moh-goss Ministry of Health-GoSS Regional Government 
142 moh-wbegz State Ministry of Health-Western 
Bahr el Ghazal 
State Government  
143 monuc UN Mission DR Congo Peacekeeping Mission 
144 mopa-goss Ministry of Presidential Affairs - 
GoSS 
Regional Government 
145 mophi-goss Ministry of Physical Infrastructure-
GoSS 
Regional Government 
146 mosd-goss Ministry of Social Development-
GoSS 
Regional Government 
147 mosd-js State Ministry of Social Development 
- Jonglei State 
State Government  
148 mosd-un State Ministry of Social Development 
- Upper Nile 
State Government  
149 mosd-wbgs State Ministry of Social 
Development-Western Bahr El 
Ghazal 
State Government  
150 motr-goss Ministry of Transport and Roads-
GoSS 
Regional Government 
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151 msa Maridi Service Agency Community based 
Organization 
152 msf-b Medicins sans Frontiers-Belgium  International NGO 
153 msf-ch Medicins sans Frontiers-Switzerland International NGO 
154 msf-f medicins sans frontiers-France  International NGO 
155 msf-h medicins sans frontiers-Holland International NGO 
156 msf-int medicins sans frontiers-International International NGO 
157 msf-sp Medicins Sans Frontiers-Spain International NGO 
158 mt-i MineTech International  Private Sector 
159 nba Nairobi-based agencies Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
160 nca Norwegian Church Aid International NGO 
161 ncp National Congress Party political Party 
162 nfi&ess NFI & Emergency Shelter Sector Mixed 
163 ngo National NGO National NGO 
164 ngos Non-Governmental Organizations NGO 
165 ngo-sc-ss NGO Secretariat in Southern Sudan consortium of INGOs & 
NNGOs 
166 ngos-ns Nutrition Sector NGOs NGO 
167 nhdf Nile Hope Development Forum National NGO 
168 nl Government of Netherlands Donor 
169 nlc Netherlands Committee Donor 
170 nor Government of Norway Donor 
171 npa Norwegian People Aid International NGO 
172 nrc Norwegian Refugee Council  International NGO 
173 nrrds Nuba Relief and Rehabilitation and 
Development Society  
National NGO 
174 nscc New Sudan Council of Churches National NGO 
175 ocha-erp OCHA Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Unit 
International Organization 
(UN) 
 
176 
ols Operation Lifeline Sudan Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
177 ols-loki Operation Lifeline Sudan-
Lokichoggio 
Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
178 ols-nbo Operation Lifeline Sudan-Nairobi Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
179 olsngos OLS NGOs NGO 
180 olsns OLS Northern Sector Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
181 olsss OLS Southern Sector Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
182 op-goss Office of the President-Goss Regional Government 
183 ovci OVCI International NGO 
184 oxfam-gb Oxfam-GB International NGO 
185 oxfam-us OXFAM-US International NGO 
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186 pc Private contributors  Donor 
187 pc-goss Police Commission-GoSS Regional Government 
188 pp Private Parties Private Sector 
189 prisons Prisons Department Regional Government 
190 pu Porters' Union Civil Society Organization 
191 r&hc Office of the UN Resident and 
Humanitarian Coordinator 
International Organization 
(UN) 
 
192 
rass Relief Association for Southern 
Sudan 
International NGO 
193 rb Radda Barnen International NGO 
194 ri Relief International International NGO 
195 rrc Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission 
National Humanitarian 
Agency 
196 rru Railroad workers Union  Civil Society Organization 
197 sa State Authorities State Government  
198 said Sudanaid National NGO 
199 sair Safari Air Private Sector  
200 salf Standard Action Liaison Focus Civil Society Organization 
201 sat Southern Air Transport private sector 
202 sc Civil Society Civil Society Organization 
203 sc Save the Children  International NGO 
204 scc Sudan Council of Churches  National NGO 
205 scfuk Save the Children Fund - UK International NGO 
206 sc-us Save the Children -US International NGO 
207 SDCF Inter-Donor Coordinating Forum Donor Coordination 
Mechanism 
208 sfm Swedish Free Mission International NGO 
209 sg-js State Government-Jonglei State State Government  
210 sg-nbeg State Government-Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal 
State Government  
211 sg-up State Government- Upper Nile   State Government  
212 sg-wes State Government-Western Equatoria 
State 
State Government  
213 sg-wes State Government-Western Equatoria 
State 
State Government  
214 sg-ws State Government-Warrap State State Government  
215 sidf Sudan Inland Development Fund Community based 
Organization 
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sim-m SIM-Maban Community based 
Organization 
217 sma Sudan Meteorological Authority National Government 
218 smest-ces State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology-CES 
State Government  
219 smest-ees State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology --EES 
State Government  
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220 smest-ls State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology -Lakes 
State Government  
221 smest-nbeg State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology-NBeG 
State Government  
222 smest-wbegs State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology - wbeg  
State Government  
223 smest-ws State Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology --Warrap  
State Government  
224 smoag State Ministries of Agriculture State Government  
225 SMoH-ces State Ministry of Health-Central 
Equatoria 
State Government  
226 smoh-ees State Ministry of Health-Eastern 
Equatoria 
State Government  
227 smoh-js State Ministry of Health-Jonglei State Government  
228 smoh-ls State Ministry of Health-Lakes State Government  
229 smoh-nbeg State Ministry of Health-Northern 
Bahr El Ghazal 
State Government  
230 smoh-uns State Ministry of Health-Upper Nile State Government  
231 smoh-us State Ministry of Health-Unity State Government  
232 smoh-wes State Ministry of Health-West 
Equatoria 
State Government  
233 smopi-nbeg State Ministry of Physical 
Infrastructure-NBeG 
State Government  
234 smopi-wbeg State Ministry of Physical 
Infrastructure-WBeG 
State Government  
235 smopi-ws State Ministry of Physical 
Infrastructure-Warrap 
State Government  
236 smosd-ls State Ministry of Social 
Development-Lakes State 
State Government  
237 smosd-us State Ministry of Social 
Development-Unity State 
State Government  
238 smosd-wes State Ministry of Social 
Development-WES 
State Government  
239 smsoh State Ministries of Health State Government  
240 sp Samaritan's Purse International NGO 
241 spla Sudan People Liberation Army Rebel Army 
242 splm Sudan People Liberation Movement Rebel Movement 
243 src Sudan Red Crescent National NGO 
244 srra Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association 
Rebel Humanitarian 
agency 
 
245 
srrwg States Return and Reintegration 
Working Groups 
Mixed 
246 sscc Southern Sudan Census Commission Regional Government 
247 ssdc Southern Sudan De-mining 
Commission 
Regional Government 
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248 ssddrc Southern Sudan DDR Commission Regional Government 
249 ssdo Southern Sudan Development 
Organization 
National NGO 
250 ssla South Sudan Legislative Assembly   Regional Government 
251 ssrrc South Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission 
Regional Government 
252 ssrrc-wes South Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission-West 
Equatoria State 
State Government  
253 suha Sudan Health Association National NGO 
254 supraid Sudan Protection Aid National NGO 
255 sw Government of Sweden Donor 
256 swiss Government of Switzerland Donor 
257 tcrc Totto Chan Rehabilitation Center Civil Society Organization 
258 tf Tear Fund International NGO 
259 uae United Arab Emirates Donor 
260 ucdc Unity Cultural Development Center Community based 
Organization 
261 uk Government of United Kingdom Donor 
262 un United Nations  International Organization 
(UN) 
263 una United Nations Agencies International Organization 
(UN) 
264 unct-ss UN Country Team - South Sudan UN team  
265 undp United Nations Development 
Program  
International Organization 
(UN) 
266 undp-rol UNDP Rule of Law  International Organization 
(UN) 
267 undss UN Department of Safety and 
Security 
International Organization 
(UN) 
268 unhas UN Humanitarian Air Services International Organization 
(UN) 
269 unhcr UN High Commission for Refugees International Organization 
(UN) 
270 unhcr-car UNHCR-Central African Republic International Organization 
(UN) 
271 unhcr-eg UNHCR-Egypt International Organization 
(UN) 
272 unhcr-et UNHCR-Ethiopia International Organization 
(UN) 
273 unhcr-ke UNHCR-Kenya International Organization 
(UN) 
274 unicef United Nations Children's Fund International Organization 
(UN) 
275 unicef/esaro UNICEF/Eastern & Southern African International Organization 
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Regional Office (UN) 
276 unicef/olsls UNICEF/OLS Livestock section Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
277 unicef-ke UNICEF-Kenya International Organization 
(UN) 
278 unicef-ns UNICEF Northern sector International Organization 
(UN) 
279 unicef-ss UNICEF Southern Sector International Organization 
(UN) 
280 unicef-ug UNICEF-Uganda International Organization 
(UN) 
281 unjlc UN Joint Logistics Centre UN Common Service 
Facility 
282 unmis  UN Mission in Sudan Peacekeeping Mission 
283 unmis-ca UNMIS Civil Affairs Peacekeeping Mission 
284 unmis-pf UNMIS-Protection Force Peacekeeping Mission 
285 unmis-phr UNMIS Proctection and Human 
Rights team 
Peacekeeping Mission 
286 unmis-rrr UNMIS Return,Reintegration and 
Recovery Section 
Peacekeeping Mission 
287 unocha UN Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
International Organization 
(UN) 
288 unpol UNMIS Police Component Peacekeeping Mission 
289 unrcso UN Resident Coordinator Support 
Office 
International Organization 
(UN) 
290 un-w United Nations-Water International Organization 
(UN) 
291 updf Ugandan People's Defence Forces Neighboring Country 
(Army) 
292 usa Government of United States of 
America 
Donor 
293 usaid United States Agency for 
International Development  
Donor 
294 uscong US Congress Donor 
295 usratuna Usratuna International NGO 
296 ussr Soviets Donor 
297 vfc Voice for Change National NGO 
298 vsf-b Veterinaires sans Frontieres (VSF) - 
Belgium  
International NGO 
299 vsf-ch Veterinaires sans Frontieres (VSF) - 
Switzerland 
International NGO 
300 vsf-g Veterinaires sans Frontieres (VSF) - 
Germany 
International NGO 
301 wash-partners Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
Partners 
Mixed 
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302 wb-juba World Bank Office in Juba Donor 
303 wc War Child International NGO 
304 wes-a WES agencies Mixed (UN agencies and 
NGOs) 
305 wfp World Food Program  International Organization 
(UN) 
306 wfp-drc World Food Program-DRC International Organization 
(UN) 
307 wfp-par WFP partners mixed 
308 wg Women's Groups Civil Society Organization 
309 wgp Working Group Mixed (UN, NGOs, 
SRRA, donor) 
310 who World Health Organization International Organization 
(UN) 
311 ws-ces Water and Sanitation Department - 
Central Equatoria State 
State Government  
312 ws-ees Water and Sanitation Department - 
Eastern Equatoria State 
State Government  
313 ws-wes Water and Sanitation Department - 
Western Equatoria State 
State Government  
314 wv World Vision International NGO 
315 wvs World Vision Sudan National NGO 
316 ymca YMCA International NGO 
317 ywca Young Women Christian Association National NGO 
318 zrc Zoa Refugee Care  International NGO 
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